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INTRODUCTION
The expansion of constitutionalism in the contemporary world is one of
the most important evidences of the overwhelming success of the doctrine
of "dtat de droit," which means the legal state or the state established and
operating according to law. The concepts of constitutionalism and "6tat de
droit" have mutually enhanced each other.' The doctrine of constitu-
tionalism grew out of the idea of limited government protecting individual
rights and freedoms. The doctrine of the legal state stemmed from the
concept that appropriate judicial mechanisms must be provided to ensure that
individuals act within the framework of the law and that hierarchically
organized organs of power not only observe law but operate exclusively on
the basis of law. The constitution, recognized as the apex of hierarchically
structured laws, was to provide a clear background for the assessment of
legality of governmental and individual activities.
The acknowledgement of the complementary character of the ideas of "tat
de droit" and constitutional government accelerated the development of
constitutional engineering. The consciousness that every mature state, well-
organized according to the rule of law, should clearly determine in one act
or a series of basic acts the principles of the political, social and economic
organization of the state, the powers and duties of state organs, and certain
rights of the people contributed to the recent rapid emission of new
constitutions.
Since World War II a large number of countries either adopted new
constitutions or revamped their existing constitutional systems. Constitution-
making intensified with the emergence of the socialist countries and the new
states of the Third World. Since 1945 more than half of the member states
of the United Nations have undertaken some kind of fundamental constitu-
tional reform.2 The post-war constitutional experiences were, however, for
'See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, JUDICIAL REvIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 7-42 (1989)
[hereinafter JuDIcIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW].
2 As Albert P. Blaustein pointed out,
Of the world's 162 existing constitutions (approximately 20 of which are
presently 'suspended') only 15 were promulgated prior to World War II
and only 14 more date from before 1960. The pre-war constitutions are
United States (1789), Norway (1814), Belgium (1831), Liberia (1847
suspended), Argentina (1853), Luxembourg (1868), Switzerland (1874),
Columbia (1886), Australia (1901), Mexico (1917), Finland (1919),
Austria (1920), Liechtenstein (1921), Lebanon (1926 inoperative), and
1993]
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the most part, dissatisfying. Without the extra-parliamentary means of
constitutional control, the constitutions of the socialist countries operated
more like political-philosophical declarations than legally binding norms.
Most of the constitutions of the new third world countries were copied from
previous, well-tested constitutional structures without regard to their
applicability to the unique geopolitical circumstances in which the new states
had emerged. The successes of these new constitutional systems were short-
lived. The political structures of the countries that emerged due to the
collapse of colonialism during the 1950s and 1960s were subject to frequent
and substantial transformation which, contrary to popular expectations,
usually resulted in the establishment of a form of military government.3
In the last few years the demand for new constitutions has become even
more pronounced. With several East-Central European countries already
drafting new constitutions and fifteen former Soviet republics likely to
follow, the region has become a major laboratory of constitutional works.
Bulgaria, Estonia and Romania adopted entirely new constitutions.
Amendments introduced to the Hungarian and Polish Constitutions purged
these acts almost entirely of the remnants of their Stalinist legacy. The
Albanians and recently the Lithuanians requested Western assistance in their
constitution-drafting process. In the early Spring of 1992 Russian legislators
visited Washington and were followed by law-makers from Ukraine, Belarus,
Armenia, Kirghizistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
If several countries of the same region try to conclude constitution drafting
one has to be aware of the comparative dimension of this process. Constitu-
tions do not emerge in a political vacuum. Countries borrow from each
other and during transitional periods, when new political entities are
emerging, borrow heavily. This natural tendency to borrow, however, raises
several questions: How to accommodate the well-tested constitutional
models in the countries with different political traditions? To what extent
the constitutional experiences of certain countries are reproducible in quite
different geopolitical circumstances?
Ireland (1937).
A. BLAUSTEIN, THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD, 33 n.25
(1986).
3 See Ludwikowski, The Beginning of the Constitutional Era: A Bicentennial
Comparative Study of the American and French Constitutions, 11 MICH. J. OF INT'L L. 167
(1989).
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Conflict always accompanies change and as the process of constitution-
drafting began to unfold many challenges arose. As the new democracies
began writing their constitutions numerous Western experts jumped into the
fray and headed East. Think-tanks, law firms, law schools, and independent
scholars offered services and advice. They confronted East-Central European
constitutional drafters unaccustomed to thinking about ideas such as division
of powers, judicial review, or the "dtat de droit" in terms of fundamental
constitutional principles. To the surprise of the Western experts, venerated
constitutional models advocated by them were neither enthusiastically
welcomed in East-Central Europe, nor automatically recognized as superior
to the socialist constitutional institutions. A post-socialist lawyer was
inclined to believe that the issue of superiority or inferiority is beside the
point and he wished rather to focus on the applicability of Western models
to the unique situation of post-communist Europe. Failure to take this
attitude into account had to result in misunderstanding and problems in
communication.
Some initiatives, such as the American Bar Association's Central and East
European Law Initiative (CEELI) workshops,4 were carefully prepared in
cooperation with constitutional drafting commissions from numerous East-
Central European countries and proved effective. Ventures advocating blind
application of Western models provoked critical comments from numerous
European constitutional experts. For example, since the process of
constitution writing has been initiated, it became clear that the readiness of
the new democracies to borrow from the Western experience has its limits
4 The Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI), a project of the American Bar
Association, is a cooperative effort to facilitate the process of legal transformation in East-
Central Europe. CEELI is administered within the ABA's Section of International Law and
Practice.
A premise of this project is "making available U.S. legal expertise and assistance to
countries that are in the process of modifying or restructuring their laws or legal systems. It
is also serving as a research forum and a source of timely information on legal projects and
legal developments in Central and Eastern Europe." Although the main purpose of the project
is to offer U.S. legal experience it recognizes that it is just one approach that participating
countries may wish to consider. CEELI is designed to operate as a public service project, not
a device for developing business opportunities. CEELI offers its services through a variety
of legal workshops and conferences, runs a special "Sister Law School" exchange program,
publishes newsletters and "Legal Guides to Doing Business". For more information on
CEELI see the American Bar Association's programmatic brochure "Central and East
European Law Initiative. An American Bar Association Initiative for Law Reform and
Comparative Law," Dec. 1, 1990.
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and that these countries wish to declare their social orientation and
emphasize the need for the state's protection over the weaker social groups.
To a socialist lawyer, both the common and civil law systems were subject
to criticism because they protected establishments insensitive to social and
economic unfairness.
The failure to recognize that the new democracies had their own legal
experiences before they became socialist states also contributed to the clashes
between Western and Eastern legal traditions. The constitutional histories
of several Eastern European countries date only from the turn of the century
while other countries of this region have an impressive constitutional legacy
to follow. 5  Constitutional experts must consider to what extent the
longevity of the pre-socialist constitutional experience would effect the
maturity of the new constitutional drafts.
Constitutional drafters also must decide whether the main purpose of the
new constitution is to abolish the socialist legal system or to substitute a new
legal order. As constitution-making has profound consequences, the drafters
must also address the question of whether the new constitutions are expected
to last for decades or are to serve only as an interim device for a transitory
period.
Several factors have guided the development of this article. The author
was fortunate to be involved in several constitutional workshops and had an
opportunity to review and assess numerous draft constitutions prepared both
by the former Soviet republics and the new East-European democracies.
These works proved that during the recent stage of constitutional develop-
ment in East-Central Europe remarkable similarities and differences exist in
the constitutional works of several countries of this region. Are these
similarities, however, strong enough to justify a thesis on a new constitution-
al model emerging in the area of former Soviet dominance? The examination
of this question is the primary aim of this article.
This article was preceded by the study, Searching for a New Constitutional
Model for East-Central Europe, published in 1991, which analyzed the
' For example, the first Polish constitution dates to 1791, right after the American
constitution, and four months before the first written French constitution. Bulgarians, for
instance, adopted their first constitution in 1879. Praised as one of the most democratic in
Europe, it was suspended within five years. However, Bulgaria is now at the forefront of
adopting certain constitutional priorities, such as the concepts of division of powers and
judicial review.
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historical background for constitutional reform in East-Central Europe.6 The
study focused on the constitutional development in the Soviet Union in the
glasnost era and in the two Central European countries most advanced in the
process of constitutional transformation, Poland and Hungary. This article
focuses on current developments in the new European democracies and the
several former Soviet republics. The author's purpose is not to add another
article to the numerous elaborate theoretical explanations of the well-known
historical events. Instead, the following remarks will be a straight-forward
report on political transformation of the post-glasnost era with a clear
emphasis on constitutional works.
The article consists of two parts. The first is the update of constitutional
transformation in the region experiencing the retreat from communism. The
organization of this part requires some explanation. The part breaks down
into two separate chapters on constitution-drafting in former Soviet Republics
and in the new democracies of East-Central Europe. As the former Soviet
republics existed within the same statehood until the end of 1991, it seemed
appropriate to assemble comments on political developments in the former
U.S.S.R in one subchapter examining the end of Gorbachev's era and the
process of the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
The country-by-country discussion which follows is limited to the examina-
tion of the process of constitutional-drafting in several former Soviet
Republics. The comments on the constitutional drafts were organized around
several more important issues such as the distribution of powers, the
inclination to adopt features of presidential or parliamentary systems,
constitutional enforcement, and the flexibility of the constitutional provisions.
The subchapter on Constitution Drafting in Former Socialist States of
East-Central Europe has a slightly different organization. It focuses
exclusively on individual countries of post-socialist Europe with the
exception of Yugoslavia where the unstable political situation at the time of
this writing does not allow any mature evaluation of a future constitutional
system. With all similarities linked to common socialist legacies, the former
European Peoples Democracies each had their own statehood and more
recently have faced different cultural, religious, economic and ethnic
problems. It seemed more appropriate to examine their post-communist
traumas separately. Thus, each country-by-country section of this subchapter
splits into a short report on political developments and a commentary on the
6 Rett R. Ludwikowski, Searching for a New Constitutional Model for East-Central
Europe, 17 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 91 (1991) [hereinafter Ludwikowski].
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process of constitution-drafting.
The reader who is looking for an explanation of the references made in
Part I to French, German or other constitutional models will find them
presented in Part II on a more detailed basis. Being more theoretical than
Part I of the article, Part II reviews the major constitutional controversies of
the post-communist world against the background of deeply-rooted Western
constitutional ideas. The primary aim of the second part of this article is to
analyze the fabric of the new constitutions. This part focuses on the issues
which proved to be most controversial during the process of constitution-
drafting in East-Central Europe, such as the description of the state in
economic, political and cultural terms; the selection of the form of govern-
ment; the concepts of the division of powers; the review of the constitution-
ality of laws; and the idea of a constitution being rigid or flexible. Although
a long and exhaustive bill of rights can be found in all new constitutions and
constitutional drafts, a more detailed analysis has to be based on the
examination of the actual record of these countries in human rights
protection. This task was left for a separate study. Finally, based on the
information collected from the country-by-country reports, Part II also
supplies observations on the process of forming a new constitutional model
in the region of former communist dominance.
I. POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTION TRANSFORMATION OF THE
POST-GLASNOST PERIOD: COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORT.
A. The End of Gorbachev's Era
Among the problems faced by Gorbachev at the end of his presidency
none was more compelling than the future of the Union of Sovereign Soviet
Republics. The largest country on earth was disintegrating and both
Gorbachev's supporters and his opponents had to consider what might
remain of the former Soviet empire. Was the Union descending into chaos?
Was there anyone who could and really wanted to save it?
The Union Treaty, proposed by Gorbachev at the end of November 1990,'
was the last desperate move to preserve both the structure of the centralized
state and his own position.' However, with the power slipping out of
7 Id. at 145-147.
' See Jeff Trimble, Douglas Stanglin, Julie Corwin, Death of a Nation: The Last Hurrah,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 19, 1990, at 37.
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Gorbachev's hands the future of a centralized union built largely on military
and ideological control was doomed. The concept of the Union was soon to
be replaced by the idea of a loose, voluntary confederation of independent
states. The concept of a commonwealth or confederation, favored by
Yeltsin, became a crucial issue in his dialogue with the Kremlin.
In fact, both Gorbachev and Yeltsin did not seem to fully understand
either the ethnic and religious animosities or the hardships which were
tearing the disintegrating empire into pieces. Gorbachev did not believe that
the Soviet people would be ungrateful for his policies of "glasnost" and
"perestroika." Despite all its devastating side-effects on the communist
regime, Gorbachev's strategy was still projected as a conservative revolution
which was intended to restore rather than undermine the framework of
communist power.9 On the one hand, he still was not ready to renounce the
communist party and the communist future for the falling empire, and on the
other hand, he did not want to admit that the Kremlin lacked the power to
control the centralized state.
Yeltsin, on his part, failed to realize that economic interdependencies were
too weak to pull the former Soviet republics toward close relations with
Moscow. Dimitri K. Simes correctly observed that:
Like most people in the Soviet Union, excepting the Baltic
states, Yeltsin operated on the assumption that the links
among the republics were too deep to allow the death of the
union. Also there was the belief that, as Yeltsin and Russia
were in the driver's seat in destroying the old union, they
would have a determining influence in shaping and running
the new confederation of independent republics.' °
On July 5, 1991, amidst disputes on control over enterprises, licensing of
foreign trade, collection of customs tariffs and taxation, Gorbachev's draft
9 The assumption that Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika are "communist nonetheless"
was widely disputed by the Sovietologists. For further discussion see Martin Malia, A New
Russian Revolution?, N.Y. REV. OF BooKS, July 18, 1991; Martin Malia, The August
Revolution, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Sept. 26, 1991; For polemics with Malia, see Andrzej
Walicki, Russia, Before the Coup and After, 5 C(RmICAL REVIEW (1991).
10 Dimitri K. Simes, America and the Post-Soviet Republics, 71 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 79, 80
(1992).
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Union Treaty was passed by the Russian Supreme Soviet." The negotia-
tions with other republics were, however, far from completion. Step-by-step
the concept of an "open union" surfaced as the working formula. According
to Gorbachev's position the Union Treaty was to be signed by Russia,
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and would be "open for signing" by other
republics. 2
However, the signing of the Union Treaty, which had been slated for
August of 1991, became less of a priority in light of the intensifying political
struggle and the rapidly developing economic crisis. By mid-1991 it was
quite clear that Gorbachev's plan to integrate the Soviet Union into the
global economy 3 did not have its desired immediate effect due to inter-
party difficulties and politics. 4 Several key leaders, including Boris Yeltsin
and the mayors of Moscow and Leningrad, followed Eduard Sheverdnadze
and resigned from the party. Gorbachev found himself locked in the
vigorous power struggles raging between the progressivists and the
communist party hardliners. Both attempted to reduce and restrict the power
of the soviet president.
To combat the conservatives' more and more open attack upon state
policy, Gorbachev decided to separate the higher levels of the government
from the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) apparatus.'" He also
instituted emergency measures to curb international barter and restrain hard-
currency bank transfers. However, the limited decrees which Gorbachev
issued in regards to the deteriorating conditions in the Union went virtually
ignored by all of the Republics, but most notably Russia.'
As the time of the signing of the Union Treaty approached, the hardliners
became more and more concerned that the Treaty would grant excessive
"Political news: build up, progress/aftermath of coup, Baltics, Business International
Country Report, Sept. 10, 1991, available in, LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Country Report file.
12 Id.
" The program was widely heralded at the time of the July 1991 summit of the leaders
of the seven major world economic powers. Gorbachev's attendance was meant to help
cement his association with the West and emphasize his commitment to true economic reform.
The Soviet Union also was awarded associate membership in the IMF and the World Bank.
Id.
,4 Government Structure, DOING Bus. IN E. EuR., July 1, 1991 (Bus. Int'l), available in
LEXIS, World Library, DBUSEU file [hereinafter Government Structure].
"5 LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Country Report File, Jan. 20, 1992.
'6 Government Structure, supra note 14.
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concessions to the republics." In the beginning of August they apparently
tried once more to coerce Gorbachev into their faction but did not suc-
ceed.'" One day before Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan were due to
sign the Union Treaty the right-wingers decided to seize power.' 9
From the 19th to the 21st of August, eight members of the Soviet
conservative alliance, led by the KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, Defense
Minister Dmitri Yazov, and Vice President Gennadi Yanaev, formed the
State Emergency Committee and placed Gorbachev under house arrest. The
coup members demanded he declare a state of emergency and transfer power
to Yanaev. ° On August 21, the coup collapsed paving way for a major
shake-up within the Soviet leadership. The conservative faction, opting for
a centralized union, was destroyed. Gorbachev declared that the Soviet
Communist Party was an all-pervasive influence blocking the progressive
reforms. On August 25, he resigned as Communist Party General Secretary
and ordered the government to seize all party property. In his resignation
statement he proclaimed that the Communist Party Central Committee should
take the difficult but honorable decision to dissolve itself."' The CPSU
ceased to exist.'
The failure of the coup gave boost to separatists in the republics and
wrecked Gorbachev's hopes for the resurrection of the Union. Within weeks
of the collapse of the coup, all of the republics but Kazakhstan and Russia
had declared independence. The various union republics began to refuse to
continue providing budget funds to the central government, which resulted
in the dissolution of many central government departments or their takeover
by the Russian government.23 On September 6, the Soviet Congress of
17 Id.
'a Recent Political and Economic Trends, The Coup d'Etat Attempt in USSR: Why it Was
Bound to Fail, DOING Bus. N E. EUR., Jan. 1, 1992 (Bus. Int'l) [hereinafter Recent Political
Trends].
'9 A Chronology of Gorbachev's Bid to Hold the Union Together, WASH. POST, Dec. 13,
1991, at A40 [hereinafter Gorbachev's Bid].
0 Id.
21 Transformations in the Interests of Working People, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1991, at
A27; see Gorbachev Abandons Party, Quits Leadership, Orders Property Seized, WASH.
POST, Aug. 25, 1991, at Al.
22 China Notes " Vigorous Upheavals" In Soviet Union Under Gorbachev, Zinhua News
Agency, reprinted in Summary of World Broadcasts, Dec. 28, 1991 (Brit. Broadcasting Corp.)
available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, BBCSWB file [hereinafter China Notes Vigorous
Upheavals].
2 Id.
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People's Deputies officially recognized the independence of Lithuania, Latvia
and Estonia, terminated the 1922 Union Treaty and handed over power to an
interim authority pending signature of a new treaty founding a voluntary
Union of Sovereign States.u
As a result of the Russian decisions to take over control of almost all
Soviet gold, diamond reserves and oil exports, and the disputes over the
control of the Soviet merchant fleet and navy, the process of signing a new
union progressed very slowly.' In October, some chances for an umbrella
agreement on economic ties seemed to emerge but they were stalled when
the three Baltic republics, along with Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and
Ukraine, decided to stay away from talks.6' At the end of November the
attempts of Gorbachev to bring seven republics around to the Treaty failed
entirely. The fate of a centralized union was finally decided by the
Ukrainian plebiscite, which by December 1, 1991 predetermined the
complete independence of this second-most populated Soviet republic.27
On December 8, the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, Ukrainian President,
Leonid Kravchuk, and Belarussian parliamentary chairman, Stanislav
Shushkevich, took over the initiative and signed a joint agreement on the
establishment of a "Commonwealth of Independent States."' On Decem-
ber 17th, Yeltsin and Gorbachev held talks and decided to terminate the
activities of the central organs of the union by the end of the year. On
December 21st, the leaders of eleven republics-Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizistan, Tajikstan, Turkmenistan, Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Moldavan-held a meeting in Alma-Ata to jointly sign a
document on the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
They formally announced that "the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had
ceased to exist" and that the former Soviet seat in the United Nation Security
Council would be taken over by Russia.29
The status of the new Commonwealth was vague from the very beginning.
Four countries which earlier split with the Soviet Union--Georgia, Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia-did not join the Commonwealth. The eleven co-
founders declared that the new loose federation is "only a consultation
u Gorbachev's Bid, supra note 19.
2 LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Country Reports File, at 4, Jan. 6, 1992.
26 Recent Political Trends, supra note 18.
2 id.
2 Gorbachev's Bid, supra note 19.
29 China Notes Vigorous Upheavals, supra note 22.
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mechanism." 3  Gorbachev, who was notified about the abolition of the
presidency of the Soviet Union, resigned on December 25, 1991. The
USSR's central power rapidly died out and by the end of 1991 the Soviet
Union ceased to exist.
B. Constitution Drafting in Several Former Soviet Republics
1. Russia Federation
The disintegration of the Soviet Union brought Russian President Boris
Yeltsin face-to-face with the problems for which he used to blame both
Gorbachev and the party conservatives. In 1992, the Soviet Union was gone
and the communist party was no longer in charge but a radical program of
reform remained as unclear as before. As Carroll Bogert wrote, "one year
later, Russians have a new system, but the same psyche. 31
Despite its preoccupation with a massive government reorganization,
programs of economic reform, and rocky relationships with other members
of the Commonwealth, Russia tried to advance works on a new federal
Constitution. The constitution drafting began in mid-1990 but progressed
very slowly. In June 1990, the Russian Congress of People's Deputies
entrusted to the newly elected Constitutional Commission the preparation of
a new draft constitution of the Russian Federation and its submission for
consideration by the next Congress. 32 The Commission prepared several
drafts which were published in November 1990 and October 1991.
The 1991 draft was presented to the Fifth Congress in the fall of 1991,
taken into consideration, and the Congress instructed the Constitutional
Commission and the Supreme Soviet "with regard for the observations and
proposals of the people's deputies of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic] to complete the draft constitution of the Russian
Federation presented to the Congress and submit it for consideration by the
next RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies."33 In effect, this simply meant
30 id.
31 Carroll Bogert, They Beat the Coup-So Why the Gloom?, Newsweek, Aug. 31, 1992,
at 48.
32 Constitutional Commission's Draft Text, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY (POINTs AND FACTS),
Mar. 30, 1992, reprinted in Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 4, 1992 (Brit. Broadcasting
Corp.) available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, BBCSWB File.
33 id.
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that the Congress did not see the possibility of the adoption of the draft in
the foreseeable future. Dmitry Kazutin commented that the draft of the
Constitution will probably "sink without trace in the quagmire of economic
ignorance, ideological idiocy, and elementary stupidity."'
Many provisions of the drafts have already been incorporated into the
existing Constitution in the form of amendments, but the task of adopting an
entirely new Constitution was still very difficult." Two problems proved
to be particularly challenging, the first being the federative structure, the
second being the distribution of powers. The drafters' concept of a federal
state is criticized both by so-called Russian "patriots" and non-Russian
"patriot-separatists. '
The patriots claim that "the draft disrupts the federation's unity, lavishly
confers rights right and left and infringes upon interests of the Russian
people."3" The patriot-separatists object that the draft favors the rights of
the Russian Republic and fails to reckon with the rights of peoples of the
autonomous regions. They suggest that Yeltsin should first set up his own
Russian Republic and later enter into treaty-stipulated relations with the
Tatar, Yakut and other republics. As Viktor Sheinis observed, "The two
stands are far removed from each other, with advocates trampling on the
draft Constitution mapping out the medium line which alone can become the
basis of compromise."3
Trying to cope with the problem, the Russian Supreme Soviet finally
adopted on March 13, 1992, the Federal Treaty on Demarcation of
Jurisdiction and Powers between the Federal Organs of State Power of the
Russian Federation and the Organs of Powers of the Republics within the
Russian Federation.39 The Treaty provides a long list of issues falling
within the jurisdiction of the federal organs or over which the federal organs
and the organs of state power of the Republics have joint jurisdiction.
Similar to the U.S. Constitution, the Republics have exclusive jurisdiction
3 Dmitry Kazutin, What I Have Read Heard or Seen, Moscow NEWS, Oct. 16, 1991.
31 Viktor Sheinis, New Constitution: Priority to the Individual, Moscow NEWS, Oct. 2,
1991.
36Vadim Bakatin, A Draw-In Whose Favor?, Moscow NEWS, Apr. 29, 1992.
" Sheinis, supra note 35.
8 Id.
" Treaty on Demarcation of Jurisdictions and Powers between the Federal Organs of State
Power of the Russia Federation and the Organs of Power of the Republics within the Russia
Federation, Mar. 13, 1992, reprinted in SovData Dialine - SovLegisLine [hereinafter Federal
Treaty].
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over those matters which have not been granted to the federal organs by the
Treaty.' The main provisions of the Treaty were incorporated into the
draft Constitution of the Russian Federation.4'
The second problem is even more controversial. The drafts put the concept
of the separation of powers among the "Fundamentals of the Constitutional
System of the Russian Federation" along with such principles as state and
people's sovereignty, supremacy of the law, political pluralism, federalism,
market economy, social justice, respect for human rights and liberties.42 In
fact, in the opinion of many Russian commentators, the incorporation of the
drafters' concept of the separation of powers would give a constitutional
sanction to the transformation of Russia from a parliamentary democracy into
a presidential republic. Viktor Sheinis observed that "[t]he immense
strengthening of executive authority in Russia and its isolation from
parliament is an accomplished fact."'43 He asks, "Should the powers which
presidential forces have assumed de facto be constitutionally formalized, or
is there a need to return to the milder variant of the initial draft, which
envisaged the government's subordination to parliament?"
The debate on the new draft Constitution illustrates just how far the
advocates of parliamentary and presidential systems have drifted apart.
Before the text was submitted to the Fifth Congress of People's Deputies,
alternative versions of the draft were drawn up by the Communists of Russia
group and researchers at the Saratov Institute of Law. 45 The Communists
charged that the commission's draft constitution made no mention of
socialism or communism and that it did not establish a well-balanced relation
4o Article III(1) of the Russian Federal Treaty provides, "The Republics shall have the
plentitude of state power on their territory with the exception of the powers delegated to the
jurisdiction of the Federal organs of state power of the Russia Federation under the present
Treaty." See Federal Treaty, supra note 39, art. Ill(l).
"' Draft Constitution of the Russian Federation, Ch. XIV (Terms of Reference and
Authority of the Russian Federation and the Republics, Krays, Oblasts, Autonomous Oblasts,
and Autonomous Okrug), reprinted in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY (POINTS AND FACrs), Mar. 30,
1992, trans. Apr. 4, 1992.
42 Constitutional Commission's Draft Text, reprinted in ARGUMENTY 1 FAKTY (POINTS
AND FACrs), Mar. 30, 1992 at arts. 1-12 [hereinafter 1992 Commission's Draft].
43 See Sheinis, supra note 35.
T Id.
i Address to Russia's Congress of People's Deputies on the Draft Constitution by the
Russian President and Chairman of the Constitutional Commission (Official Kremlin Int'l
News Broadcast, Nov. 4, 1991) [hereinafter Address to Russia's Congress].
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between the legislature and the executive.' In response, in his Address to
the Congress of People's Deputies, Yeltsin tried to defend the draft and
explain his concept of constitutional checks and balances."
Following the instructions of the Fifth Congress, the Constitutional
Commission decided to organize an extensive discussion of the draft. As a
result, several more "alternative drafts" surfaced, most of them advising the
conclusion of separate treaties between the Russian Federation and its
members; the strengthening of the parliamentary democracy through granting
legislative functions only to one house of the Russian parliament (the State
Duma) and supervisory functions to the other one (the Senate); and the
curbing of the prerogatives of the President through shifting some of his
functions to the federal Prime Minister, who would be fully responsible for
the government's administrative activity." In response, Boris Yeltsin's
aides, led by Alexander Maslov, drew up a "Presidential draft Constitution
of Russia" which clearly absorbed a number of features of the American
presidential system such as the presidential prerogative to control the
executive, the right to veto any law enacted by the parliament subject to the
overruling vote of a two-thirds parliamentary majority, the right to be elected
in nationwide elections for a six-year term in tandem with a Vice-President
who would automatically become speaker of the parliament's upper
chamber.49
Amidst the discussion whether Yeltsin will decide to submit his draft
Constitution to a public referendum,' the Constitutional Commission
4 id.
47 Id.
' See Sergei Alexeyev & Anatoli Sobchak, Constitution and the Destiny of Russia,
SOVIET PRESS DIG., Mar. 30, 1992; See also Vladimir Todres, Save Constitution and Take
Khazbulatov 'Down a Peg', SOVIET PRESS DIG., Mar. 7, 1992 (Todres' comments on draft
proposed by the Communists of Russia faction, assisted by the so-called Smena group of
deputies).
9 1. Sichka, Presidential Draft Constitution of Russia Discovered, SOVIET PRESS DIG.,
Apr. 9, 1992; See also The President's Draft Constitution of Russia is Found (Official
Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, Apr. 9, 1992).
' Serghei Chugayev, Russia's President Ready to Hold Referendum on Land and New
Constitution, SOVIET PRESS DiG., May 13, 1992. Chugayev commented on the main problem
facing Yeltsin:
[Hie does not have the power to conduct referendum. So Yeltsin is
expected, before the month is out, to ask Parliament to amend the relevant
legislation so as to grant him such powers. Should Parliament refuse, he
would have to collect one million votes in support of the demand for a
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amended its draft and prepared a version which was a sort of compromise
between the Commission's original draft and the presidential draft. This
draft was published on March 30, 1992 as the "Constitutional Commission's
Draft Text."51 The draft provides that the Russian Federation Supreme
Soviet is a bicameral standing parliament and the sole legislative authority.
The Supreme Soviet consists of the State Duma and the Federal Assembly,
both chambers participating in the legislative process on equal footing.
The president of the Republic is both the head of the state and the head
of the executive. He is elected directly by the people for a five-year term,
heads the Security Council and is the supreme commander-in-chief of the
armed forces. The president issues decrees and ordinances which do not
need governmental countersignature. Contrarily, he has the right to revise
or revoke ordinances and regulations of the government. The president does
not have the right to veto legislation but he may ask for a reconsideration of
the law. If, however, upon repeat examination the federal law is passed by
a majority of both chambers the President must sign and promulgate the law.
The president, the chairman of the government (the prime minister), and
the members of the government may not be deputies. The president runs for
the office together with the vice-president. In the event of a compromise,
the vice-president does not preside over the Federal Assembly and is only a
president's deputy. The chairman and the members of the government are
appointed by the president with the consent of the Supreme Soviet. The
members of the government may be forced out of office by the Supreme
Soviet in the unclear procedure in which the chambers vote by majority to
refuse to recognize the president's justification "not to dismiss a minister. 5 2
The president may also be dismissed from office for deliberate serious
violation of the constitution in a proceeding initiated by no less than one-
third of the deputies of the State Duma, as a result of a decision of the
Constitutional Court and upon the voting by the Federal Assembly by a
majority vote of no less than two-thirds of the total number of elected
deputies.
popular vote to enable the President to conduct referendums. This would
of course slow the process of adopting a new Constitution, but would
make it possible to use such a referendum for settling the land issue.
Id.
s' See 1992 Commission's Draft, supra note 42.
52 Id. at art. 102, § 4.
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The institution of judicial review was modeled on the German system
which combines features of abstract and concrete review. The thirteen-
member Russian Constitutional Court, created in July 1991 and chaired by
Valerii Zorkin, has an extensive jurisdiction to review the constitutionality
of federal laws, governmental acts, international agreements, constitutional
conflicts between federal and state authorities, constitutionality of political
parties and other voluntary organizations." The access to the Court is open
to a relatively wide range of petitioners. The review may be initiated by the
abstract petition of the highest governmental and judicial officials, by
petition of a chamber or a deputy of the Supreme Soviet. The Court also
hears individual complaints and protests against "the unconstitutionality of
law enforcement practice."' The decisions of the Constitutional Court are
definitive and are not subject to appeal or protest; the enactments or
provisions deemed unconstitutional "become null and void."5
Although the judicial review of the constitutionality of the laws in
"concrete" adversary proceedings is permitted by the draft, the proceeding
is still vague and requires further clarification. The judges of all courts must
refuse to apply the law which they recognize as unconstitutional and "make
a representation to the Constitutional Court concerning recognition of this
law as unconstitutional." It is highly unclear, however, what steps the
Constitutional Court may take. Is the Constitutional Court able to enforce
its interpretation of constitutionality against the interpretation of the regular
courts? Will it work as an appellate court? How is this Court able to secure
" The Constitutional Court made its reputation by agreeing to hear a petition of 37
people's deputies representing the defunct Communist party who sought to overturn Yeltsin's
banning of the Party and the confiscation of its property following the August 1991 coup.
A group of anti-Communist deputies responded with a countersuit charging the Communist
Party with being an unconstitutional organization. Hearings began on July 7, 1992 and were
widely commented upon by the western press when the Court barred Mikhail Gorbachev from
traveling abroad so as to compel his testimony at trial. See Richard Pipes, The Past on Trial:
Russia, One Year Later, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1992 at Cl; Michael Dobbs, Court Bars
Gorbachev from Travel, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1992, at A18; See also Constitution Watch,
Russia, E. EUR. CONST. REV. 1,7 (Summer 1992). On October 27, 1992 Yeltsin banned
another party, the National Salvation Front, charging it for the attempt to "overthrow the
legally constituted authorities." As was the case of Yeltsin's decree banning the Communist
Party, his October ban on the National Salvation Front could be challenged in the
Constitutional Court. See Michael Dobbs, Yeltsin, Citing 'Terrible Danger' Bans Nationalist
Opposition Front, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1992, at A18.
' See 1992 Commission's Draft, supra note 42, art. 106.
55 Id. at §§6,7.
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the stability of the legal system if regular courts might reach different
opinions concerning constitutionality of the laws?
Acknowledging the fact that the draft still involves a great deal of
controversy and may require some additional work, the Constitutional
Commission decided to publish the draft and submit it for consideration by
the Sixth Russian Congress of Deputies. President Yeltsin again proposed
several Amendments to the draft going against the tendency to curtail his
power. 6 The Congress discussed the draft at the evening meeting on April
18, 1992. The resolution which was adopted did not differ from the
resolution of the Fifth Congress. The general concept for constitutional
reform and the basic provisions of the draft Constitutions were approved but
"[t]he Supreme Soviet and the Constitutional Commission were instructed to
complete work on the draft, taking into account the proposals and critical
comments that have been made, and to submit it to the next Congress of
Russian Federation People's Deputies, after first publishing it so the general
public can become familiar with it.""7 Despite the general opinion that the
Congress and the president are locked in the vicious circle of constitutional
debate,5" Yeltsin optimistically expressed the view that the new Constitution
could be adopted in 1993. s9
2. Lithuania
Due to its preoccupation with internal political struggles, Russia may be
quickly outdistanced in constitutional works by smaller republics. First
constitutional drafts were produced by Lithuania, Estonia and Ukraine in
1991, with Belarus, Kirghizistan and recently Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
following suit shortly thereafter.
The first draft of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania was dated
March 7, 1991 and was discussed at the first Lithuanian constitutional
workshop, attended by American participants, in Vilnius on January 21-25,
5 Amendments Proposed by the President of the Russian Federation to the Draft
Constitution of the Russian Federation, (unpublished text of 16 Amendments, trans. by
CEELI, Nov. 1992).
57 Khasbulatov Reports on Draft Constitution; Basic Provisions Ok'd, XLIV CURRENT
DiG. SOvIEr PRESs (16), May 20, 1992, at 7.
58 Andrei Goltsblat, Many Variants, But One Choice. The Draft Itself What to Do?
RISSISKAYA GAZETA (RussiAN GAzETTE), Oct. 8, 1992.
59 Boris Yeltsin: Russia Is Losing a Lot Because It Lives by the 014 Tattered and
Patched Up Constitution, SOvIET PRESS DIG., July 30, 1992.
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1992. The workshop was followed by the visit of the Lithuanian delegation
in Washington D.C., March 1-6, 1992,' during which the second draft
dated February 26, 1992 was analyzed. This draft was supplemented in May
1992 by Lithuania's draft Court Law.6'
The Lithuanian drafts were the result of a solid effort of its drafters to
introduce into the Lithuanian system the fundamental principles of Western
constitutionalism such as the sovereignty of the people, democratic and
representative government, division of powers and judicial review.
Assessing the second Lithuanian draft, Professor William Wagner, one of
the participants of the workshops, wrote that "in many ways (the draft)
reflects a far deeper and more natural grasp of the principles of constitutional
democracy than has been the case in some other constitutional drafts
emerging in East and Central Europe.'"2
The 1992 draft establishes a parliamentary system and attempts to create
checks and balances among the three branches of the government. The
whole concept of the division of powers is, however, designed halfheartedly.
On the one hand, the draft provides that "full and absolute power may not
be concentrated in any one State institution;" on the other hand, it declares
that "the Seimas (the legislative organ) is the supreme and sole organ of state
power representing the Lithuanian People." 3 The legislative and control-
ling power of the parliament was to be balanced by the dual executive
system, with the president, directly elected by the people, sharing the
executive power with the government headed by the prime minister. The
president has the right to veto the legislature which can be overridden by
two-thirds of all the Seimas deputies. The president seems to be stripped of
the power to dissolve the Seimas but has the right to form a Provisional
Government for a period of six months "if the Seimas does not confirm two-
thirds of all Ministers and does not approve the program of Government
activities within 30 days of the nomination of the Prime Minister, or if the
Seimas expresses non-confidence in the Government within six months of
its formation."
60 See March Report, AMERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN LAW
INITIATIVE, (Mar. 1-8, 1992) [hereinafter CEELI MARCH 1992 REPORT].
61 See Update 5, American Bar Association Central & East European Law Initiative (June
1992).
62 See CEELI MARCH 1992 REPORT, supra note 60.
63 Feb. 26, 1992 Draft Lithuanian Constitution, art. 5, 40, reprinted in CEELI MARCH
1992 REPORT.
"Id. at art. 90.
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It is quite clear that the drafters tried to adopt some features of the
German constitutional institutions known as the "constructive vote of no
confidence" and "legislative emergency." They were set up to secure stability
similar to that offered by the German system. Trying to explain their
rationale, Alex N. Drahnich and Jorgen Rasmussen wrote:
The underlying idea is to prevent a negative majority, of
say, the extreme left and the extreme right, from voting a
Government out of office when all they can agree upon is
that they do not like what the Government has been doing.
Therefore, in Germany a chancellor defeated in the
Bundestag, even by an absolute majority, is not required to
resign. The only way the Bundestag can force a chancellor
from office is to designate a successor by an absolute
majority.'
Still one has to observe that the rationale for the adoption of these
institutions into the Lithuanian draft is vague. The Lithuanian Seimas lacks
the right of the German Bundestag to elect the prime minister by an absolute
majority without presidential cooperation. The president and the prime
minister also lack the power to dissolve the Seimas which might alleviate a
parliamentary impasse. The shortcoming of the Lithuanian arrangement is
that upon the expiration of the six-months term of the Provisional Govern-
ment the president still might not be able to resolve the stalemate.'
The completely restructured judicial system, drawn partially from the
experience gained during twenty years of Lithuanian independence and
partially from the experience of other legal systems, shows a clear intention
of the drafters to insure the independence of the judiciary. The draft
provides also for the establishment of the Constitutional Court but its
structure and functions demand further clarification. The Lithuanian draft
follows a so-called centralized, or concentrated, model of review, which
65 ALEX N. DRAHNICH & JORGEN RASMUSSEN, MAJOR EUROPEAN GOvERNMENTS 404-6
(1992).
" Article 91 of the 1992 Draft provides, "Upon the expiration of the six-months period,
the Provisional Government shall either resign or submit a program to the Seimas requesting
that the Seimas consider and resolve the question of confidence in this Government. Upon
the resignation of the Provisional Government, the formation of a new Government shall be
carried out according to the procedure established by the Constitution." See 1992 Draft
Lithuanian Constitution, supra note 63, art. 91.
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reserves the right to control the constitutionality of the laws to one special
judicial organ. The draft provides that the Lithuanian Constitutional Court
will review the statutes adopted by the parliament, presidential decrees, and
governmental directives and resolutions. When asked by the parliament, the
Court would review violations of the electoral law, constitutionality of the
international agreements and the capacity of the President to continue his
tenure. The Court will also settle the disputes between local and central
governmental agencies and disputes regarding the constitutionality of
political parties. Several commentators have pointed out that without further
refinement the Court would be an "exceedingly busy" body as it would
operate mostly as an advisory organ. 7 All ambiguities and some technical
problems notwithstanding, the first Lithuanian drafts received wide praise
from Western commentators.
Despite the strong encouragement from the west, the process of adoption
of a new constitution ii Lithuania advanced slowly. Particularly the
establishment of a formal presidency proved to be a major problem for the
Lithuanians. A referendum held on this issue on May 23, 1992 failed to
support a constitutional amendment to a Provisional Basic Law (March 11,
1990) meant to bind the drafters of a final constitution. In fact, 69.5 percent
of those voting were in favor, but only 57.5 percent of eligible voters turned
out, thereby denying the referendum the necessary approval of 50 percent of
the entire electorate."
The question of presidential powers was put on the ballot in the parlia-
mentary elections in October 26, 1992. The voters approved a new
constitution establishing presidential institutions but the independence
movement, Sajudis-the representatives of which prepared the draft
constitution-was defeated in the election.69  An upset victory of the
communists led by Algirdas Brazauskas, Lithuania's former communist party
chief, leaves the details of a new constitution open to further dispute.
3. Estonia
The unsuccessful referendum left Lithuania behind neighboring Estonia in
67 See comments of Maty J. Morrison & Cass R. Sunstein, CEELI MARCH 1992 REPORT,
supra note 60.
69 Constitution Watch, E. EUR. CONST. REV. 2,5 (Summer 1992).
69 Michael Dobbs, Ex-Communists Win Elections in Lithuania, WASH. POST, Oct. 27,
1992, at A21.
[Vol. 23:155
CONSTITUTION MAKING
terms of completing the constitutional process. Estonia declared its
independence in March 1990 and fully separated from Moscow on August
20, 1990, after the coup attempt in Russia.7° Shortly afterwards a constitu-
tional commission was formed to draft a new constitution. The 60-member
commission, called the Constituent Assembly, was composed of 30 members
of the Supreme Council (the former Supreme Soviet of Estonia), and 30
members from the Congress of Estonia (an interim independent quasi-
parliament).7
The Assembly considered four drafts and widely discussed the possibility
of using the 1938 Constitution of Estonia as a model for a new basic law.72
As in the other republics of the former Soviet Union, the attention of the
drafters was focused on two major problems: the limits of presidential
power and the method of electing the president. After the initial rejection
of two drafts which clearly favored the presidential system, the Assembly
focused on the proposal of the Estonian National Independence Party
("ENIP") to reactivate the 1938 Constitution, and on two new drafts: one
prepared by former Estonian Minister of Justice, Juri Raidla, and the other
by the drafting committee of the Assembly led by Jun Adams.73 The 1938
Constitution generated some attention as it provided for the election of the
president by the parliament, the model favored by the Assembly. Under the
pressure of the population which favored election of the president directly
by the people, the Assembly compromised. It decided that the first
president, would be popularly elected but his followers would be elected by
the parliament.74 The debate on the model of the presidential election
showed that the Assembly clearly favors a parliamentary system. Finally, all
drafts proposing a strong presidential power, including the one based on
1938 constitution were rejected. The Assembly decided to put before the
electorate a modified Adam's draft which envisaged Estonia as a parliamen-
tary republic.
70 Constitution Watch, E. EUR. CONST. REV. 5 (Spring 1992).
71 Id.
72 Constitution Watch, E. Etm. CONST. REv. 3 (Summer 1992).
73 Id.
7' Constitutional assembly completes draft constitution, British Broadcasting Corporation,
reprinted in Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, BBCSWB File.
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The draft vested supreme legislative power in the Riigikogu, a 101-
member unicameral parliament. 5 The Riigikogu is a clearly predominant
power in Estonia. It adopts laws, elects the president, decides on the
conducting of referenda, ratifies and denounces foreign treaties, authorizes
the candidate for prime minister to form the government, and makes major
governmental appointments.
The president is elected for five years by the Riigikogu and representatives
of local governments, who together form the Presidential Electoral Assembly.
The Constituent Assembly decided that the term of the first popularly-elected
holder of the presidential office would be shortened to four years.76 The
president as head of the state has functions typical for this position in
Western European parliamentary republics, such as the role of an arbiter in
inter-parties disputes and the representative of the state in international
relations. Within some limits he has the right to issue decrees and to request
the reconsideration of a bill or ask for the review of its constitutionality by
the State Court.77
Several features of the procedure of the selection of the government seem
to be borrowed from the German Basic Law. The President nominates a
candidate for the prime minister, who is expected in 14 days to submit to the
parliament an "expose," a proposal outlining the basics of forming the future
government. If two successive candidates of the president fail to form the
government or fail to get the parliament's approval for their "expose," the
right to submit the candidate for prime minister reverts to the parliament.
If, however, the parliament fails to select a prime minister, the president,
may dissolve the parliament and declare a new election. The parliament may
also vote the government down in a no-confidence action with a resolution
carried by a majority vote of the Riigikogu. In response to a no-confidence
vote the president has, at the suggestion of the government, an option of
dissolving the parliament and holding a new election. The right to dissolve
the parliament in the time of a governmental crisis seems to give the
Estonian president a stronger position than that reserved for his Lithuanian
counterpart.
75 REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA DRAFT CONST., art. 59 and 60, reprinted in 1992 U.S. Dept of
Commerce, Central & Eastern Europe Legal Texts, June 19, 1992 [hereinafter ESTONIA
CONST. (1992 Draft)].
76 Constitution Watch, supra note 68, at 4.
" ESTONIA CONST. (1992 Draft), supra note 75, arts. 78. 107, 109, 110.
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The Estonian Constitution also provides for another procedural mecha-
nism, the motion of confidence, which seems borrowed from the French
Constitution. This mechanism provides that the government can make
passage of a particular bill a matter of confidence, meaning it may stake its
life on a particular bill. In France, a motion of confidence fails if it does not
receive a majority of the total membership (not just those voting). The
rationale for this procedural mechanism is that if the motion of confidence
fails then the bill passes even without a vote of a majority of those
present.78
The court system is comprised of rural and city courts, district courts, and
the State Court which appears to have some power of judicial enforcement
of the constitutional provisions. The Constitution provides that all courts, in
the course of their proceedings, should refrain from applying laws or legal
measures if they are in conflict with the Constitution. The power to
invalidate unconstitutional legal acts is vested in the State Court.79 In fact,
the Constitution does not provide any further details regarding the establish-
ment of judicial review in Estonia.
A month before the draft Constitution was submitted to the referendum it
had been strongly attacked by a group known as Restitution, led by Endel
Lippmaa, Johannes Kass, and Juri Estam, who favored the readoption of the
1938 Constitution.' For a moment it looked as though the Estonian
Constitution may share the fate of the Lithuanian draft. This criticism
notwithstanding, the draft Constitution of Estonia was put to national
referendum on June 28, 1992, and was adopted. Approximately two-thirds
of the eligible voters voted, with more than 91 percent accepting the draft."'
The adopted Constitution, the first one accepted by a former Soviet republic,
took effect on July 4, 1992.2
4. Ukraine
"After centuries of colonial anonymity," wrote Adrian Karatnycky,
"Ukraine is finally making its mark on world affairs."8 3 Karatnycky further
78 Id. at art. 98; See also MAJOR EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, supra note 65, at 270.
79 ESTONIA CONST. (1992 Draft), supra note 75, art. 152.
80 Constitution Watch, supra note 68, at 3.
81 Id.
Si92d.
83 Adrian Karatnycky, The Ukrainian Factor, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 90 (Summer 1992).
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wrote:
Although relegated to secondary status by the West, Ukraine
is rapidly emerging as a forceful and important actor in
defining the contours of post-Soviet Europe. Russia and its
President Boris Yeltsin may have taken the lead in defeating
the August 1991 putsch and the Soviet Communist Party.
But it was Ukraine, led by President Leonid Kravchuk, that
ultimately provoked the unraveling of the Soviet empire:
Ukraine's refusal to sign Mikhail Gorbachev's union treaty
precipitated the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the creation of
the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).84
The constitutional works in Ukraine began shortly after the December 1,
1991 referendum, in which 90 percent of the population voted for indepen-
dence. The working group of the Constitution Commission of the Parliament
of Ukraine, headed by Leonid Yuzkov, prepared two first drafts of the
Constitution of Ukraine in January and June 1992. The second draft was
submitted to the evaluation of a CEELI group of experts and the CEELI
Report was forwarded to Kiev on July 14, 1992.5
The draft, which contains 258 articles, exceeds by one-third the length of
constitutional texts in other former Soviet republics. It provides specific
regulations concerning, for example, the national anthem (Article 253), the
state flag (Article 252), professional and amateur arts (Article 93), and
legislative organization (Articles 149-153). On the one hand, the drafters
intended to give the constitution some rigidity by disallowing amendments
directed against independence; territorial integrity; additions restricting forms
of property and human rights; and by providing for an all-Ukrainian
referendum in the case of amendments proposed by no less than two million
electors.' On the other hand, the detailed character of the draft which
provides specific regulations could encourage frequent amendments which,
4 Id.
5 Analysis of the Constitution of Ukraine, ABA CEELI Report, July 14, 1992.
[hereinafter Ukrainian Constitutional Analysis].
6 The amendments proposed by one-third of the members of both houses have to be
approved by at least two-thirds of each house of the National Assembly. DRAFT CONSTrrU-
TON OF THE UKRAINE, June 10, 1992, at arts. 256-257 [hereinafter UKRAINE CONST. (1992
Draft)].
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in turn, may diminish public respect for the constitution. The commentators
observed that the draft seems at the same time to prescribe too much and too
little, and suggested that minor problems should instead be subject to
statutory control."
The introductory chapter on General Principles of the Constitutional
System portrays Ukraine as "a democratic, social state which adheres (its)
activity with the rule of law.""8  It provides a solid framework for a
representative government, although it also recognizes the importance of the
idea of direct democracy. Article 115 of the draft states that "the people
exercise state power through nation-wide voting (referenda), elections, and
through the system of state bodies." 9  The following article explains,
expresis verbis, that "an all-Ukrainian referendum is the constitutional means
of direct approval by the people of Ukraine of laws and other state
decisions."'
It must be observed with satisfaction that the drafters placed the concept
of limited government among the essential foundations of democratic
government. 9' The draft provides that citizens can exercise their rights in
the sphere "which is not prohibited by law," but the state bodies operate only
within an area which is determined by law, meaning that they must have a
clear legal basis for their actions.92
Departing from the socialist tradition, the draft constitution clearly
recognizes the principle of division of powers. Legislative power in Ukraine
is vested in the National Assembly. A bicameral structure of the legislature
can hardly be explained either in the light of Ukraine being a unitarian state
or Ukrainian constitutional tradition. One may observe that bicameralism
might undermine the effectiveness of the legislative system.
The executive power is vested in the president, who is both the head of
state and the head of the government. The drafters clearly intended to
incorporate into the constitution some elements of the American presidential
system. Similar to the American model, the president of Ukraine is elected
7 Ukrainian Constitutional Analysis, supra note 85, at 1.
U UKRAINE CONST. (1992 Draft), supra note 86, art. 1.
8 Id. at art. 115.
90 Id. at art. 116.
9' Id. at arts. 64, 65. Article 64 reads, "The state shall be subordinated to and serves the
civil society .. " Article 65 states, "The state shall not infringe on the affairs of persons and
of society.... State regulation of societal relationships shall be confined within the borders
defined by this constitution. Executive and legislative power shall be limited by the law."
9 Id. at art. 5.
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directly by the people and he "carries out the general leadership of the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and directs its executive activities. 93 The
President may issue decrees and orders which do not require countersignature
of the ministers. He is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and he has
a suspensive (deferring) veto which can be overridden by two-thirds of the
total number of members of each house as determined by the constitution.
The prime minister is only a deputy to the president and is "subordinated and
accountable" to him. In addition, the president may annul the acts of
ministers and heads of central or local bodies of executive power. The
president submits candidates for the post of prime minister to the National
Assembly and proposals for their dismissals.
The executive and the legislature are separate and independent. To
terminate the president's tenure before the expiration of his 5-year term the
Assembly must impeach the president. As opposed to the American system,
the people may be called to decide directly on the termination of the powers
of the president or on the dissolution of the Assembly. The Assembly must
decide by at least a two-thirds majority of each of the houses to hold a
referendum on the termination of the powers of the President. The President
cannot dissolve the National Assembly, except in a case where the Assembly
has initiated an all-Ukrainian referendum on the termination of the presiden-
tial powers of the head of state and the people expressed their confidence in
the president.
The draft still has some ambiguities. The role of the prime minister is not
well-defined. This position, being a concession toward the parliamentary
system, seems to be halfheartedly crafted. Also, the provisions on the
presidential election are vague. The draft seems to provide for a majority
vote to elect a president. It does not explain, however, what happens if a
majority of the electorate does not vote or the vote is split among several
candidates. The commentators suggested that in order to diminish the danger
of rule by a person acceptable only to a small minority of the public,
Ukraine might wish to consider amending the draft Constitution to provide
for run-off elections where a presidential candidate has not received
endorsement by a majority of the electorate. 4
The judiciary system consists of the common courts, economic courts, and
the Constitutional Court.95 The system still shows some features tradition-
93 Id. at arts. 175, 178, § 11.
9 Ukrainian Constitutional Analysis, supra note 85, at 8.
95 UKRAINE CONST. (1992 Draft), supra note 86, art. 203.
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ally attributed to a socialist model. The existence of special economic
courts, which in a socialist state handled disputes between state enterprises,
state farms and cooperatives and operated more like courts of arbitration than
regular courts, confirms that the drafters still anticipate that the state will
administer a vast area of public property." On the other hand, the draft
constitution does not provide for special administrative courts. The right to
hear cases regarding illegal actions of state administrators and officials is
vested in regular courts (courts of general jurisdiction).' This system,
introduced in most socialist countries in the 1950s, has never worked
properly. The judges of regular courts, well-trained to follow the rules
provided in the codes hardly can offer a policy-minded analysis of adminis-
trative decisions. In some former socialist countries, notably Poland, the
judicial review of administrative acts has been taken over by a network of
special administrative courts.
The Constitutional Court is fashioned on the German model of the mixed,
(abstract and concrete) constitutional review.98 Articles 243 and 244 grant
the Court abstract judicial review, power to review the compatibility of laws,
presidential decrees, international agreements, as well as acts and actions of
the central and local legislative and executive bodies with the constitution.
The Court institutes the review when asked to do so by the highest officials
of the state and at least one fifth of the members of the chambers of the
parliament.9 Review by the Constitutional Court may also be initiated in
connection with regular judicial proceedings, which resembles the concrete
(or incidenter) form of review. I"° Article 217 provides that if "in the
course of a judicial proceeding the court determines that it must apply a law
or its interpretation that is inconsistent with the Constitution, then the court
shall adjourn the proceeding and shall petition the Constitutional Court of
Ukraine to declare the law or its interpretation unconstitutional." The
For description of the functions of economic courts in a socialist state, see MARY ANN
GLENDON, MICHAEL GORDON, & CHRISTOPHER OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS
765-72 (1985).
9 UKRAINE CONST. (1992 Draft), supra note 86, art. 205.
"For a more detailed explanation of the German model of judicial review see Part II,
Chapter E: Constitutional Enforcement.
"It resembles provisions of Article 93 of the German Basic Laws which granted German
Federal Constitutional Court abstract power to review constitutionality of Federal and Land
law when. petitioned by Federal or Land government or one-third of the members of the
Bundestag. GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTMMON [GG] art. 93 (F.R.G.).
'00 Id. at art. 100.
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Constitutional Court is also an advisory body and may be asked "to give
consultations."
Similar to the German model, the draft grants individuals the right to file
a complaint. In light of the fact that complaints comprise some 95 percent
of the cases of the German Federal Constitutional Court, the Ukrainian
drafters tried to limit the complaints to cases which have already been
"considered and decided by general courts" and in which the complaint was
supported by the Ombudsman (the Representative of National Assembly of
people's rights).'01
To sum up, the Ukrainian Constitutional Court is the single judicial organ
vested with the power to review and to determine the constitutionality of
normative acts. Constitutional proceedings can be initiated either through
petition (an "abstract" review) or through inquiry by a regular court
("concrete" review.) The CEELI commentators were skeptical that the "idea
of interrupting trials to certify an issue to the Constitutional Court and
awaiting its decision could seriously undermine the effectiveness of the trial
court system."'" Instead, it was suggested that the drafters might wish to
consider the introduction of a decentralized system0 3 allowing all regular
courts to rule on Constitutional issues themselves. This author is of a
different opinion and believes that a decentralized or American system of
constitutional review is not applicable to countries of this region.1° In his
opinion the concept of judicial review presented by the Ukrainian draft is
ambitious but quite coherent and the drafters may be complemented for the
attempt to follow recognized European traditions of judicial review.
5. Belarus
Constitutional reform was initiated in Belarus shortly after the country
proclaimed Byelorussian laws ascendant over Soviet statutes in July 1991,
and declared the Republic's independence on August 25, 1991. On
December 8, 1991, Belarus joined with Russia and Ukraine to declare the
101 UKRAINE CONST. (1992 Draft), supra note 86, art. 243; See also WALTER F. MURPHY
& JOSEPH TANNENHAUS, COMPARATIVE CONsTITUIONAL LAw, CASES AND COMMENTARIES,
29 (1977).
"o Ukrainian Constitutional Analysis, supra note 85.
103 A decentralized American system of judicial review is analyzed in Part II, Chapter E:
Constitutional Enforcement.
'" See comments on the applicability of the main models of judicial review to East-
Central European geo-political environment at the end of this study.
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demise of the Soviet Union and the creation of a Commonwealth of
Independent States." s On April 6, 1992, the Constitutional Committee
headed by Valentin A. Borostov, Chief of the Legal Department of the
Cabinet of Ministers, prepared the draft of the Constitution of the Republic
of Belarus. The draft was submitted for the assessment of the CEELI's
group of attorneys with expertise in the area of constitutional law. A
compilation of individual comments was forwarded to the Belarusian
Constitutional Committee on August 28, 1992.'"
The draft begins with a short preamble followed by a section on the basis
of the constitutional system. Article 1 describes the Republic as tat de
droit, ("law-based state" or a state operating according to law). This idea
incorporates the most important principles found in most forms of democratic
government, such as the separating, checking, and counterbalancing of
powers; a hierarchical and graduated legal system with the constitution on
the top; priority of universally-acknowledged norms of international law;
submission of the state to the law; and operation of the state's authorities
within the limits of the law." The draft recognizes the people as the
single source of state sovereignty and puts some emphasis on the forms of
direct participation of people in power. Although the representative form of
democracy still prevails, the draft leaves a number of important questions of
state and social life for the decision of republic-wide and local referenda.
It is clear that the choice of the presidential or parliamentary system was
a difficult decision for the drafters. The draft borrows from the French
model of government,"08 but borrows inconsistently. Similar to the French
system, the draft of the Belarusian Constitution recognizes in the president
of the Republic the function of arbitrator or mediator."° The president is
directly elected by the people, can issue orders and instructions, and dissolve
101 ABC-CLIo, INc. KALEIDOSCOPE, COUNTRY: BELARUs, Aug. 21, 1992.
106 Analysis of the Draft Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, Report of Aug. 28, 1992,
American Bar Assoc. Central & East European Law Initiative [hereinafter Belarusian
Constitutional Analysis].
107 Belarusian Draft Constitution, reprinted in Report of Aug. 28, 1992, American Bar
Association, Central & East European Law Initiative, [hereinafter BELARUSIA CONST. (1992
Draft)).
"SO For more detailed comments on the French model of government, see text accompany-
ing notes 361-368, infra.
'09 See FOYER, THE DRAFTING OF THE FRENCH CONSTITUTION OF 1958, CONSTITUTION
MAKERS ON CONSTrrtToN MAKING, (R. Goldwin and Kaufman eds. 1988), at 19; see also
BELARUSIA CONST. (1992 Draft), supra note 107, art. 102.
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the Soim (parliament) in the event of the non-confirmation of the Govern-
ment of the Republic in the course of six months or in the event of the
expression of non-confidence in the government more than twice in the
course of a year.
As in France, the president lacks the veto power of the American
president, but he can ask the legislature to reconsider a bill that it has passed.
The Belarusian president does not need, however, to ask the prime minister
to agree for resubmission of the bill or for countersignatures for his orders.
On the other hand, in France the government derives its legitimacy from the
president. The French president appoints the prime minister and for a long
time it was not clear whether the government would be obliged to ask the
National Assembly for a vote of confidence. ° In the Belarusian draft, the
president only nominates the Chairman of the Government but the Chairman
and the government are elected by the Soim, are responsible to the Soim,
and accountable before it. The commentators observed that the draft still
"places too much power in the hands of the Soim, the legislative branch,
whose power is not adequately checked by the other branches of govern-
ment.....
The establishment of a system of judicial review seems to be another
central theme of the constitutional debate in Belarus. The draft provides for
a very interesting system of mixed constitutional control which is both
centralized and concentrated, concrete and abstract." 2 Article 133 of the
draft gives the right to decide on the constitutionality of a given normative
act to any court which comes upon a constitutional controversy during
consideration of a specific case. The Constitutional Court would institute an
abstract control on its own initiative and when called upon by the main
officials and highest courts of the Republic. It is unclear whether the
Constitutional Court would also work as an appellate constitutional tribunal
and how, in the absence of a stare decisis system, the consistency of the
constitutional decisions will be protected. The procedure by which the
Constitutional Court suspends the acts recognized as unconstitutional and
submits its decision for review by the Soim while reserving the right to
override the Soim's opinion thereby depriving the act of juridical force,
seems to unnecessarily complicate and politicize the process of review and
10 Foyer, supra note 109, at 19.
.. Belarusian Constitutional Analysis, supra note 106, at 1.
12 For a more detailed analysis of the models of judicial review see text accompanying
notes 369-386, infra.
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undermine the concept of the separation of powers.
The commentators also observed that the draft does not make clear
whether the new government is to be based upon principles of market
economy or a socialist model,." On the other hand, they praised the fact
that the rights secured by the draft are directly applicable law and that the
constitutional guarantees of rights are protected from being eradicated by
subsequent legislation, executive action, or judicial decision." 4 Generally
speaking, although the draft provided a lot of information on the develop-
ment of the Byelorussian constitutional system following its independence,
the completion of the constitution drafting in this republic nonetheless
requires a great deal of work and a lengthy nation-wide discussion.
6. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan
The three republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia share many
common features. They are located in the area which is engulfed in a long-
running conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding the status of the
region of Nagorno-Karabakh, and plagued by ethnic and civil warfare
following the toppling of the Presidents of Georgia, Azerbaijan and
Tajikistan." 5 All of them lack any democratic traditions and all received
independence as a side-effect of events in which they participated somehow
reluctantly."" The republics have economies which are still fully inter-
twined with those of their neighbors and with Moscow. Martha Brill Olcott
wrote:
As Soviet central structures withered, so too did subsidies
from Moscow that had long helped feed Central Asia's ever
increasing population. The region's leaders were left with
sole responsibility for keeping their economies afloat. Yet
13 See comments of Judge John P. Fullam, Belarusian Constitutional Analysis, supra note
106, at 2-3.
"4 See comments of Virginia Supreme Court Justice Barbara Milano Keenan, id.
'"Georgia's President Zviad Gamasakhurdia was forced to flee Tbilisi in January 1992;
Azerbaijan's Ayaz Mutalibov was toppled in May, 1992; and Tajik President, Rakhman
Nabijev, was toppled in September 1992. See Tajik President Resigns in Opposition Custody,
WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1992, at A14; Spread of Ethnic Wars Feared in Ex-U.S.S.R., WASH.
POST, Sept. 9, 1992, at A25; See also Olcott, Central Asia's Catapult to Independence,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 108-130 (1992).
116 See Olcott, supra note 115, at 108.
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technological and diplomatic expertise was sorely lacking in
these new states. Each nation has tried to varying degrees
to diversify its economy and exploit the interest of regional
powers-most often, Iran, and Turkey. But those efforts are
hindered by transportation and communication links that still
follow old colonial routes through Russia." 7
In the summer of 1992, Kirghizistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan prepared
drafts of new constitutions which share many common features that might
be examined together. The texts are more concepts of a preliminary and
general nature, than well-rounded and detailed drafts. Although the
documents seem to benefit from the numerous similar projects available at
this moment in other former Soviet republics, they still demand a lot of work
and their adoption without further amending process seems to be problemat-
ic. " 8 At first glance it is obvious that the drafts need some structural
reorganization which would enhance their coherence, contribute to their
clarity, and could help flush out many possible questions of interpretation
and reservations concerning overlapping provisions.
The most striking similarity linking all three drafts is a clear intention of
the drafters to provide a framework for a presidential system. The
Azerbaijani draft describes the state expresis verbis as "a presidential
republic" and the two other draft constitutions, although less explicit, leave
no doubts as to the similar intention of the drafters. While a tendency to
incorporate some elements of the presidential model into the new constitu-
tions could be detected in many East-Central European new constitutions,
117 id.
18 The texts subject to analysis are: DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KAZAKHSTAN, June 2, 1992 [hereinafter KAZAKHSTAN CONST. (1992 Draft)]; CONCEPT FOR
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIuAN (undated, submitted to CEELI for
evaluation in July 1992, [hereinafter AZERBAIJAN CONST. (1992 Draft)], and DRAFT
CONSTITIMON OF THE KIRGHIZ REPUBLIC, June 16, 1992 [hereinafter KIRGHIZISTAN CONST.
(1992 Draft)]. Kirghizistan's draft, used for this study, has been prepared by L.I. Levitin, S.
Kosakov, and M. Cholnobayev, with the participation of D. Narymbayev and M. Ukushov.
The draft was published in the Kirghiz press and submitted to the Supreme Soviet of
Kirghizistan together with alternative versions drafted by the Democratic Movement. As the
deputies divided into two camps which supported two different versions of the draft, the
Supreme Soviet postponed the adoption of the constitution. See, ITARTASS news agency,
Moscow, World Service, July 24, 1992; see also British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary
of World Broadcasts, July 27, 1992.
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this inclination has usually been manifested half-heartedly; the presidents
were presented as "senior statesmen" or "supreme arbitrators" sharing power
with parliamentary accountable chiefs of governments. The Kirghiz,
Kazakhstani and Azerbaijani drafts break with these half-measures and drift
clearly toward an American version of the presidential rule. In the opinion
of the drafters, given the special geopolitical circumstances of the region, this
model can guarantee the rights and freedoms of the citizens better than a
parliamentary government.
The presidents are the heads of the states, highest executive officials, and
commanders-in-chief of the armed forces. They are elected directly by the
people, have the right of veto which can be overridden by a majority of two-
thirds of the legislature," 9 and can issue, decrees. The cabinets are headed
by the presidents, who, with consent of the legislature, can appoint the prime
ministers and the ministers. The executive officers are accountable to the
presidents.' 2
The limits of the presidential power are still vague. On the one hand, the
drafters seem to understand that the balance of powers depends on the
cooperation of the President and the Parliament, and try to follow to some
extent the American model of checks and balances. On the other hand, they
intend to secure a supreme power to the executive. The confusing results are
clearly visible and if the ambiguities of the drafts are not removed political
abuses may very well ensue.
At this moment, it only seems appropriate to observe that all drafts show
a clear tendency to provide for some kind of enforcement mechanisms for
constitutional rights and freedoms. The concept of judicial review requires,
119 KIRGHIZISTAN CONST. (1992 Draft), supra note 118, art. 48; KAZAKHSTAN CONST.
(1992 Draft), supra note 118, art. 88. The Azerbaijani Draft simply declares that "the
President makes use of the right to veto legislation." AZERBAUAN CONST. (1992 Draft), supra
note 118, section on Organs of Executive Power.
12) KAZAKHSTAN CONST. (1992 Draft), supra note 118, arts. 94-95, which makes the
Cabinet of Ministers politically accountable to the president and constitutionally accountable
to the Parliament. The drafters reserved for the parliament the right to dismiss the minister,
with the consent of the president, by two-thirds majority vote of the general number of
deputies, in the case of violation of the Constitution or the laws of the Republic. Id.; see also
KIRGHIZISTAN CONST. (1992 Draft), supra note 118, art. 48. The Azerbaijani Draft is less
explicit. It provides that the President appoints the Cabinet with "subsequent confirmation"
of the Parliament and that "the President carries out functions regarding the execution of laws
and is in charge of the activities of the Cabinet of Ministers." AZERBAIJAN CONST. (1992
Draft), supra note 118, at 19-21.
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however, further refinement. For example, the Azerbaijani draft goes to the
extent of giving the Constitutional Court an unprecedented power to
"dissolve parliament if it repeatedly passes laws that violate the Constitu-
tion." With all admiration of the drafters' intention to establish an effective
system of constitutional protection, this provision seems clearly to infringe
upon the autonomy of the legislative power and affect the commonly
understood principle of division of powers. Two other drafts more clearly
provide for a centralized model of constitutional review which in Kazakhstan
is vested in a special Constitutional Court and in Kirghizistan in the
Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. Both drafts prohibit the
regular courts from applying the laws which contradict the Constitution and
instruct the courts that a the violation of the Constitution is found, they
should suspend the trial and turn to the central constitutional authority for the
final examination of the law claimed unconstitutional.
One can also observe that, although the drafts guarantee economic freedom
and the inviolability of all forms of property, they do not declare the clear
adherence to the concept of market economy. All three drafts seem to repeat
the old socialist formula limiting the freedom of the owner by vague needs
of society and interests of the people. The drafts also provide that the land
and natural resources are within the exclusive ownership of the state, a
provision which might clearly be read as discouraging both domestic
entrepreneurship and foreign investment.
To sum up, one has to admit that, despite all the turbulent geopolitical
circumstances, the constitutional works in the post-Soviet republics are in full
bloom and it can soon be expected that the region will produce several brand
new constitutions. All the shortcomings of the new drafts notwithstanding,
this significant effort of countries having very little, if any, constitutional
tradition is admirable. The success of these emerging but still imperfect and
fragile democracies is in the clear interest of the West and warrants as much
attention and support as possible.
C. Constitution Drafting in Former People's Republics of East-Central
Europe
"The cataclysmic dissolution of Communist regimes and the clamorous
awakening of the East European peoples in 1989" wrote Laszlo and David
Stark, "prompted observers to overestimate the strength of organized
democratic forces in these events. The stunning electoral victory of
Solidarity in June, the public drama of Imre Nagy's reburial in Budapest that
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same month, the street demonstrations in Leipzig in October, and the
massive assemblies in Prague in November were all signs of popular striving
for democracy."'
The first "velvet revolutions" in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia
placed these countries in the avant-garde of democratic transformations in
East-Central Europe. The speed with which the three countries purged their
basic laws of communist rhetoric raised the expectation that they would be
the first to adopt brand new constitutions in this region. In 1989, Poland
announced that its new constitution might be expected in the bicentennial of
the country's first constitution of May 3, 1791. The Preamble of the
amended constitution of Hungary referred to the temporary character of the
text. Since the beginning of 1990 Czechoslovakia quickly began to adopt a
number of constitutional acts which were expected to be soon collected into
one basic law in the very beginning of the nineties. None of these
expectations proved true, with the first new constitutions actually being
adopted in Bulgaria and Romania, the countries which traditionally were
recognized as strongholds of Communism. The question as to why those
countries which were more advanced in democratic restructuring were
outpaced in the process of making constitutions deserves further attention.
1. The First "Communist" Constitutions of Post-Communist Europe
a. Bulgaria
Political and Economic Transformation: In the eighties Bulgaria shared
with other Soviet satellite countries most of the crucial symptoms signifying
the corroding effects of the economic crisis of the communist system.
Incompetence, widespread corruption, and the unaccountability of decision-
makers were incompatible with the basic principles of economic efficiency.
Lack of information about, coordination of, and proper control over the
implementation of production decisions, coupled with a form of decentraliza-
tion that was more apparent than real, crippled the socialist system of central
planning and decisionmaking. The double standard of morality, together
with massive economic dislocations, created a black market and corruption
which have been irrevocably integrated into the way of life in communist
countries. In addition to all of these problems, Bulgaria's rapid industrializa-
tion in the sixties and seventies and the respective sweeping economic shifts
12' EAsTERN EUROPE IN REVOLUTION 13 (Ivo Banac ed., 1992).
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resulted in the widespread collapse of agriculture and left the country greatly
dependent on its Western and Eastern markets. M. Todorova observed,
The disintegration of the traditional East European and
Soviet markets, which had been Bulgaria's only export
possibility for the produce of its heavy, electronic, chemical,
and light industries became a major problem for the effec-
tiveness and, indeed, the very existence of these industries.
On the other hand, if one considers the structure of the
foreign debt, the extreme dependence of Bulgarian industries
on foreign imports is indicated by the fact that over 60
percent of the hard-currency expenditures during the last five
years went for the import of raw and other materials. There
is practically no industrial branch whose hard-currency
return is bigger than its hard-currency expenditures. The
continuous devaluations of the dollar were an additional
blow. On the whole, the country exports for dollars but
imports for deutsche marks, yens, and schillings.'
The pressure for reform that swept through Eastern Europe took effect in
Bulgaria starting with Bulgarian President Tudor Zhivkov's unexpected
resignation on November 11, 1989." Petar Mladenov, the former Foreign
Minister, replaced Zhivkov as the leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party
and the new President of the country."
The dissident or opposition movement in Bulgaria, until December 1989,
had consisted of various separate and small groups with different objectives
and strategies. In early December 1989, Bulgaria's nine leading opposition
groups, led by Zhelyu Zhelev, joined together to form the Union of
Democratic Forces ("UDF").In Under the pressure of the opposition, the
National Assembly voted on January 15, 1990 to end the Bulgarian
Communist Party's monopoly on political power. 6 The Assembly also
122 TODOROVA, IMPROBABLE MAVERICH OR TYPICAL CONFORMIST? SEVEN THOUGHTS
ON THE NEW BULGARIA, IN EASTERN EUROPE IN REVOLUTION, 149-50 (Ivo Banac ed., 1992).
'2 Battiata, Bulgaria's Zhivkov Quits After 35 Years; Foreign Minister, 53, Replaces East
Bloc's Longest-Serving Leader, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1989, at Al.
124 Id.
"5 Union of Democratic Forces Sets Out Its Aims, British Broadcasting Corp., Summary
of World Broadcasts, Dec. 9, 1989 available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, BBCSWB File.
126 Bulgaria Tumbles Communist Monopoly, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1990, at P2.
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approved provisions which would protect the rights of Bulgaria's ethnic Turk
and Moslem minorities. Responding to the UDF's pressure for a speedy
transition to a democracy, the Assembly also agreed to discuss with the
opposition further constitutional changes.
The Bulgarian opposition faced, however, several difficult problems. First,
it was inexperienced and staked its future heavily on a negative campaign
against the communists. 27 Second, the UDF lacked charismatic leaders
such as Polish Walesa or Czech Havel. Third, it did not have a real remedy
for the Bulgarian economy which presented many urgent problems, including
a mounting foreign debt, a substantial trade deficit, shortages of basic foods,
and poor quality of consumer products. Fourth, the opposition had to win
the confidence of the society which feared rapid changes and especially
economic shock-therapies. The UDF's effort for accelerating the process of
economic reform met with the electorate's reservations and criticism.
All of these factors contributed to the Bulgarian Communists', renamed
as the Bulgarian Socialist Party ("BSP"), unexpected victory in the elections
held in June 1990. Bulgaria became the first country in Eastern Europe to
return the communists to power after holding free multi-party elections."
The opposition, however, managed to elevate UDF's candidate to the
position of President."2  After five unsuccessful attempts to elect a
president, the parliament agreed to a "compromise candidate," Zhelyu
Zhelev, who ran unopposed and gained a vote of 284 out of 389 votes
cast.
130
The elections in Bulgaria resulted in a typical period of diarchy. After its
victory the "BSP," led by Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov, formed a
"coalition government of experts" with the Agrarian Union and the
Movement for the Rights and Freedoms.13 ' The UDF refused to join such
a coalition saying that it did not want to be held responsible for the
'27 Todorova, supra note 122, at 165.
'2' The result was repeated in March and April 1991 in Albanian multi-party elections in
which the Communist APL got over a two-thirds majority in the Albanian parliament.
Albania, Forgotten Country, E. EuR. REPORTER, 113, Aug. 13, 1992.
" President Mladenov was forced to resign on July 6, 1990, because of a videotape that
was made public which showed Mladenov calling for tanks to be used against demonstrators
in December 1989. See Bulgaria Chief Quits in "Let Tanks Come" Flap, L.A. TIMES, July
6, 1990, at P1.
130 Bulgaria Picks Non-Communist, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1990, at P2.
13' BULGARIAN SOCIALIST PARTY NOMINATES LUKANOV FOR PRIME MINSTER, REUTERS,
June 30, 1990.
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economic mistakes that the interim BSP government under Prime Minister
Lukanov had made during its period of rule. 32
After two weeks of street protests and a four-day general strike led by the
new trade union called Podkrepa, and with severe economic crisis plaguing
the country, Premier Lukanov was forced to resign on November 29,
1990.13 On December 7, 1990 Dimitar Popov, a politically independent
judge, was chosen by parliament to be the new prime minister."
In February 1991, the Bulgarian economy faced drastic reforms that were
implemented to facilitate the transition to a market economy. Price controls
were dropped and this was followed by price increases of up to ten times on
many basic items. Bulgaria also suffered severe shortages of fuel and other
necessities. The situation was grim: production had fallen 30% since 1989
and continued to fall, unemployment was at about 7% and rising, and
inflation was at about 500%. 35
In this situation it was obvious that the new elections of 1991 would also
be dominated by economic concerns. The results of the elections were a sort
of draw. Both major parties received almost identical support of the
electorate: Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), 110 seats and 34.36% of the
vote; and Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), 106 seats and 33.14% of the
vote 36 Although the UDF received a nominally higher percentage of
votes than the BSP, the UDF was far short of securing a majority of the
seats in the 240-seat parliament. Consequently, the BSP obtained enough
seats to slow the pace of reform. 37
The next show-down between the BSP and the UDF came with the
presidential elections held on January 12, 1992. This was the first time in
Bulgaria's history that the people were allowed to elect a president. The
main issues in the election were the economy, with the monthly inflation rate
at 3.5% and the unemployment rate at 10%, and nationalism, directed against
the ethnic Turk minority. The incumbent President Zhelev and his Vice-
President Blaga Dimitrov faced 21 other candidates and won by a narrow
132 Bulgarians Rally to Support Strike for Democracy, REUTERS, June 25, 1991.
133 THE POLmCAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 90 (Arthur S. Banks ed, 1991).
"4 Judge Chosen as Bulgaria's Prime Minister, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1990, at P3.
115 Bulgaria Gets Few Points for Progress, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 25, 1991, at CI.
136 Final Official General Election Results, British Broadcasting Corp., Summary of World
Broadcasts, (Radio Broadcast, Oct. 23, 1991).
137 By a vote of 131-94 the Parliament chose Philip Dimitrov, a lawyer and leader of the
UDF, as the new prime minister of Bulgaria. See Dimitrov Elected Bulgarian Prime Minister,
UPI, Nov. 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, UPI File.
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margin in the run-off against the BSP candidate Velko Valkanov. 31
.The UDF government faces an electorate exhausted by factional politics
and ready to support any party which would offer a coherent program of
economic recovery. Many Bulgarians, disillusioned by the economic crisis
as well as by the government's confrontational stance towards unions and the
press, have openly turned against the UDF government under Prime Minister
Dimitrov, including the powerful anti-communist union Podkrepa, the post-
communist Independent Syndicate Confederation, the Confederation of
Independent Trade Unions, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, and
President Zhelev.3 Many critics assert that the strong anti-communist
stance taken by the UDF government has only added to the economic
problems of Bulgaria. They claim that there is still a strong pro-communist
sentiment in the country and that communist opposition is the fact which has
to be faced by the UDF. Opinion polls for Fall 1992 gave the UDF 31%,
down from 35% at the beginning of the year, and gave the BSP 26% of the
vote.
140
Constitutional Development: Despite the economic turmoil, Bulgaria's
overall human rights performance continued to improve in 1991. Freedom
of press, assembly, religion, speech, association, and travel were generally
respected. 141  One also might observe that, all factional animosities
notwithstanding, the Bulgarians were able to avoid drastic pluralization of
their legislative body which crippled many of the constitutional reforms in
Poland and Czechoslovakia. On the one hand, the Bulgarian National
Assembly, which split into two major coalitions, suffered from the excessive
polarization of its political forces. On the other hand, the existence of just
two major opponents still kept this body operational. Thus, using its
significant electoral victory in 1990, the socialist coalition was in the
position to push forward the process of constitutional drafting. As a result,
the Grand National Assembly, elected in 1990, adopted the first brand new
constitution in East-Central Europe in July 1991.
The constitution was carefully purged of rhetoric typical for the Stalinist
constitutions. It dropped the terms such as "people's republic," "socialist
3 Zhelev did win 53 percent of the vote, beating out Valkanov who received 46.6
percent. Bulgarians endorse reform, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 24, 1992.
'
39 Sergueva, Crisis Looms Large in Bulgaria, MIDDLE EAST NEWS NETWORK, Sept. 13,
1992.
140id.
41 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 1991 Human Rights Report, Feb. 1992.
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state," "socialists achievements," and "central planning." Instead, the
Republic of Bulgaria is characterized as a democratic, law-governed, and
social state, based upon the rule of law, principles of people's sovereignty,
political pluralism, division of powers, precedence of ratified, constitutional
international treaties over conflicting domestic legislation, and wide
protection of fundamental rights of citizens.'
The 1971 Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria rejected the
principle of division of powers, vesting all power in representative organs,
the National Assembly, and people's councils. The new Constitution
clearly provides that "the power of the state is divided between a legislative,
an executive, and a judicial branch."'"
The changes in the system of governance are less elaborate. The form of
government did not change and Article 1 of the 1991 constitution provides
that "Bulgaria is a republic with a parliamentary system of government.""
The drafters shifted the functions of the State Council, the collegiate head of
state, to the President. One who would attempt to trace in the new Bulgarian
Constitution some elements of the presidential system will discover some
borrowings from the French model,'" such as direct election of the
President or the prohibition of a joint appointment as a minister and a
national representative." 7 Otherwise, the role of the President is envisaged
as that of a senior statesman who represents Bulgaria in international
relations and consults the parliamentary groups in the process of nominating
the candidate for Prime Minister.'" The President's discretion to choose
his own candidate for Prime Minister is limited; he either has to nominate
the candidate of the largest parliamentary group, or, respectively, the
candidates of the second-largest and other major parties if the previous
appointees fail to propose the cabinet in seven days. If the National
Assembly subsequently is unable to nominate its own candidate, the
42 CONSTIUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
EELEG File; U.S. Dept of Commerce, July 13, 1991, Preamble, arts. 1,4,5,8,11,24/2 and ch.
2 (Fundamental Rights and Obligations of Citizens) [hereinafter BULGARIAN CONSTITUTION].
,4" Id. at art 2(2). See also WILLIAM B. SIMONS, THE CONsTrrUTIoNs OF THE
COMMUNIST WORLD, at 38-67 (1980), for text of the 1917 Constitution.
'" BuLG. CONST. art. 8.
"id. at art. 1.
,4 For the explanation of the French model, see Part II, Chapter D: Presidential vs.
Parliamentary System.
147 BuLG. CONST. arts. 93(1), 68(2).
'" Id. at arts. 92(1), 99.
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President has to appoint a "caretaker cabinet" and dissolve the Assembly.
The President does not have the right to veto the legislative acts, to rule by
decrees, to hold referenda, or to declare martial law or a state of emergency.
Nor is he the chief of the executive. That position is held by the Prime
Minister who is fully responsible before the National Assembly.
Justice is administered by the courts and supervised by the Supreme Court
of Appeals. The judiciary has independent and coequal status with the
legislature and the executive.14' The 1991 constitution also provides for
a system of administrative adjudication exercised by the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court.'5 Judges, prosecutors, and investigators are appointed,
promoted, demoted, transferred, or dismissed by the High Judicial Council,
a self-governing judicial body composed of the Presidents of the Supreme
Courts and appointees of the National Assembly and judicial authorities:
The Presidents of the Supreme Courts are appointed or dismissed by the
President of the Republic upon the proposal of the High Judicial Coun-
cil.15
1
The Constitution established the Constitutional Court based on Western
European models. The Constitutional Court consists of 12 justices, elected
in the modified French fashion:' 52 one-third by the National Assembly, the
second third by the President, and the final third by a joint meeting of the
justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals and the Supreme Administrative
Court. The Court has elaborate advisory and arbitrary functions. The
constitution also vested in the Court the right of abstract constitutional
review which may be exercised on the initiative of no less than one-fifth of
the national representatives, the President, the Council of Ministers, the
Supreme Court of Appeals, the Supreme Administrative Court, or the
Prosecutor General. The decisions of the Court are final and any act ruled
unconstitutional becomes invalid as of the day of the enactment of the
ruling. 15
3
To sum up, the Bulgarian Constitution of 1991 can be praised for its
clarity and coherence, well-balanced concept of a parliamentary, system,
judicial review of administrative actions , and elaborate system of judicial
149 U.S. DEPt. OF STATE, supra note 141.
0 BULG. CONST. arts. 119 (1), 124, 125.
Ms' Id. at arts. 129, 130.
5For more detailed explanation of French model, see Part II, Chapter E: Constitutional
Enforcement.
t53 BuLo. CONST. arts. 149-152.
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self-government. The presidential-executive relations are still confusing and
one must observe that the Bulgarian Prime Minister lacks the maneuverabili-
ty of the British Prime Minister or the German Chancellor. The scope of the
constitutional review is still fairly limited and the functions of the Constitu-
tional Court, which can be activated either by the ordinary courts or
individual petitions, are predominantly advisory. Despite these shortcomings,
the 1991 Bulgarian Constitution attracted significant media attention as the
first brand new constitution of the post-glasnost period in East-Central
Europe.
b. Romania
Political and Economic Transformation: The end of communist dictator
Nicolae Ceausescu's rule came about in late December 1989. Following the
Timisoara demonstrations and a week-long outburst of hostilities in
Bucharest between protesters the Securitate (the state secret police), and the
troops loyal to Ceausescu, the dictator was ousted and executed on December
25, 1989.
Several days before the execution of Ceausescu, on December 22, 1989,
a new provisional government, the Council of the National Salvation Front
("CNSF'), was formed to serve until May 1990, when Romania would hold
free parliamentary elections." The leaders of the CNSF took over the
main governmental positions: Ion Iliescu, a former Communist Party official
who was deposed by Ceausescu, became President; Dumitru Mazilu, a
diplomat who was placed under house arrest for criticizing the dictator, was
named Vice President; and Petre Roman, professor at the Polytechnic
Institute, was appointed Prime Minister.155
The question of how the CNSF was actually formed was the subject of
controversy; there was much speculation that the group had been in existence
for many months before the December revolution in Romania. The Council
officially announced its existence on December 22 on national television; at
that time, it had thirty-nine members consisting of dissidents, former
Communist Party members, intellectuals, and artists. By early January 1990,
" Celestine Bohlen, Upheaval in the East: Bucharest Says Entire Politburo Ruled by
Ceausescu is in Custody, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan 3, 1990, at Al.
" Celestine Bohlen, Upheaval in the East; Interim Rumanian [sic] Leaders Named as
Fighting Subsidies; Hundreds Buried in Capital, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec 27, 1989, at Al.
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the CNSF had grown to 150 members."
On February 2, 1990, under pressure from opposition groups, the CNSF
relinquished its control over the government, reorganized as a political party,
and joined with members of 29 other political parties to form an interim
coalition government.'57 Basically, any group that had met the require-
ments for forming an official political party was eligible to join the new
interim government.15 The new government, which was to rule the country
until the May 1990 elections, was called the "Provisional Council for
National Unity."' 59
The presidential and parliamentary elections set for May 1990 were the
first free elections in Romania in 62 years. The only three parties represent-
ed in the presidential elections were: the National Salvation Front ("NSF'),
whose candidate was Ion Iliescu; the National Peasant's Party ("NPP"),
whose candidate was Ion Ratiu; and the National Liberal Party ("NLP"),
whose candidate was Radu Campeanu. Over 80 parties ran candidates in the
parliamentary elections for the 397 seats in the lower house, the National
Assembly, and the 190 seats in the upper house, the Senate."w
The result of the elections was basically a landslide victory for the left-
wing NSF. Iliescu was elected President of Romania, receiving 85.07% of
the vote, and the NSF won a two-thirds majority in both houses of the
parliament, receiving 62.31% of the vote for the lower house and 67.02% of
the vote for the upper house.'6 Although the victories of both the NSF
and Iliescu had been predicted, the difference in votes received between the
NSF and other opposition parties was surprisingly large.
"5 Celestine Bohlen, Upheaval in the East: The Overview; Rumanian [sic] Moving to
Abolish Worst of Repressive Era, N.Y. TIMES, Dec 28, 1989, at Al.
157 Celestine Bohlen, Upheaval in the East: Rumania; Rumania's Rulers Agree to Share
Power, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1990, at Al.
58 The official political party requirements were that there were to be at least 251
members in the organization, deposit in bank of at least $1,100, an address, a platform, and
a set of bylaws. By February 1, 1990, 29 parties had met the requirements. See Celestine
Bohlen, Upheaval in the East: Rumania; Question in Bucharest: Who's in What Party?,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb 3, 1990, at AS.
19 Id.
"
60 Evolution in Europe; Choosing a New Romanian Leader, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1990,
at 16.
16' Final Election Results, The BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts (Radio Broadcast,
May 28, 1990).
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Upon assuming his position as President, Iliescu began a program of
"dismantling centralized planning in favor of freer markets."'6 Moreover,
the NSF advocated a "gradual transition to a market economy with the
emphasis on social guarantees for the working people" which would not
include any shock therapy reforms.'63 In June of 1990, President Iliescu
appointed Petre Roman as prime minister; subsequent to that, Roman
appointed a 23-member cabinet composed mostly of technocrats, with
representation of the opposition lacking. This absence was basically the
reason that sparked student demonstrations against the NSF at Bucharest
University in mid-June 1990. The students accused the Front of neo-
communism and established a "Communist-free zone" in the city center.'"
The demonstration was broken up by thousands of miners who, on Iliescu's
call, arrived in Bucharest and beat up the demonstrators in the presence of
the police.10
The next tide of protests in Bucharest was caused by the reorganization of
the Romanian Communist Party. The Party which virtually disappeared after
it was ousted in December 1989, re-initiated itself under the name Socialist
Party of Labor ("SPL") in November 1990. This new party was created by
former members of the Communist Party joining with the left-wing
Democratic Party of Labor.'6 The creation of the SPL was met with
protests from opposition forces both in the streets of Bucharest and in the
parliament. Protesters, who viewed the SPL as merely a secret creation of
Iliescu and the NSF, demanded the resignation of the President. 67
Throughout the end of 1990 and the first half of 1991, the protests against
the government continued, resulting in the resignation of Prime Minister
Roman on September 26, 199 1. The violence began on September 25 when
Romanian miners gathered in Bucharest to demand higher wages and better
living conditions. The miners were soon joined by city residents protesting
'6 Romanian President Pledges Freer Markets, CHi. TaiB., May 26, 1990, at 4.
'6 Romanian Elections Show "Predominance of Left-Wing Forces", British Broadcasting
Corp., Summary of World Broadcasts, (Radio Broadcast, May 30, 1990).
'" Katherine Verdery & Gail Kligman, Romania after Ceausescu: Post-Communist
Communism?, in EASTERN EUROPE IN REVOLUTION, at 130, (Ivo Banac ed., 1992) [hereinafter
EASTERN EUROPE N REVOLUTION].
'6 Id. at 133-34.
'6 Romanian Communist Party Reappears Under New Name, REUTERS, Nov. 18, 1990,
available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Reuters File.
167 Protests Mark Launch of New Romanian Party, REUTERS, Nov. 19, 1990, available
in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Reuters File.
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both the government and the economic crisis plaguing the country. This
time the demonstrators demanded the resignation of the President and the
Prime Minister. Succumbing to the pressure, Roman resigned but remained
in office until the new government of Theodor Stolojan was ready to take
over. 1
Looking ahead to the next general elections which were to be held in
September 1992, it appeared that the opposition parties would need to join
forces in order to challenge the incumbent NSF. As early as November
1991, the NPL leader Radu Campeanu started to unite the NPL, the NPP, the
Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania ("DUHR"), and other
opposition parties in an attempt to form some sort of alliance to run against
the NSF.' Such an alliance of opposition forces was finally formed in
November 1991 under the name "Democratic Convention." The Convention,
which was composed of 18 different groups, said that it was seeking to
remove from Romania, "communism, primitive nationalism, extremism, and
chauvinism" and in turn institute the rule of law as well as a market
economy.' 70
As the 1992 elections drew nearer, it appeared that President Iliescu, who
had relinquished his party membership upon assuming his position as
President, would seek to secure his reelection by disassociating himself from
the radical economic program of NSF. He successfully presented himself as
a senior statesman standing above factional conflicts, presiding over steady,
free-market, and democratic reforms but opposing any drastic, "surgical"
changes. This position manifested in the pre-election period contributed to
the split between Iliescu supporters and the supporters of former Prime
Minister Roman. Roman has called Iliescu "a neo-communist who depends
on the Romanian Intelligence Service for survival" while calling himself "the
only capable reformer in politics today. '17'
Iliescu's chances for reelection were also enhanced by the split in the
opposition camp. In May of 1992, Campeanu removed the NLP from the
Democratic Convention, thus removing any hopes of the Convention being
the biggest electoral bloc. The main reason behind this split was that the
'6 Romanian Miners Hold Out for President's Resignation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1991,
at 3.
'69 Romania: Stolojan's Quick-step, EASTERN EUR. NEWSLETrER, Nov. 18, 1991, at 1,
6-7.
170 Anatomy of Romania's Centrist Opposition Alliance, REUTERS, Sept. 25, 1992.
171 Romania: Election Briefing, E. EuR. NEWsLETIrER, Sept. 7, 1992, at 2, 3.
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NLP could not agree with the Democratic Convention on power sharing.
Moreover, this action by the NLP blocked any chance that one party would
win more than 20% of the seats in the Parliament."
As had been predicted in the presidential race, no candidate won an
absolute majority, thus making a second round run-off mandatory. What was
surprising was the fact that, despite national opinion polls, Iliescu received
a higher percentage of votes than the main opposition candidate Emil
Constantinescu. The second round, run-off presidential election was held on
October 11, 1992, with Iliescu winning over 61% of the vote to beat out
Constantinescu, who won 39% of the vote.173
In the parliamentary elections, the results were even more surprising as the
ex-communists, receiving about 30% of the vote and defying earlier
predictions, prevailed over the democrats who only received about 20% of
the vote. 74 However, since no party won a clear majority, future legisla-
tive action depended on the winners' possibility to form a coalition
government. The task took almost a month but finally, on November 4,
1992, at a meeting between Iliescu and parliamentary party leaders, Nicolae
Vacaroiu was appointed as the new Prime Minister.' " Iliescu appointed
the non-partisan Vacaroiu calling him a "man of reform."'76  While
Vacaroiu wants to work for "the continuation and consolidation of reform,"
he does not want to introduce quick and abrupt changes that would cause the
standard of living to drop dramatically.'
Constitutional Development: The communist dominance in the Romanian
National Assembly in 1990-91 had undoubtedly one beneficial aspect. The
communists, attempting to establish their reputation as reformers, declared
that the primary task of the new Parliament would be to draft a new
constitution. The communist-dominated Parliament completed its task of the
adoption of a new constitution fifteen months after a Constitutional
Commission was formed in June 1990.178 The Commission, consisting of
172 Romania: Waiting for E-Day, E. EUR. NEWSLErr, May 11, 1992, at 5, 6.
" Romanian President Calls for 'Exceptional Measures' Against Crime, UPI, Oct. 13,
1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, UPI File.
174 Romania: After the Victory, a Deluge?, E. EUR. NEWSLETFER, Oct. 5, 1992, at 8.
'7 Nicolae Vacaroiu Named as New Romanian Premier, The BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts (Radio Broadcast, Nov. 5, 1992), available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, BBC File.
'76 Tough Times Ahead for New Romanian Premier, AGENCE FRANCE PRmsSE, Nov. 5,
1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library.
in Id.
17 E. EUR. CoNsT. REv., Spring 1992, at 4.
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parliament deputies from Iliescu's National Salvation Front, discussed the
draft constitution with the group of CEELI experts in the Summer and the
Fall of 1991 in Bucharest and Washington, D.C. Preliminary and final drafts
were debated in the full Constituent Assembly (which doubles the regular
parliament) and, after having been submitted to a referendum, the final draft
was passed on November 21, 1991 and was promulgated on December 8,
1991.119
The Constitution should be praised for its clear structure and compact
character. The list of constitutional rights is long and looks impressive at
first glance. The Constitution guarantees equality of rights; individual
freedom and personal security; rights to free movement; privacy of life;
freedom of religion, assembly, speech, and press; confidentiality of
correspondence; inviolability of domicile; major political, social and
economic rights, such as the rights to vote, and to be elected; rights to
education, to information, to health care; the right to strike; the protection of
private property; and many others.
A more careful examination of this list may raise several concerns. For
example, one may observe that minority interests, notoriously Romania's
problem, require more sophisticated safeguards than the regular guarantees
of equality before the law, impartiality of the courts, and respect for
minorities' languages.'8° One may also point out that the protection of the
rights of aliens do not measure up to current international standards, which
offer equal protection before the law to "the persons," including foreigners,
rather than only to "the citizens" of the country.' Among other prob-
lems, it may be noted that, if the freedom of movement of citizens is to be
protected, the restrictions of this right should be laid down by the constitu-
tion, not by ordinary law. The restriction on the exercise of individual rights
and freedoms on the basis of offending a vaguely defined "public morality"
may also raise some concern."s
Generally speaking, the evaluation of constitutional rights is always
difficult without the examination of judicial enforcement of the constitutional
guarantees and here some observations deserve notice. The Romanian
Constitutional Court, established on the basis of a law adopted by the
1"9 Id.
110 ROM. CoNsT., pt. I, art. 6 and pt. I1, ch. 1, art. 59, § 2.
181 RoM. CONsT pt. II, ch. 1, art. 16.
8 Id. at pt. II, ch. II, arts. 26, 49.
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National Assembly on May 16, 1992,"83 follows the French model of
political rather than "sensu stricto" judicial review.' The Court may not
convene on the initiative of other courts, or on its own initiative. The right
to initiate constitutional review is reserved to a few political figures who will
usually belong to the same majority which passed the challenged statute,
such as the presidents of two chambers, at least 50 deputies and 25
senators.18 5 The Romanian Court cannot decide on the constitutionality of
laws in force or ratified international agreements. The Court's right to hear
individual complaints on violations of constitutionally guaranteed rights is
very vague. With the exception of the power of review when a legislative
enactment has been drafted but not yet promulgated, in addition to some
supervisory functions, the powers of the Romanian Constitutional Court are
very limited. The decision of the Court concerning the unconstitutionality
of laws may be overruled by a two-thirds majority of Parliament. In France,
this system works in combination with the network of administrative courts,
with the Conseil d'Etat (Council of State) at the top, which reviews the
legality of the administrative acts. In absence of this system, one may
observe that the judicial enforcement of the constitutional rights in Romania
may still be difficult.
The Constitution created a parliamentary form of government with a dual
executive and bicameral legislature. The rationale for the existence of the
second chamber in the Romanian system is not clear. The chambers are
equal and elected in the same way. Both Deputies and Senators represent
the entire country and cannot be bound by the instructions of their constitu-
encies. The number of instances in which both chambers meet in joint
sittings further confirms an opinion that their functions are basically the
same.
The second chambers are usually set up to promote regionalism, as is the
case of Belgium, Spain and Italy, are federal components of the legislative
bodies, as is the case of the United States, Germany, Switzerland, Russia and
Yugoslavia, or simply survived in the countries with strong traditions of
bicameralism, such as the United Kingdom. In some new democracies of
113 The court was founded on June 3, 1992. See Constitution Watch: Romania, EAST
EuR. CONST. REv., Summer 1992, at 5.
'" For more comments on French model of constitutional review see text accompanying
notes 369-386, infra.
'85 The Court can also convene at the request of the President of Romania and the
Supreme Court of Justice. ROM. CONST. art. 144.
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East-Central Europe, Poland for one, the second chambers were set up for
political reasons to counterbalance the influence of the communist nomencla-
ture in the first chamber. As none of these reasons characterize the
Romanian political environment, the existence of two chambers seems to be
of little use.
The prerogatives of the directly elected President are limited. Before
promulgation, the President may refer the law to Parliament for reconsidera-
tion but has to promulgate it if the Parliament passes the law again by a
simple majority.'" The President designates a candidate for the post of
Prime Minister and appoints the government on the basis of a vote of
confidence from Parliament.' The President, after consulting the Presi-
dents of both chambers, may dissolve Parliament once a year if Parliament
does not approve the formation of the government within 60 days of the first
request." The President is the commander-in-chief and can institute a
popular referendum, after consulting Parliament. 89
In summary, despite several flaws, the Constitution sets up a solid
framework for the further development of democratic mechanisms in
Romania. Whether this framework will be used to strengthen the communist
legacy or to peel off the country's neo-communist label depends on the
Romanians themselves. 9°  In an interview on September 25, 1992,
preceding his electoral victory, President Iliescu said, "It is not up to others,
but up to the Romanian people to decide who is the best representative for
them." 19' At least until recently, this seemed to be true.
c. Albania
The End of Political Isolation: "Enver Hoxha, who ruled from 1945 to
his death in 1985," wrote Kathleen Imbolz, "maintained one of the world's
strictest and most isolated communist police states. He broke ties first with
Yugoslavia, Albania's northern and eastern neighbor, and then, in 1960, with
the Soviet Union, in each case claiming that they had diverged unacceptably
I' ld. at art. 77.
I' Id. at art. 85.
188 Id. at art. 89.
9 Id. at arts. 90, 92.
"9 Psst! Iliescu Reelected President, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1992, at A18.
'9' Romania's Ex-Communist President Faces Tough Reelection Bid Today, WASH. POST,
Sept. 27, 1992, at A44.
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from a Stalinist purity. From then until 1978, Albania maintained a political
friendship only with China. After breaking with that nation as well, Albania
stood alone for more than 10 years."'1
When Ramiz Alia, Hoxha's successor as the president and first secretary
of the ruling Party of Labor (APL), assumed power, many people hoped that
he would become "Albania's Gorbachev." 93 Contrary to these expecta-
tions the situation in Albania remained essentially the same, as the personali-
ty cult established by Hoxha was still heavily followed.
Late 1990 brought the first outright challenges to the communist regime.
Initially, President Alia, acting in the role of "the reformer," had announced
that the upcoming elections in March 1991 would be secret-ballot, multi-
choice elections, but refused to allow multi-party elections. Then on
December 8, 1990, student protests erupted at Tirana University. The
protests evolved into a pro-democracy movement, and on December 11,
President Alia agreed to meet with the student leaders. As a result of this
meeting and mounting demonstrations, Alia authorized the formation of
opposition parties."
As the first opposition party to form, the Democratic Party was comprised
of students and intellectuals.195 In addition to the Democratic Party, the
following parties formed prior to the elections in the spring of 1991: the
Republican Party, the Democratic Front, the environmentalist Greens, the
pro-communist Agrarian Party, the Albanian Women's Committee, and the
Greek minority Omania organization.'"
The first multi-party parliamentary elections since the communists took
over in 1944 took place in two rounds, on March 31, 1991 and on April 7,
1991. As had been forecasted, the Communists, acting under the pretense
of reformers, proved victorious at the ballot box, receiving the vast majority
of their support from rural areas." The Democratic Party, on the other
hand, received the majority of their support from cities, including the
192 Kathleen Imbolz, Albania: Forgotten Country, Analysis and Opinion, E. EUR. REP.,
Aug. 31, 1992, at 732.
93 Verdery & Kligman, supra note 164, at 189.
194 Id.
'9 Carol J. Williams, Albania--A Step to Democracy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1991, at 6.
196 Id.
19" Paul Holmes, Albania's Communists Hold Power, Leaders Humbled-Forecast,
REUTERS, Apr. 1, 1991.
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Albanian capital, Tirana.'" These elections resulted in a 250-member
parliament consisting of both hardliners and moderates, in which the
Communist APL held over a two-thirds majority of 168 seats.
A surprising result of the election was the upset of President Alia in his
campaign for a seat in Parliament; Alia was defeated by Democratic Party
candidate Frank Krrogi.' 99 This apparent upset was not, however, the end
of Alia's political career. A new draft constitution, introduced by Alia and
the ALP right before the March 31 elections, stated, among other things, that
Parliament could elect anyone to be president if the person "fulfills all
conditions for being elected a deputy."'  The draft constitution did not
explicitly require that person to be a member of Parliament.2°  Since the
APL won a majority in Parliament, it had enough strength to push through
a temporary Law on Major Constitutional Provisions, despite resistance from
the opposition. After passing this law, the Parliament elected Alia as
President.
As a result of unsuccessful attempts of several governments to cope with
the political turmoil and grave economic problems, the date of the next
parliamentary elections was set for March 22, 1992. Although the Demo-
crats won the elections, beating the Socialists as predicted, they inherited a
country in serious economic trouble, with hungry and unemployed masses,
rising inflation, widespread crime, and a collapsed economy. The Democrat-
ic Party obtained control over 62% of the National Assembly seats, giving
Albania's Parliament the largest democratic majority in all of Eastern
Europe.m Democratic Party leader, Sali Berisha, was appointed by
Parliament as Albania's first non-communist president. Much to the
satisfaction of the Democrats, on April 4, 1992, President Alia, the "last of
the communist style dictators in Eastern Europe," resigned before the
Parliament could remove him from office. 3
'" Albania, E. EuR. REP., (American Banker-Bond Buyer, A Division of Thomas
Publishing Corp.) Apr. 15, 1991, Vol 1, No. 14, at 2.
199 Id.
'00 ALB. CoNsT. art. 78 (March 1991 draft) [hereinafter ALB. CONST. (1991 Draft)].
20' Paul Holmes, Albania Dumps Title "Socialist" in Draft Constitution, REUTERS, Apr.
10, 1991.
' Janusz Bugajski, A Pivotal Time in Albania, CHRISTIAN Sci. MoNITOR, Apr. 15, 1992,
at 19.
203 Graham Barrett, Albania: Alia Resigns, Reuter Textline, THE AGE (Melbourne), Apr.
4, 1992.
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Constitution Drafting: The constitution-making process in Albania began
in 1990, when a parliamentary commission assisted by an extraparliamentary
expert group was formed to write a new constitution.O The first draft was
completed in December 1990 and the work on a second draft proceeded as
the country moved toward the spring 1991 elections.' The draft, dated
March 1991, was submitted to Western commentators for evaluation.'
The analysis was forwarded to Albania at the end of September 1991. 207
The disputes regarding the March 1991 draft focused on several key
issues: the separation of powers, the regulation of economic activity, the
treatment of human rights protections, the status and functioning of the
judiciary, and the constitutional court. The framework describing the basic
philosophical concepts of the Albanian Constitution still is not clear. The
draft refers to Albania as an "6tat de droit" 8 "based on social justice, the
protection of human rights and freedoms, and on political pluralism."'t 9
One may observe, however, that the concept of "dtat de droit" in a classical
version comprises an idea of division of powers, the most venerated principle
of Western constitutionalism. Contrarily, the socialist constitutional
jurisprudence usually rejected the doctrine of division of powers as
apparently incompatible with the idea of parliamentary supremacy. In fact,
the doctrine of division of powers was irreconcilable with the totalitarian
leadership of the communist parties and, as such, could not be placed among
the major principles of socialist constitutionalism. In contrast to some other
constitutional drafts analyzed above, the Albanian draft still did not recognize
this principle explicitly. It refers to the People's Assembly as "the supreme
organ of state power," whereas the Council of Ministers is not referred to as
the "executive power" but, as in typical socialist constitutions, as "the
supreme executive organ."210
The Albanian draft provides for typical provisions setting up the
framework for a parliamentary system in which the two branches of
2m Constitution Watch: Albania, E. EUR. CONsT. REv., Summer 1992, at 2.
20' See E. EuR. CONST. REv., Spring 1992, at 4.
2o6 The March 1991 draft, which will be analyzed below, will be referred to as the
"Albanian draft."
' Analysis of the Draft Constitution of Albania, A.B.A. CEELI, Sept. 30, 1991
[hereinafter CEELI Albanian Analysis].
o For a more detailed explanation of the concept of "tat de droit" see Part II, Chapter
B: The Description of the State.
m ALB. CONST. (1991 Draft), supra note 200, at art. 2.
210 Id. at arts. 67, 68.
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government, legislative and executive, are more or less fused, with the
legislature being able to vote the executive out of office without any need
for a national election by the people. The Albanian People's Assembly has
an exclusive right to adopt and amend the constitution (the "pouvoir
constituant"), to adopt statutes, and to elect the President and the Council of
Ministers. Western experts commented:
The vesting of primary government power in the legislature
has been a hallmark for socialist regimes in Central and East
Europe for many years under the Communist system.
During that time, the legislatures acted primarily as a rubber
stamp to Communist Party dictates and were not expected to
carry out the full exercise of governance and policy making.
Under a more democratic system the vesting of almost total
power in the legislature is an invitation to authoritarianism
and abuse of power. This threat can be prevented only by
establishing in the constitutional framework a more evenly
balanced distribution of powers between the executive,
legislative and judicial branches.2"
It was clearly the will of the drafters to leave the concept of ownership
close to the socialist model. Although the draft provides that private
property can be expropriated only for public needs and that the state does not
have a monopoly over ownership, public ownership is still privileged. Land
and underground resources are the property of the state, land being given
only for "the use" of physical persons. There are still no declarations of the
marketization of the economy. In fact, the draft contains numerous
references to "central planning" as a "mechanism of harmonization of
national and local interests," reminiscent of the traditional rhetoric of the
Stalinist constitutions." 2 These provisions are still far away from Western
standards.
Of special concern to Western commentators were serious problems in the
treatment of human rights protections. The catalog of fundamental rights
presented by the draft is relatively long and looks impressive at first glance.
One may observe that some of the economic and social rights, such as the
right to employment, health care, and education, are at this moment
211 CEELI Albanian Analysis, supra note 207, at 3.
212 ALB. CONST. (1991 Draft), supra note 200, at art. 19.
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unenforceable and may be treated only as programmatic statements. The
constitutional declaration that the state promotes policies in favor of the
implementation of these rights would be more consistent with the availability
of national resources in the poorest country of the Eastern Europe. The
human rights provisions of the draft have been criticized for their generally
unclear language, for the presence of limitations and exceptions that could
seriously curtail the exercise of legitimate freedoms, and for granting
government officials substantial discretion in determining how and whether
protected rights can be invoked." 3
The provisions on organization of the independent judiciary raise serious
concern. The commentators observed that many elements in the Draft
Constitution would limit or undermine the independent status of judges and
the court system.21 4 Among the most important are, for example, the
power of the Assembly to dismiss members of the highest courts,215 the
power of the Ministry of Justice to "direct and control the activity of judicial
administration, 2 6 the composition of the Supreme Council of Justice as
a self-governing judicial body made up of nominated officials (by the
President, the Minister of Justice, the Attorney General) or jurists elected not
by the courts but by the legislature, and the very limited term of office (5
years) of the Constitutional Council.2 7
The Albanian draft follows a limited mixed system of judicial review
which provides for one centralized organ, the Constitutional Council, to hear
all constitutional cases. The Council can be activated either by the inquiry
of the regular courts hearing the disputes involving constitutional controver-
sies, or by special political organs through a direct action. The Albanian
draft has some French features and borrows from the model of judicial
review initially introduced in Poland in the mid-eighties. The Albanian
Constitutional Council, more a political body than a court, is to be comprised
of members appointed by the Assembly and by the President. The right to
file a petition is to be vested in the highest state officials and one-fifth of the
deputies. The ability of the Council to act as an effective independent check
on unauthorized action by the Assembly is limited by the fact that in cases
dealing with the constitutionality of statutes, the decision of the Council is
213 CEELU Albanian Analysis, supra note 207, at 3-5.
214 Id. at 5.
21- ALB. CONST. (1991 Draft), supra note 200, at arts. 68, 69.
216 Id. at art. 111.
217 CEELU Albanian Analysis, supra note 207, at 5-6.
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not final and may be overruled by a vote of two-thirds of the People's
Assembly.218
In sum, the Albanian draft still has general organizational and structural
needs, insufficient clarity, and a socialist flavor, shortcomings which most
likely will be corrected by the third draft. A new commission headed by
Deputy Minister of Justice Kristag Traja recently began preparation for a
third draft. The Commission containing members of all five parties
represented in Parliament, such as Democratic, Socialist, Social Democratic,
Republican and Human Rights, as well as judges and other experts, is
expected to complete its work at the end of 1992.19
2. The Avant-Garde Comes Late
a. Poland
Political Compromise: One who would like to contrast the Hungarian and
Polish retreats from Communism quickly finds that the transition to
democracy in Hungary took place in unfettered electoral competition while
the transition in Poland was a result of an important political compro-
mise.2' At the moment when the Polish Solidarity set to their Round
Table negotiations with the communist government officials in April 1989,
the idea of free elections in Eastern Europe was inconceivable. 22 The
compromise reached in Spring 1989 provided for the opposition's participa-
tion in the upcoming elections in exchange for 35% of the seats in the Seym
(the lower house) and free elections of the Senate (the second chamber of the
parliament). The newly created Presidency was to remain in the hands of the
Communists. The Hungarian opposition capitalized on the Polish experience
and refused to enter into the elections under the communist umbrella. 222
The re-legalization of Solidarity and its electoral success in June 1989
confronted Poland's first post-war non-communist Prime Minister Tadeusz
Mazowiecki with the communist President, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, elected
by both chambers in which the seats were still occupied by the representa-
211 Id. at 16.
219 E. EUR. CONsT. REv., supra note 205, at 2.
o See EASTERN EUROPE IN REVOLUTION, supra note 164, at 17-19.
2' See Jan Gross, Poland: From Civil Society to Political Nation, in EASTERN EUROPE
IN REVOLUTION, supra note 164, at 60.
2n Id. at 27-30.
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tives with disputable legitimacy.' In April and December of 1989, the
Constitution was redrafted to include provisions guaranteeing a number of
civil liberties, establishing free elections, and removing the Communist Party
from its leading role in state affairs. Still the adoption of a brand new
constitution by the Parliament carrying a post-communist stigma seemed to
be unacceptable.
"In Hungary, by contrast," wrote Laszlo Bruszt and David Stark, "the
transformation of political structures has been so rapid and comprehensive
that its party system seems to whirl like a finely calibrated and well-oiled
machine."'  When the Hungarian Communists began to regain their
respectability, Poland was starting its "witch hunt" for the Communists who
still occupied important governmental and parliamentary posts. Paradoxical-
ly, on the one hand, Poles, like Hungarians, began to look back with some
sentiment to the communist policy of full employment and centralized
governmental control as opposed to uncertainty and hardships of a market
economy. On the other hand, Poles showed more and more impatience that
the end of communism had not brought immediate prosperity and began
blaming the government for "not settling accounts" with the former
Communists living opulently and obstructing the reforms. Professor Andrzej
Mania explains,
In result, if someone in the government has had connection
with the communist party in the past, no matter how small
the connection or how young this person was, he will have
a negative aura of untrustworthiness instilled upon him by
other members of government. These people claim that a
person with a communist background may not in fact know
what the proper interests of the country should be. For
example, during the formation of the parliament a dilemma
arose when it was necessary to find seats for each of the
party's representatives. No one wanted to sit next to the
communist party representatives out of fear that this would
show that their party is not too different from the commu-
223 Id. at 52.
224 Id
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nists since they sit so close.'
Neither the elevation of Lech Walesa to the post of the President in new
direct elections at the end of 1990, nor the parliamentary elections in October
1991 solved the Polish constitutional impasse. Being a result of a political
compromise, the amended Constitution created checks and balances which
ceased to work in a changing political environment. The Round Table
Agreements, which were to guarantee some amount of control for the
Communists, were a major departure from the parliamentary system toward
a presidential model.' The President was granted the right of veto and
legislative initiative, the right to dissolve the Parliament, and to impose
martial law.
The direct election of Lech Walesa as the first non-communist President
deprived the presidential model of its former rationale and strengthened the
sentiment to restore a parliamentary system. The opinion, however, that
depriving the Solidarity President of the same prerogatives enjoyed by his
Communist predecessor would be rather embarrassing, gave some steam to
the idea of balancing the President's power by further "democratization" of
the Parliament. Using the system of strict proportionality and disregarding
the usual 5% threshold which kept weaker parties out of the Parliament,
Poles elected representatives of no less than 29 parties. No single party
received more than 13% of the vote.2'
The excessive system of checking and balancing contributed to the
impotence of the Government. President Walesa, abandoned by his former
political allies, lost his backing in the Parliament. The communication
between both chambers of the legislature and the Government also became
very strained. Wiktor Osiatynski noted that
when, however, President Walesa tried to use his preroga-
tives, his power proved to be illusive. The Seym (the main
chamber of the Polish Parliament) could not rule itself but
22 Interview with Dr. Andrew Mania, Professor and Associate Dean of the Faculty of
Law, Jagiellonian University of Cracow, Poland, an expert on Polish Constitutional law (July
13, 1992) [hereinafter Interview with Dr. Mania].
m Osiatynski, Skazani na oryginalnosc [Doomed to Originality], GAZETA WYBORCZA
[ELECTORAL GAZETTE], Aug. 29, 1992, at 8.
227 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 1991 Human Rights Report: Poland (Feb. 1992) [hereinafter
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE].
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could block the work of the Government through obstructing
the legislative procedure. The President, despite the huge
power, could not rule himself either but could restrain the
Government and the Parliament.'
The opening ceremonies of Poland's first democratically elected Parlia-
ment were upset by the month-long failure of Parliament and the President
to agree on a new prime minister. 9 The protracted negotiations between
major parties, such as the Democratic Union Party headed by Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, the Liberal Democratic Congress of Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (the
second non-communist Prime Minister), and the center-right Center Alliance
most closely associated with Lech Walesa, were unsuccessful and ended with
the rejection of Walesa's first choice for prime minister, former Solidarity
adviser Bronislaw Geremek. Finally, in late December, the coalition
government of Jan Olszewski, supported by, among others, the Center
Alliance, the Christian National Union, and several peasant parties was
confirmed by Parliament.? According to expectations, this Government,
based on a large coalition, was from the very beginning incapacitated by
bitter factional struggles and unable to complete the constitution-making
process.
Economic Shock-Therapy: As in the case of Hungary, economic hardships
diverted the attention of the Poles from the constitutional reform. Advised
by Western experts, led by Harvard's Jeffrey Sachs, the Polish government
subscribed to the strategy of a one-shot jump toward a market economy.
The Polish economic reform has been based on three major kinds of
measures: liberalization, stabilization and privatization. Jeffrey Sachs wrote:
Economic liberalization means introducing market competi-
tion and creating a legal framework for private property and
privately owned business. Stabilization fosters a climate in
which enterprise of any kind can survive. It involves
limiting budget deficits, reducing the growth of the money
supply and establishing a realistic, uniform currency ex-
change rate to promote stable prices and foreign trade.
' Osiatynski, supra note 226, at 8.
229 Mary Battiata, Polish Parliament Opens with No Prime Minister, WASH. POST, Nov.
26, 1991, at A14, col 1.
230 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 227.
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Privatization, certainly the trickiest area of reform, transfers
existing state property, such as factories, to the private
sector.23
In January 1990, the architect of Poland's unprecedented transformation
from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Finance Leszek Balcerowicz announced that, in
order to provide a foundation for future liberalization, stabilization, and
privatization, the Polish Government had to pursue a program of significant
economic austerity. To keep inflation under control and to make the
currency convertible, the Government introduced a tight money policy and
removed most price controls. As far as macroeconomic stabilization is
concerned, the results were remarkable. The budget shifted from a deficit
of 7.4 percent of the GNP in 1989 to a surplus of 3.8 percent in 1990. The
reform eliminated persistent shortages and lines at Polish stores. Inflation
dropped and thanks to the new convertibility of the Polish currency and the
favorable exchange rate after devaluation, Polish exports to the West surged
from around $8.5 billion in 1989 to $11.5 billion in 1990.232
The surveys clearly indicate a significant growth of Western investment
intentions in Poland. It is clear that the size of the population and the size
of the perceived market, a decent communication system, relatively good
roads, ethnic and religious homogeneity, access to the Baltic Sea, and
location on the channel between Germany and Russia makes Poland
attractive for Western business. 233  The number of Polish-Western joint
23 Jeffrey Sachs, Building a Market Economy in Poland, Sci. AM., Mar. 1992, at 36.
232 Figures according to Jeffrey Sachs, id. at 37; U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 227.
233 Released in April 1992, DRT International's survey on middle-market investment in
Central and Eastern Europe shows that while a clear majority of Western companies see
growth opportunities in this region, as well as growing customer demand and the possibility
to reduce costs and become less dependent on their home economies, most of them would
admit that major problems have to be taken into consideration before going into East-Central
Europe. Among the difficulties most often encountered is the uncertain political and
economic environment which creates high risk for investment. Other difficulties include
cultural, social and linguistic problems, administrative formalities, lack of finance for
investment, currency restrictions, poorly working banking system, and the general lack of
information and reliable contacts.
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ventures grew along with the general growth of small private corpora-
tions.'
The service sector was booming. Sachs reported, "between December
1989 and June 1991, individuals started 460,000 businesses, operating mostly
in services, and the payrolls of all small private firms grew by an estimated
860,000 workers."235
On the other hand, privatization of large enterprises, the third pillar of the
reform, did not move forward rapidly enough, resulting in the significant
shrinking of the industrial sector and declining budget revenues in 1991.2'
The Government had to cut back some social services and cap wages and
benefits in the state sector. The state budget also suffered from the cuts in
subsidized sales of Soviet petroleum. Unemployment rose to 11%, inflation
to 70% and real incomes dropped over 30% during the period from January
1990 to the end of 1991. Inflation again dropped to 41% in 1992, but it was
still higher than in Hungary and Czechoslovakia where it was at 27% and
17%, respectively in 1992.23  The significant influx of inexpensive
western agricultural products into Poland served a major blow to the Polish
agricultural sector. These factors generated scattered strikes and public
criticism of the government's austerity measures.23 After months of
indecision regarding whether to continue the Polish "shock therapy,"
President Walesa replaced Prime Minister Olszewski with Hanna Suchocka,
' The Polish Central Statistical Office reports that there were 7,685 joint ventures in the
second quarter of 1992, compared with 2,176 for the same period last year. By country of
origin, firms from Germany had the largest number of joint ventures (37%), followed by
companies from Sweden (8%), France (5.1%) and the United Kingdom (4.8%). Within the
last year, capital invested by joint ventures doubled from $182 million at the end of 1990 to
$402 million at the end of 1991. Government Reports Sizeable Rise in Ventures with Foreign
Investors, [Sept. 14, 1992] E. EuR. REP. (BNA) No. 19, at 739, 748 (Sept. 14, 1992).
235 Between December 1989 and June 1991, the number of private industrial corporations
grew by about 25,000. Jeffrey Sachs, Building a market Economy in Poland, SCI. AM., Mar.
1992, at 39.
23 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 227.
2' Data after cAdata\contracAtaskliste, Polish G.U.S. and "Advanced Reforming Countries
Might Reach End of Recession", THE VIENNA INSTrrrE FOR COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC
STUDIES, June 1992, quoting Polska Szansa tej Jesieni [Polish Chance this Fall], GAZETA
WYBORZcZA, [ELECTORAL GAZETTE], Sept. 10, 1992.
' Labor Minister Jacek Kuron stated that as of July 25, 1992 there was a total of 38
brief strikes and 42 protests in three different regions, with more than 50,000 workers taking
part in them. Government Promises to Prepare Draft Stabilization Agreement, E. EUR. REP.
(BNA), Aug. 3, 1992, at 627.
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a specialist in constitutional and parliamentary law.29
The Interim Constitution: The works on a new constitutional draft.are
advanced but still far from completion.' After amending the 1952
Constitution in 1989, separate constitutional committees were formed in two
chambers of the Polish parliament to draft versions of a brand new
charter."' The conflicts between the two committees, which resulted in
breaking off all contacts with one another, stemmed mostly from the
discussion of the Polish preferences for a parliamentary or a presidential
system." 2 The issue of the applicability of either model in the Polish
geopolitical circumstances generated a lot of emotion.
The Seym Constitutional Committee, chaired by Bronislaw Geremek,
prepared a draft whose aim was to reconcile these conflicting preferenc-
es. 3 The draft, released in September 1991, borrowed heavily from the
German model of so-called "chancellor's democracy." The President's role
was conceived as that of a senior statesman, but the center of power was
shifted to the Prime Minister and his cabinet.'" The Senate's Committee,
chaired by Alicja Grzeskowiak, put forward two drafts, the first in April
1991, and the second one after the new parliamentary elections in October
1991. Both drafts favored a presidential form of government and vested the
2" Id. at 594.
m4 Some Polish constitutional experts believe that the Polish Seym lost momentum after
the completion of the Round Table negotiations. "The biggest mistake the government has
committed since the changes began-says Mr. Szczepanek, of the office of Kaizmierz
Barczyk, Representative to the Seym,-was to neglect putting forth a constitutional draft
quickly; trying it out to see if it succeeds and if it does not then discarding it." Interview
with the Representative Kazimierz Barczyk and his associates, Mr. Szczepanek and Mr.
Gadowski (June 29, 1992).
" The precise date when the commissions were appointed is not clear. Andrzej
Rapaczynski mentions early 1990, while other commentators date the beginning of the
constitutional works to December 1989. See Andrei Rapaczynski, Constitutional Politics in
Poland: A Report on the Constitutional Committee of the Polish Parliament, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 595, 601 (1991); cf. Constitution Watch: Poland, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Spring 1992,
at 2 [hereinafter Poland].
242 Poland, supra note 241.
243 id.
' Rapaczynski, supra note 241, at 626-30 (analyzing the draft in detail). See also
A.B.A. CEELI, Comments on the Draft Polish Constitution, July 8, 1991.
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President with full cabinet appointment power.245 As new developments
have rendered these drafts outdated and reduced their significance to a
merely historical one, they do not warrant a more in-depth analysis in this
study.2 6
In the spring of 1992, the issue which generated the most heated
discussion was the procedure for the adoption of a new constitution.' 7 In
accordance with the bill passed by the Seym, a new Constitutional Commit-
tee was to be composed of 46 members of the Seym and 10 members of the
Senate. Constitutional initiative was granted to the Constitutional Committee
of the Parliament, to any group of 46 deputies to the Seym, and to the
President. The Constitution was to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of
the National Assembly, i.e., the Seym and the Senate combined, and subject
to ratification by popular referendum. The bill met with opposition from
both the President and the Senate. President Walesa wanted to include in the
Committee representatives of the Government, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitutional Tribunal who had been given only observer status by the bill.
The Senate introduced amendments which proposed to increase the ratio of
Senators to deputies on the Constitutional Commission and suggested that the
constitution be adopted in the National Assembly by a 55% majority rather
than two-thirds. The Senate amendments were invalidated by a vote of two-
thirds of the Seym which confirmed that the Constitution would be drafted,
adopted, and ratified according to the Seym's bill.2'
In the meantime, the Extraordinary Commission of the Seym has been
working on the project of the constitutional act, "The Constitutional Statute
on Appointing and Dismissing the Government and Other Changes
245 See PROJEKT KONSrYucn RZECZYPosPoLrrEJ POLSKIEJ [DRAFt CONSTITUTION OF
THE POLISH REPUBLIC], Apr. 1991; PROJEKT KONsTnTuci RZECZYPOSPOLITEi PoLsKIEi,
[DRAFt CONSTrTUTION OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC], Oct. 24, 1991; PRAcE KoMIsJI
KONSTYTUCYJNEJ SENATU [WORKs OF THE SENATE'S CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION], Vol
3, 1991; PRACE KoMIsn KoNsTYTucYjNEj SENATU. PROJEKT KONSTYTUCJI [WORKs OF THE
SENATE'S CONSTTnTONAL COMMISSION, DRAFT CONSTInUTON], Vol 5, 1991.
' The Polish Constitutional drafts prepared in 1989-1991 years were published by
Wydawnictwo Sejmowe [Seym Publisher] as PROJEKTY KOsTYrucYJNE 1989-1991
[CONSTIrUrTONAL DRAFrS 1989-1991], Warsaw 1992.
"' Minutes of the Legislative Commission of the Polish Seym, Biuletyn [Report], Feb. 5,
1992, Feb. 11, 1992, Feb. 14, 1992; see also the Constitutional Bill on Procedure of the
Adoption of a New Constitution, submitted by the Seym's Marshal Wieslaw Chrzanowski,
Mar. 10, 1992.
2 Interim Constitution Approved in Poland, E. EUR. CONST. REv., Spring 1992, at 12;
records of the constitutional debates taken personally by the author.
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Regarding the Highest State Organs," submitted to the Seym by the President
Walesa.u 9 In response to the presidential proposal, the Democratic Union,
the largest party in the Parliament, prepared and submitted to the Seym, in
February 1992, a draft of the interim constitution. The draft, called "The
Constitutional Act on Mutual Relations between Legislative and Executive
Powers of the Polish Republic," or "The Small Constitution" for short,
focused on checks and balances between the Parliament, the President, and
the Government, leaving other issues for the regulation of the new constitu-
tion.'
In comparison to the recently in force, amended Constitution of 1952, the
draft of the Small Constitution" proposed several major changes. 5'
First, the 1952 Constitution provided that at motion of the President, the
Seym shall appoint and recall the Prime Minister. The Small Constitution,
however, suggested that the President should designate the Prime Minister
and the Cabinet, which would then need the approval of the Parliament. The
procedure for designating the Government is elaborate and cunning. The
refusal to approve the presidential candidate for Prime Minister by an
absolute majority gives the Seym the opportunity to designate a successive
candidate by the same majority. If a majority of the Seym then fails to agree
on a candidate, the President would once again designate a Prime Minister,
who this time would need only the approval of a plurality. If it fails once
again, in the next round the Seym may elect its candidate by a plurality of
the votes cast. However, should the Parliament's candidate fail to win the
required support, the President can either dissolve the Parliament or appoint
a Provisional Government for the six months. 3 Second, the draft of the
2 The full title of the act is "The Constitutional Statute on Appointing and Dismissing
the Government and Other Changes Regarding the Highest State Organs." See the draft of
the act submitted to Wieslaw Chrzanowski, Seym's Marshal by the President Lech Walesa,
Mar. 12, 1991.
250 See Jaka Konstytucja [What Constitution], GAZETA WYBORCZA, (ELEcFORAL
GAZETTE), June 29, 1992 [hereinafter Konstytucjal; Osiatynski, supra note 226; Interim
Constitution Approved in Poland, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Spring 1992 at 12-13.
25' The text of the Small Constitution has been published as Ustawa Konstytucyjna of
August 1, 1992 on Mutual Relations Between the Legislative and the Executive Power and
on the Local Government in EKONOMIA i PRAWo, [EcoNoMics AND LAW], Aug. 7, 1992, Nr
185, at VIII.
252 See Lech Mazewski, Wzmocnienie Panstwa [Reinforcing the State], RZECZYPOSPOLITA
[REPuBc], Sept. 18, 1992.
253 Konstytucja, supra note 250, at 11.
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Small Constitution introduced the so-called "constructive vote of no
confidence" which provides that in dismissing the Prime Minister, the Seym
must simultaneously designate a successor by an absolute majority.'
Third, the draft significantly increased the power of the Cabinet. The Prime
Minister was made directly responsible to the Seym, and the President was
stripped of the power to ask the Parliament for the Cabinet's dismissal. On
the other hand, the draft gave the President and the Prime Minister the joint
power to replace ministers without the consent of the Seym. In contrast to
the Constitution in force, the draft allowed the Cabinet to ask the Seym for
permission to legislate by decree. Fourth, the amended 1952 Constitution
provided that a separate statute would determine which acts of the President
need to be countersigned by the Prime Minister. The statute, however, has
never been passed. The draft provides a list of actions, such as calling
elections of the Parliament, dissolving the Parliament, vetoing the Parlia-
ment's legislature, and appointing judges, which do not need to be counter-
signed by the Prime Minister or one of the other ministers. In other actions,
the President must cooperate with the Cabinet. The President has important
checks on the Seym with the veto power and on the Government with the
veto power over its decrees. In contrast, should the President attempt to
bypass the Seym by means of referendum, the cooperation of the Senate is
required. 255
The draft of the Small Constitution was widely praised as the result of a
clever compromise which could be recognized as a "success of the Polish
democracy."'  On the other hand, it also has been attacked by the Center
Alliance and the Movement for the Republic, headed by former Prime
Minister Jan Olszewski, which claimed the draft gave preference to the
presidential system. 7  Despite the opposition of these two parties, on
August 1, 1992, the Seym adopted the draft by a two-thirds majority."
The draft was submitted to the Senate which returned a heavily amended
2' Constitution Watch: Poland, E. EUR. CONST. REv., Spring 1992, at 2.
255 Konstytucja, supra note 250.
2' Osiatynski, supra note 226, at 8. Zbigniew Witkowski, counselor for the Senate
Constitutional Commission, is of a different opinion and claims that the draft "is not a great
success of Polish democracy. It is rather an evidence that we do not know how to reach
democracy." Jaka Bedzie Ta Mala? [What Will be This Small?], GAZETA WYBORCZA
[ELECTORAL GAZETrE], Sept. 18, 1992.
217 Interim Constitution Approved in Poland, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Spring 1992, at 13.
2s Mala Konstytucja Uchwalona, [The Small Constitution Adopted], GAZETA KRAKOW-
sKA, [CRAcow's GAZETrE], Oct. 17-18, 1992, at 1.
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version. For final adoption, the interim "Small Constitution" again needed
the vote of a two-thirds majority of the Seym to override the Senate's
opposition.5 9
The procedure of the Seym's voting over the Senate amendments became
the matter of a major controversy. The Seym's procedural rules initially
provided that the Seym should vote on the amendments twice, once to reject
an amendment and the second time to accept it, if the amendment has not
been voted down. In both instances, a majority of two-thirds was required
to decide about the future of the amendment. However, this procedure may
result in a legislative deadlock. If one-half of the Seym deputies vote against
the amendment, it is not rejected because a two-thirds majority is needed for
this purpose. If, however, the other half of the deputies supports the
amendment, it also will not be accepted due to the lack of the required
qualified majority of two-thirds. The amendment is neither rejected nor
accepted as is the whole act, a constitution, or a regular statute, which has
been subject to the amendment process. The described scenario causes a
clear legislative impasse.
The rules of procedure were changed in July 1992 when it was decided
that the Seym would vote only once; a two-thirds majority is needed to reject
the Senate's amendments, but when they are not rejected, they are automati-
cally adopted. This procedure greatly increased the role of the Senate
because the support of one-third of the Seym's deputies would be sufficient
to adopt the Senate's amendments. Confronted with the heavily amended
version of the Small Constitution, in October of 1992, the Seym decided to
change the rules of procedure again. The new procedure distinguishes
between regular statutes and constitutional acts. As far as regular statues are
concerned, the Seym votes twice, with a two-thirds majority needed to reject
the Senate's amendments and a plurality required to accept them. The
possibility of a deadlock was decreased but not eliminated. In the case of
constitutional amendments, it was decided that the Seym should vote only
once. A qualified majority of two-thirds of the vote is necessary to adopt the
amendment but if the amendment is not adopted it is automatically rejected.
The role of the Senate was reduced as the one-third plus one of the Seym
deputies voting against the adoption of the Senate's constitutional amend-
ment would be enough to kill the Senate's amending action.
259 Regulamin Niekonstytucyjny, [Unconstitutional Procedure], GAZETA WYBORCZA,
[ELECrORAL GAZETrE], Oct. 19, 1992, at 2.
19931
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The decision to change procedural rules was challenged as unconstitutional
in the Constitutional Tribunal which delayed the process of the adoption of
the Small Constitution by one month.' In mid-November, the Constitu-
tional Tribunal ruled in favor of the Seym's action and on November 17,
1992, President Walesa signed a new interim Polish Constitution which is to
become an important component of a brand new constitution, the completion
of which is not expected before the end of 1993.
b. The Republic of Czechs and Slovaks
Retreat from Communism: One who is aware of the comparative
dimension of the process of the East-Central European countries' retreat from
communism easily finds out that the striking similarities in the new
democracies' reform programs have been based on several commonly
recognized priorities, such as democratization, resocialization, and market-
ization. Democratization means the radical transformation of the constitu-
tional system through the replacement of totalitarian or quasi-totalitarian
mechanisms with a legal framework in which the supreme power would be
truly vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly.
Resocialization is conceived as the real and dramatic recovery of the society
from the ethical crisis caused by the socialist double standard of morality,
widespread corruption, forced labor, disrespect for social values, unaccount-
ability of decisionmakers, rewarded incompetence, etc. Marketization means
a fundamental structural economic change signified by massive privatization,
price liberalization, the introduction of internal exchange convertibility, a
certain amount of competition, and the elimination of most governmental
subsidies. In some countries, however, these remarkable similarities in
projecting major social, economic, and political goals are overshadowed by
the very specific local problems among which the importance of the ethnic
controversies is second to none. This is the case of Czechoslovakia where
the post-glasnost constitutional development unfolds its special features only
when analyzed in the context of the particular ethnic problems faced by this
country. Katarina Mathernova wrote,
People often view the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic
(CSFR), Hungary and Poland jointly as being countries of
260 Wlodzimierz Bieron, Regulamin Seymu przed Trybunalem [The Seym's Procedure
before the Tribunal), RZEczYPOSPOLrrA [REPUBLIC], Oct. 20, 1992.
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the former Eastern bloc most likely to achieve democratic
political and market economic reform. The recent constitu-
tional developments of these three countries do possess some
similar traits-all three have striven to reinstate the rule of
law, create new democratic structures, protect fundamental
rights and freedoms, create a system of reliable checks and
balances, and introduce a genuine judicial review. It is
important to realize, however, that despite these similarities,
the current constitutional debate in Czechoslovakia is
fundamentally different from the debate in the other coun-
tries.
The most fundamental difference is that Czechoslovakia
is not ethnically homogeneous, while both Hungary and
Poland are more or less ethnically homogeneous societ-
ies.26'
The dissolution of communist power in Czechoslovakia began at the end
of 1989 with mass pro-reform protests in Prague and other cities, the
formation of the opposition group "Civic Forum," and the speedy resignation
of the Communist Party General Secretary, Milos Jakes, and the 13-member
Politburo.2 The initial stages of the anti-communist retreat looked so
smooth that the western commentators, following Timothy Garton Ash,
named the Czech revolution "gentle" or "velvet."20 Tony Judt wrote that
"[i]n contrast with its Polish and Hungarian neighbors, Czechoslovakia in
1989 had undergone no gradual political liberalization, no partial economic
reform."'2 ' But Czechoslovakia also did not incur the massive debts to
Western banks that were expected to cripple its neighbors like Hungary and
Poland; in contrast, Czechoslovakia was entering the era of democracy with
the reputation of a "specialist supplier within the East European common
market. 26 Moreover, Czechoslovakia had a communist leadership well-
aware of the inevitable collapse of their world and ready to learn from the
26' Katarina Mathemova, Czecho? Slovakia: Constitutional Disappointments, AM. U.J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y, 471 (1992).
262 Judt, Metamorphosis: The Democratic Revolution in Czechoslovakia, in EASTERN
EUROPE IN REVOLUTION, supra note 121, at 96-99.
263 TiMOTHY GARTON ASH, THE MAoIC LANTERN 78-131 (1990).
M4 Id. at 96.
265 1991 IBC Int'l Country Risk Guide, Services of Mead Data Central Inc., December
1991 [hereinafter Int'l Risk Guide].
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Polish and Hungarian lessons.
After President Husak's resignation, a new "coalition government of
national understanding" was sworn in.2' The main objectives of this
interim government, under the direction of Prime Minister Calfa, were first
to lead the country to its first free elections since 1948, to be held in June
1990, and second, to revive the stagnant economy.
The first signs of hope for reform in Czechoslovakia came with the
election of Alexander Dubcek as chairman of the Federal Assembly on
December 28, 1989' and with the election on the following day of
Vaclav Havel as President of the country. 2' Dubcek had been out of the
political scene since 1968 when his attempt to introduce reform to Czecho-
slovakia had been crushed by the Soviets. Havel, who had been jailed
several times for his subversive views and controversial plays, had never
even intended to run for a political office. Havel and the Civic Forum had,
however, been gaining respect and support from the Czech people, who were
desperately in need of reliable political leadership. As the first non-
communist president of Czechoslovakia since 1948, Havel was unanimously
elected by all 323, still predominantly communist, Assembly members.2"
In April 1990, the federal Assembly in Czechoslovakia adopted a new
name for the country, the "Czech and Slovak Federal Republic." The heated
debate between Czech and Slovak representatives over the initially proposed
names "Czechoslovak Republic," "Republic of Czechoslovakia," or "Czecho-
slovak Republic" was a clear symptom of the deep division of sentiment
between the country's two major nationalities.27
The first post-war free elections took place in Czechoslovakia in June
1990. They were based on the electoral law which limited the number of
parties seeking election to those that were able to show proof of either
10,000 members or 10,000 signatories, further limiting the number of parties
represented in the Federal Assembly to those which could secure at least 5%
of the popular vote."' The turnout at the polls was overwhelming with
M6 id.
'6' William R. Doerner, Our Time Has Come, TIME, Dec. 4, 1989, at 20-24.
26 Judt, supra note 262, at 100.
2 " Michael Wise, Once-Dissident Havel Inaugurated as Czechoslovak President, Reuters,
Dec. 29, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
270 Judt, supra note 262, at 105.
27' Id. at 106.
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96% of the 11.2 million eligible voters casting ballots. 2 The two parties
that dominated elections were the Czech group, Civic Forum, and the Slovak
counterpart, Public Against Violence. Together, these parties received 46.3%
of the national vote and secured 170 seats in the new 300-member bicameral
parliament." 3 Reelected as President, Havel asked Marian Calfa to form
a new government.27 4
Upon assuming office, President Havel and Prime Minister Calfa faced
massive economic and social problems which the people expected them to
resolve during their two-year terms. 275 Between February and June 1990,
the Czechoslovak Assembly passed some sixty laws which were intended to
end monopolies and price controls, and establish the right to free enter-
prise. 2' After the election, the government managed to follow with
several important economic regulations dealing with privatization, restitution,
foreign exchange, banking, and foreign investment.27 7  These laws were
expected to start the transformation from a communist society into a free-
market economy. As in other new European democracies, the new laws also
led to social tension, unemployment, and strikes.27 The slowdown in the
economy hit the Slovak Republic much harder than the Czech Republic.
272 Civic Forum, Ally Win Czechoslovak Elections; Communists Show Surprising Strength,
Facts on File World News Digest, June 15, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Facts
File, at 444.
273 Klas Bergman, Civic Forum Faces New Hurdles in Prague, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
June 13, 1990, at 6, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CSM File. In the lower chamber,
the House of People, the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence won 87 of the 150 seats,
and in the House of the Nations the two parties won 83 of the total 150 seats. The
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, with 13.6% of the vote, won 47 of the 300 seats in
parliament, while the Christian Democratic Union with 11.6% of the vote won 40 seats, the
Moravian autonomists won 16 seats, Slovak separatists 16 and the Hungarian minority 13.
Surprisingly enough, the communists took second place in the elections; originally the
Christian Democratic Union, composed of the People's Party and the Czech and Slovak
Christian Democratic parties had been predicted to take second place.
274 Havel was reelected as president on July 5. Peter S. Green, Havel to Ask Former
Communist to Form Czechoslovak Government, UPI, June 13, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
275 Steve Schoenhoff & Mark Hanna, After the Revolution: Czechoslovakia's Quest for
Recovery, New Dimensions, Mar. 1991, at 60-65.
276 The de-control of prices was set to happen in two stages: the first on July 1, 1990;
the second in January 1991. Judt, supra note 262, at 103.
27 Mathernova, supra note 261, at 481.
278 Klas Bergman, Civic Forum Faces New Hurdles in Prague, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
June 13, 1990, at 6, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CSM File.
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The reports showed that Slovakia suffered from four major disabilities:
First, for strategic reasons 80 percent of Czechoslovakia's
arms industry was located in the Slovak Republic. The
program of military conversion has, therefore hit Slovakia
far harder than the Czech Republic. Second, most of the
civilian industry in Slovakia is based on the processing of
raw materials which are utilized by domestic industry. Thus
Slovakia has only limited means of exporting directly and is
in fact responsible for only 20 percent of the federation's
total exports. Third, agriculture accounts for a major portion
of the republic's GDP (Gross Domestic Product), and the
crisis in Czechoslovak agriculture has thus hit Slovakia
much harder that the Czech Republic. Fourth, because of its
proximity to the former states of the CMEA (Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance), Slovakia was highly depen-
dent on direct and transit trade with those states. The
collapse of that trade has also hit Slovakia harder than the
Czech Republic which borders on Austria and Germany.279
These problems exacerbated the political tensions between the two members
of the federation.
The Break-down of the Constitutional Process: The other major target of
the Havel's 1990-92 presidential term was constitutional reform which was
widely expected to create a firm legal background for the economic
transformation. After the beginning of the Czechoslovak revolution in
November 1989, several amendments were passed to purge the Constitution
of 1960 of its Stalinist legacy.' Similar to those of Poland and Hungary,
the new Czechoslovak constitutional amendments eliminated the provisions
on the leading role of the Communist Party and modified the role of an
29 Int'l Risk Guide, supra note 265.
m0 Texts of the Constitution of 1960 and the Constitution Law on the Czechoslovak
Federation of October 27, 1968 are reprinted in WnLIAM B. SIMONS, THE CONSTrrITIONS
OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD, at 135-58, 582-624 (1984) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COMMUNIST WORLD].
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interim parliament and president."' One year later, in November and
December 1990, the Parliament succeeded in passing a number of piecemeal
amendments to the Constitution, most notably the Bill of Rights and
Freedoms, as well as an act on the division of competencies between the two
republics. 28' In March 1991, the Assembly adopted a constitutional act on
the constitutional court and, in July 1991, another act on the judiciary.3'
Further attempts, however, to advance works on a new constitution brought
even more frustration and disappointment than had the economic reform.
The balance of political powers in the Federal Assembly clearly results in
a failure of the constitutional process. Although the Czech Civic Forum and
Slovak Public Against Violence won the 1990 elections, neither secured the
three-fifths support necessary to push through constitutional changes.
Czechoslovakia has a bicameral parliament (Federal Assembly), comprised
of a 150-member House of the People and a 150-member House of the
Nations. Following the 1968 Federation amendment, which introduced "the
prohibition of majoritarian rule," the Czech and Slovak representatives in the
House of the Nations vote separately.2 As Katarina Mathernova ob-
serves, "[tihese voting procedures result in a DE FACTO creation of a three
chamber Federal Assembly consisting of the Chamber of People and the
Czech and the Slovak parts of the Chamber of Nations., 2 5  A bill is
approved only if it is passed by a majority of the total number of the
2' In contrast to Poland, the Czechoslovak President's powers are modest. He is elected
by the Federal Assembly, can dissolve the Assembly only if it cannot agree on the budget,
and can appoint the Government which can be easily voted out by the Assembly. He cannot
call for a referendum, rule by decree, or veto the acts of the Assembly. Id. at 603-05
(Articles 60-65, Constitutional Law on the Czechoslovak Federation).
292 Constitution Watch, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Spring 1992, at 3; U.S. Dep't of State, 1991
Human Rights Report: Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Feb. 1992.
233 CZECH. CoNsT. Act no. 91/1991 and No. 32611991.
21 See CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD, supra note 276, at 597-98
(Constitutional Law on the Czechoslovak Federations, of 27 Oct. 1968, art. 42). K.
Matherova explains "he majoritarian rule (a majority outvoting a minority) is prohibited,
i.e., deputies in the two parts of the Chambers of Nations have to vote separately, when
voting on bills regulating taxes, price policy, customs, technological investment, labor, wages
and social policy, press, media, economic administration, establishment of federal organs of
state administration, foreign economic relations, any budgetary questions and issues of
citizenship. Interestingly, the prohibition of majoritarian rule does not apply to votes of no
confidence to the government (the executive)." Mathernova, supra note 261, at 482 (citations
omitted).
25 Id. at 483.
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representatives of each republic. Constitutional acts and amendments, the
declaration of war, and the election of the President require a three-fifths
majority of the deputies of each house.2s In practice, this means that 38
votes of either the Czech or Slovak part of the Chamber of Nations can
block any ordinary law and 31 votes in either part can block constitutional
acts and amendments.'
After the June 1990 elections, the winning parties in both Republics had
suffered from factional wars within, splitting into rival groups. In February
1991, the Civic Forum, which had been the strongest party in the Czech
region, split into 3 parties: the center-right Civic Democratic Party, whose
leader was Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus; the center-left Civic Movement,
led by Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier; and the small center-right party Civic
Democratic Alliance, supported by Federal Economy Minister Vladimir
Dlouhym. Public Against Violence had split into two factions: those who
supported the ousted Slovakia Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and those
who did not. Merciar, the former communist and outspoken speaker for
greater autonomy for the Slovak republic, was forced out of office in a
power struggle in 1991 amid allegations that he had worked for years as a
secret police informer.2 9 Meciar was replaced by the Christian Democrat
leader, Jan Carnogursky, who opted for keeping the federation together but
also wanted much larger autonomy for his republic. Being in opposition to
Carnogursky, Merciar joined a rival party, the Movement for Democratic
Slovakia.
The fractionalization of the political movements doomed the chances for
further constitutional development at the federal level. At the beginning of
1992, the Federal Assembly considered the possibility of adopting an interim
constitution, fashioned after the Polish "Small Constitution." The law was
intended to comprise three chapters of a federal constitution regulating the
relations between the president, federal parliament, and federal govern-
ment. ° However, the bill failed to pass, as did President Havel's propos-
als for a ratification of the new federal constitution by the Czech and Slovak
s Articles 41 and 42 of the 1968 Federation Amendment, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H.
Flanz eds. 1974).
2" Mathernova, supra note 261, at 483.
2u One Year Business Forecast: 1991, Int'l Risk Guide, supra note 265.
2" Mary Battiata, Slovaks of Two Minds Over Separation from Big Czech Brother, WASH.
POST, Sept. 10, 1992, at A22.
mo Mathernova, supra note 261, at 488.
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National Councils, the proposed amendment to the Referendum Law which
would allow the president to initiate a referendum with the consent of the
federal government instead of the federal parliament, and the amendment
which would allow the president to dissolve the parliament when two
chambers are unable to agree on a draft bill.29'
On the level of the republics, the Slovak National Council submitted its
draft Constitution of the Slovak Republic for public discussion.292 The
basic text of the draft, which had been worked out from the coordinated
proposals and positions of the political parties and the political movements,
provided for a unicameral parliament, the Slovak National Council, and for
numerous alternative solutions suitable either for an independent republic or
an autonomous republic envisaged as a component of "the joint state."
The Velvet Divorce of the Czechs and Slovaks: For the country headed
into the 1992 elections, the problem of the dissolution of the 74-year-old
federation became an issue of foremost importance. Whereas in the 1990
elections the choices boiled down to "anybody but the communists," in the
1992 elections the voters were deciding on the future existence of the
country. The results of the elections in the two republics were the exact
opposite of each other.9 3 In the Czech Republic, for instance, the Civic
Democratic Party (CDP) led by Vaclav Klaus won the most votes; Klaus
basically advocated a speedy transformation to a free market and the
maintenance of a common state.' g The CDP won 33 percent of the vote
to the Federal Assembly and 30 percent to the Czech National Council.295
In Slovakia, on the other hand, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
(MDS), led by Meciar, who advocated slowing down the reform process and
independence for Slovakia, won the most votes. The MDS secured 34
percent of the vote to the Federal Assembly and 37 percent of the vote to the
Slovak National Council.296
With the election campaign taking on a highly ideological tone the
emphasis shifted from the preparation of a constitution to the accelerated
2' id. at 496-97.
mSLOvAK REPUBLIC CONST. (CSFR's Proposed Draft), U.S. Dept. of Commerce, NTIS,
Central & Eastern Europe Legal Texts, Dec. 23, 1991.
293 See Janyska, No More of That, E. EUR. REP., July/Aug. 1992.
' Mary Battiata, Czechs, Slovaks Split in Elections; Outcome Could Hasten Country's
Breakup, WASH. POST, June 7, 1992, at A27.
29' Id. See also New Czech, Slovak Leaders Accelerate Separation, E. EUR. CONsT. REV.,
SPECIAL REPORT, Summer 1992. at 10.
% Id.
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process of the disintegration of the Federation. In summer 1992, the Czech
and Slovak leaders worked out an agreement in which, on January 1, 1993,
the country would split into two separate and independent states with two
currencies and constitutions.' This agreement, which allowed for a
peaceful separation of the two republics and a gradually reduced federal role,
was the only structure on which the Czechs and Slovaks could agree.'
The future of the country was an issue which determined the tone of the
presidential elections. These elections, held in early July 1992, resulted in
the parliament, led by Slovak deputies, rejecting the re-election of Havel.
Although Havel was the only candidate in the first round of voting, he was
barred from the next round which was scheduled for later in July. Havel
was entitled to remain in office until October 5, 1992, if parliament could
not appoint a successor. He resigned, however, in response to the Slovak
parliament's declaration of the sovereignty of Slovakia on July 17, 1992.2 9
Taking another step closer to separation, the Slovak parliament approved a
draft constitution on September 1, 1992, providing for dissolution of the
federation with the two republics cooperating only in custom and monetary
matters. 300 By January 1, 1993, the velvet divorce of the Czechs and
Slovaks became an accomplished fact.
c. Hungary
Of all Central European countries Hungary seems to be the least
determined to adopt a brand new constitution. The current political structure
in Hungary was formulated by the 1949 Constitution which was heavily
amended in 1989. The 1989 Amendments contain a broad range of human
rights protections and provide for a democratically elected Parliament, 3 1
a parliamentarily elected President,' and an independent judiciary. 3
9 Jan Krcmar, Czechoslovakia Will Split After 74 Years, Reuters, June 20, 1992 available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File; Czechoslovak Split Due January 1, WASH. POST, Aug.
27, 1992.
298 Andrew Nagorski, It Was Good While It Lasted: Czechs and Slovaks Decide to Go
Their Own Ways, NEWSWEEK, June 29, 1992, at 33.
299 Stephen Engelberg, Slovakia Deputies Block Re-election of Vaclav Havel, N.Y. TIMES,
July 4, 1992, at 6.
o Slovak Parliament Approves Constitution, Reuters, Sept. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Reuter File.
301 HUNG. CONsT. ch. 2, § 20.
m Id., ch. 3, § 20A.
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The 1989 amendments confirmed a temporary character of the constitution
but the further constitutional development was slow. At the time of this
writing, the chances for a quick adoption of the brand new Hungarian basic
laws seem to be slim.
Several factors contribute to the political stalemate which makes further
constitutional reform in Hungary very difficult. First is the crumbling
support for the ruling parties. Two rounds of Parliamentary elections held
in March and April of 1990 determined the distribution of the parliamentary
seats between the main political forces. The winning Hungarian Democratic
Forum (HDF), with 43 percent of the parliamentary seats, formed the
governing coalition with the Independent Smallholders Party (ISP), which
gained 11 percent of the seats, and the Christian Democratic People's Party
(CDPP), which controlled 5 percent of the seats.' The opposition was
comprised of the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD)(23 percent of the seats),
the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) (8.5 percent of the seats), and the
Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz) (5.4 percent of the seats).'
After the elections, the right-of-center coalition of HDF, ISP, and CDPP
held 229 out of 396 parliamentary seats, but the poor showing of the
coalition in public opinion polls has contributed to the internal turmoil
between the three parties and has eroded the HDF's control of the Hungarian
National Assembly. The debates within Parliament have been the subject of
much criticism, as members have been accused of debating relentlessly
without actually coming to any definable terms. Of the three parties, it is the
ISP and the HDF that have been continually at odds, creating an atmosphere
of extreme factionalism and excessive politicalization of all legislative
work.' This atmosphere provides the opportunity to obstruct any serious
attempts at drafting a new constitution.
I d., ch. 4, § 32A. For a more detailed analysis of the Hungarian constitutional reform,
see Ludwikowski, supra note 6, at 157-164.
304 Bruszt & Stark, Remaking the Political Field in Hungary: From the Politics of
Confrontation to the Politics of Competition, in EASTERN EUROPE IN REVOLUTION, supra note
160, at 51.
"s Country: Hungary, Kaleidoscope: Current World Data, Aug. 21, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Intnew Library, KCWD File.
3 First of all, there has been a split within the ISP with one section, the Historical
Section, supporting the governing coalition and the other section, led by Jozsef Torygan,
which does not support the coalition. Coalition Smallholders Hold Rallies in Support of
Government, (BBC radio broadcast, Apr. 29, 1992), available in LEXIS, Intnew Library,
BBCSWB File. See also Int'l Risk Guide, supra note 265.
1993]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Second, the coalition policy also is being attacked from the outside. The
possibility of further cooperation between Prime Minister Jozsef Antall,
representing the HDF, and President Arpad Goncz, the leader of the
opposition party AFD, is heavily tested. Antall agreed to the appointment
of Goncz because of a deal struck between the two parties; the HDF
members in Parliament supported Goncz in return for the AFD supporting
various constitutional changes proposed by the HDF.3  Although
Hungary's support of a parliamentary system contrasts significantly with the
attempts of several East-Central European countries, notably Poland, Ukraine,
and Belarus, to introduce elements of a presidential system, President Goncz
has sought to increase his prerogatives as president.3° Although Goncz's
position was largely ceremonial, with no real power or political responsibili-
ty, Goncz was widely respected for his significant role as mediator. He has
frequently addressed the country on issues involving national policy, has
negotiated with the transportation workers during the strike of October 1990,
and has used his power to send the compensation bill (providing restitution
to .former owners of land that had been seized by the Communists) to the
Constitutional Court for review.30 9 In summer 1992, the disagreement
between Antall and Goncz and between the HDF and AFD became more
acute. The ongoing dispute has erupted into "open warfare" with Goncz
refusing to comply with Antall's order to fire the directors of the state-run
radio and television. 1 Peter Tolgyessy, one of the leaders of the AFD,
said recently that Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's and HDF's "stability will
definitely be questioned in the long-range, and its chances of re-election will
decline considerably."33 '
The third factor which discourages the governing coalition to put forth a
new draft constitution is the strength of the Hungarian leftist movement.
The AFD, for instance, supported HDF's proposal to change the constitutional
requirement of a two-thirds majority of parliament to pass some important measures. Arpad
Goncz IBC Political Risk Services, May 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
RFTIBC File.
3 EASTERN EUROPE IN REVOLUTION, supra note 160, at 19; see also Gabor Horvath,
Hungary: Parliament Adopts New Government's Program, Inter Press Service, May 24,
1990, available in LEXIS, Intnew Library, Inpres File.
" Barnabas Racz, The Hungarian Parliament's Rise and Challenges, 1 RFE/RI Research
Report, No. 7, Feb. 14, 1992, at 22, 23 [hereinafter Racz].31 Antall versus Goncz" Crisis Looms in Hungary, FIN. TIMES, June 12, 1992.
3 Smallholders' Decision-Views, MTI Econews, Feb. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, MT1 File.
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Recently, commentators observed almost a rebirth of the Socialist party in
Hungary. Opinion polls have shown that the socialists are gaining more
respect in the public eye. Although it does not seem that the public would
ever advocate a return to communism, the public continues to confront the
hardships of a market economy, such as unemployment and inflation, with
the social protectionism of the communist era. Sensing this growing public
support, it is very unlikely that the renamed Communists would easily accept
the further purging of their original 1949 Constitution, much less the
adoption of a new constitution. The Constitution, amended in 1989 and
1990, still restrains the operations of the Parliament by old procedural rules,
called Standing Orders, and provides opportunities for the opposition to
obstruct legislation.3"
Last but not least, the governing coalition has economic rather than
political priorities on its agenda. The economy of Hungary has been
declining since the end of Communist rule. In 1991, inflation was up 31
percent at the end of the first quarter.313 Unemployment was at 10.1
percent at the end of June 1992 with over 547,000 registered
unemployed. 4 The main characteristics of the economy at the end of
June 1992 were declining production and consumption, and a higher than
planned budget deficit.315 The consensus on the need for foreign invest-
ment is overwhelming. The West, along with the IMF and the World Bank,
has accommodated Hungary's requests for money. Thirty-four percent of
Western companies which were asked to indicate any interest in investing in
East-Central Europe gave first choice to Hungary as opposed to 32 percent
attracted by Poland, and 29 percent by the Czech and Slovak Republic.316
Foreign trade between Hungary and the West also has been on the rise. As
of 1990, the Soviet Union was the chief trading partner of Hungary, but by
1991 Hungary's trade with the Soviet Union had fallen to almost nothing,
312 RFE/RI Research Report, How Hungary's Parliament Works, Feb. 14, 1992, at 26.
313 Hungary-Country Marketing Plan FY '92, Market Reports (National Trade Data Bank)
Jan. 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Mktrpt File [hereinafter Market Reports].
3"' Mid-Year Unemployment Figures Published, Daily Report: East Europe, (Foreign
Broadcasts Information Service), Aug. 6, 1992, at 23.3
"' Statistical Data on Economy Analysed, Daily Report: East Europe, (Foreign Broadcast
Information Service), Aug. 20, 1992, at 15.
31 DRT International, Middle-Market Investment in Central and Eastern Europe,
(preliminary results of survey prepared by Jacques Manardo, Chairman European Board DRT
International), Apr. 1992, at 3.
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while trade with the West had soared." 7
When the coalition came to power, Prime Minister Antall maintained that
the key to moving forward was stimulating foreign investment and trade."'
Although Antall began his term with the intention of transforming the
Hungarian economy into a market economy, concerns over unemployment
and inflation slowed the reform process. For the most part, the Hungarian
people do not seem satisfied with Antall's performance. While the leaders
of various nations hold Hungary in high esteem as the pioneer of reform in
Eastern Europe, the general mood of the Hungarian population is one of
dissatisfaction and pessimism." 9 Taking those factors into consideration,
it is understandable that, although the HDF and Antall had on their original
agenda the institution of more constitutional reform, there has yet to be any
significant changes to the Constitution, with the exception of minor revisions
in 1991 and 1992. The overriding concern in Hungary seems to be the
mounting inflation and unemployment rates, at the expense of working on
the proposed constitutional reforms.
In summary, the partisan pattern of voting in the Hungarian National
Assembly, does not leave any room for constitutional restructuring.
According to Article 24, section 3 of the Constitution, the amendment or the
adoption of new basic laws requires the vote of two-thirds of the National
Assembly.32 Hence, without support of the opposition parties, the
coalition occupies only approximately 60 percent of the 396 seats in the
Assembly and falls short of the majority needed to pass a brand-new
constitution.321
3. Why the Firsts are the Lasts
The anti-communist revolt of 1989 destroyed the "magic" of Marxist-
Leninist cliches such as "justice for all," "collective mentality," and "perfect
equality.",322  The revolt compromised once sacred and apparently all-
explaining keystones of Marxism, "the rules of dialectics," "the concept of
117 Market Reports, supra note 313, at 40.
31" Id. at 37.
' Hungary's Tough Times Reviving Political Jokes, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 1992, at 3 1C.
3 HUNG. CONST. ch. 2 § 24 (3).
32' Racz, supra note 309, at 22.
322 RE7r R. LUDwiKowsKI, THE CRISIS OF COMMUNISM: ITS MEANING, ORIGINS, AND
PHASES 1-31 (1986).
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class war," "the thesis about withering away of state and law." Societies
proved to be pluralistic rather than dichotomous structures. Social conflicts
did not explain themselves through a simplified concept of two-class clashes.
The whole thesis of the withering away of state and law found itself in a
trap. Stalin proclaimed that the dictatorship of the proletariat abolished
classes. Thus, if law and state were nothing but instruments of class
domination, they could exist only in societies split into opposite classes.
Class law without classes was a self-contradictory concept and no "dialectic
decorative rhetoric" could overcome the paradox of its existence in the
socialist classless society. 3
Among all these window-dressing ideas which for decades served as a sort
of ideological facade, or social cement rather than real creed of communism,
one thought proved to be more time resistent than others. This was a
Hegelian idea, that "it is not consciousness that determines life, but life that
determines consciousness."3"' This idea, transformed into the main thesis
of Marxist-Leninist historical materialism, proclaimed that conditions of life,
economic basis, and means of production determine human consciousness,
ideas, and even politics. Ideas, views, and convictions have consequences
but they are just factors in the sum total of the determinants of life.
Economic basis is the dominant engine of the evolution of human civiliza-
tion. In Marx's view, if the social superstructure of moral, legal, religious,
and political ideas does not keep up with the development of economic
infrastructure, it has to be changed by class war or revolution.
Ironically, communism did not prove to be exempt from this regularity.
All moral, ideological, and social deficiencies of communism notwithstand-
ing, the crisis of this system was sealed by its irreversible economic failures.
Similarly the fate of the new democracies seems to be linked to the successes
of their large-scale economic experiments. As Maria N. Todorova wrote,
"for all the euphoria over democratization, intellectuals' revolution, and the
rest, economic problems have dominated the public discourse through-
Out.
''325
The new experiments of East-Central European countries with democratic
mechanisms illustrate this thesis perfectly. The sentiments of the people in
323 Rett R. Ludwikowski, Socialist Legal Theory in the Post-Pashukanis Era, 10 B.C.
INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 329-32 (1987).
324 LESZEK KoLAKowsKI, MAIN CURRENTS OF MARXISM 157 (1978).
3' Todorova, Improbable Maverick or Typical Conformist? Seven Thoughts on the New
Bulgaria, in EASTERN EUROPE N REVOLUTION, supra note 160, n. 2.
19931
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
East-Central Europe for their communist past seem to be determined by the
signs of a quick economic recovery or the symptoms of further economic
stagnation. One may observe that the graver the economic hardships in the
new democracies, the stronger the popular yearning of the people for return
to the illusive state protectionism of the communist era. Thus, the chance
of the communist reformers returning to power may be increasing.
Although some nostalgia for communist stability is common to all new
democracies, one has to observe that economic, cultural, and ethnic factors
impacted the reform process differently in the various countries. More
economically advanced countries like Hungary and less socially, ethnically,
and religiously fragmented countries like Poland seem to be more immune
to promises of "post-Communist communism" than less developed countries
with weaker democratic and liberal traditions such as Albania, Bulgaria, and
Romania.
Resistance to a communist comeback does not, however, automatically
entail economic and political success. Paradoxically, the communist
governments which retained power sometimes were more efficient in terms
of the speed of a constitutional transformation. Although the constitutional
changes were not profound enough and the new constitutions still bear
communist stigmas, the constitution-drafting process could be quickly
completed by the former communists desperately trying to build a reputation
as reformists and by the communist controlled parliaments.
The countries which started their peaceful process of retreat from
communism early, such as Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, overesti-
mated the strength of democratic forces and the maturity of their societies'
political culture. The factional struggles of deeply pluralized legislative
bodies were counterproductive and delayed the legislative processes. The
deputies learned how to speak openly and criticize each other faster than
they learned to respect the arguments of the opponents. On the one hand,
the more "velvet" the first stage of the transition, the more compromises that
were made. This process further protracted the advancement of democratic
reform. On the other hand, the process of constitution making cannot be
rushed, and it may happen that the countries which "come late" will adopt
mature constitutions of a well-tested durability. Still, the last ones might be
the first ones.
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II. FABRIC OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONS: OVERVIEW OF A NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL.
The main goal of this study is to report on the constitutional process in the
new European democracies from a comparative perspective. This entails an
attempt to discover similarities and differences in the processes of the
constitutional works with special emphasis on the examination of common
fundamental features of the new constitutional drafts.
Clearly, countries subject to examination have shared some distinctive, key
elements that characterized the socialist system, such as mono-party rule,
socialist ownership of productive resources in the form of state property,
income redistribution controlled by the government, and the principle of
central planning. They shared also the system of "democratic centralism,"
which was to combine a centralized decision-making process with depen-
dence on the creative activity and initiative of local managers. Among these
features one could easily discover the common core of the socialist
constitutions.32
The preceding part of this article identified some common economic,
social, and political problems shared by the new democracies in their first
post-socialist years. The question remains as to what extent these problems
reflect on the formation of the common core of the new constitutions. To
what extent will this core absorb the basic principles of Western constitution-
alism? Is there any new constitutional model which is surfacing in this
region? To respond to these questions, several issues, most frequently
discussed in the process of the constitutional works, were selected.327
Although the final evaluation of a "post-socialist" model must be postponed
until more East-European constitutions are formally adopted, the process of
constitutional drafting is so advanced that some tendencies can be already
identified and some observations deserve notice.
31 See Ludwikowski, supra note 6, at 125-36.
327 Although long and exhaustive bills of rights can be found in all new constitutions and
constitutional drafts, their more detailed analysis has to be based on the examination of the
actual record of these countries in human rights protection. This task was left for a separate
study. For further information, see, PRAWA, WOLNOSCI I OBOWIAZKI CZLOWIEKA I
OBYWATELA W NOWEJ POLSKEJ KONSTYTuJCn [RIGHTS, FREEDOMS, AND DUTES OF MAN
AND CITIZEN IN A NEW POLISH CONSTIUTIONJ, 1990; see also Human Rights: The
Development of the Constitutional Framework and the Prospects for the Future, in
CoNsTrrmONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS; AMERICA, POLAND AND FRANCE, (Thompson and
Ludwikowski eds., 1991) at 121-60.
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A. The Structure of the New Constitutions
The fabric of most constitutions consists of such essential components as
a preamble, general principles of state organization, fundamental rights and
freedoms, system of state governance including sections on central and local
government, sections on judicial structures and judicial control of the
constitutionality of laws, concluding provisions on amending the constitu-
tions, emergency measures, and some miscellaneous or transitional
provisions. One who would undertake the task of checking some 20
constitutions from around the world adopted in the last 10 years will find all
these components in many of these constitutions and most of them in all of
the constitutions." For example, the majority of constitutions reviewed
contain preambles and a section on local government and judicial review, but
virtually every constitution contains a section on general principles of state
organization, fundamental rights, central government, the judiciary, and
procedures for amendments.32
Viewed from this perspective, the new East-Central European constitutions
and constitutional drafts do not reveal any glaring abnormalities. Most of
the new constitutions and constitutional drafts are of moderate length of 150-
170 articles.33 While the communist constitutions usually contained very
328 The constitutions studied were adopted during the last ten years and thus provide the
best indication of the most current trends in constitutionalism. These constitutions are from
countries which are very diverse in that they are from completely different parts of the world
and represent a wide range of social and economic backgrounds. These countries and the
year of adoption of their respective constitutions are: Afghanistan, 1990; Algeria, 1989;
Brazil, 1988; Burkina Faso, 1991; Chad, 1989; China, 1982; Colombia, 1991; Haiti, 1987;
Honduras, 1982; Laos, 1991; Liberia, 1984; Namibia, 1990; Nepal, 1990; The Netherlands,
1983; Nicaragua, 1987; Nigeria, 1989; Sierra Leone, 1991; Suriname, 1987; Tuvala, 1986; and
Turkey, 1982.
329 An exception to this is the Chinese constitution, which contains no amendment
provision.
The comparison is based on the review of the five newly adopted or fundamentally
changed constitutions of Hungary (text of amended constitution published August 24, 1990),
Bulgaria (July 13, 1991), Romania (December 23, 1991) Estonia (July 3, 1992), and Slovakia
(September 1, 1992) and five more "mature" constitutional drafts prepared in Albania (March
1991), Poland (the Seym's Project of August 24, 1991) Lithuania (February 26, 1992),
Belarus (April 6, 1992), and Ukraine (June 10, 1992). Of those reviewed constitutions and
constitutional drafts, only the Hungarian and Albanian acts are relatively short, containing 78
and 121 articles, respectively. The Ukrainian draft is very long, numbering 258 articles. The
others range from 151 (Lithuanian draft) to 177 (Slovakian draft) articles.
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lengthy preambles stressing history and goals of socialism and providing
many anti-imperialism references33 , the preambles of the new East-Central
European constitutions are short or omitted altogether.332 General princi-
ples and a section on fundamental rights and freedoms are in every
constitution without exception. The list of rights usually breaks down into
sections or chapters dealing with political, social, and economic rights, as
well as a part describing the duties of the citizens. Some of the constitution-
al drafts, such as the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Azerbaijani drafts, contain
special chapters on civic society, which usually cover the state regulation of
societal relationships with a special focus on ownership rights. Several
countries, such as Slovakia, Romania, Belarus, Bulgaria and Estonia, have
separate sections on economy, finance, and state budget.
The sections on the horizontal and vertical distribution of powers between
central and local government and legislative, executive, judicial bodies can
be found in all constitutions. Some of the drafts, the Ukrainian act for
example, contain a separate chapter on territorial structure of the country and
a special section on the electoral system and referendums. Following the old
Soviet model, the Lithuanian draft and the new Estonian Constitution retain
the chapters on foreign policy, and Ukraine, Lithuania, Hungary and Albania
include special chapters on national defense.
Judicial control of the constitutionality of law, traditionally discredited by
the Stalinist constitutions, is now also a standard element of the reviewed
constitutions. Most of the constitutions and drafts, with the exception of the
Slovak and Estonian Constitutions, contain separate chapters on the
Constitutional Court or the Constitutional Council, emphasizing that these
bodies are vested with the special powers and are separate from the regular
judicial organs. All of the constitutions and drafts contain concluding
sections which usually cover the amendment provisions,333 emergency
measures and miscellaneous provisions regarding the coat of arms, the seal,
the flag, the anthem, and the capital.
3 See, e.g., POL. CONST. (1952), or U.S.S.R. CONST. (1977), in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COMMUNIST WORLD, supra note 280, at 288, 352.
332 Eight of the reviewed acts have short preambles, but two of them, the Constitution of
Romania of December 1991 and the draft of Lithuanian Constitution of February 1992 do not
contain preambles at all.
33 In the Hungarian Constitution (as amended by August 24, 1990) the amendment
provisions are short and are included in the section on the National Assembly. See HUNG.
CONST. ch. 2, § 24(3).
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B. The Description of the State
Wojciech Sokolewicz, Professor of Constitutional Law at the Institute of
Law Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences wrote:
Most generally speaking, the changes now in progress in the
political systems of Eastern Europe consist in transition from
autocracy to liberal democracy; from arbitrariness of the
Communist Party-controlled State to unconditional subordi-
nation of State to the rigors of law; and from a loose system
of sources of law, their hierarchy obscure in practice, to a
coherent and strictly hierarchical one, based on a stable
foundation of the national Constitution treated as the basic
statute and the supreme law.33
The political transformation of the post-communist world from "autocracy
to liberal democracy" is best manifested by the changes in the constitutional
descriptions of the new East-Central European states. The socialist rhetoric
has been carefully eliminated from the new basic laws which no longer
describe their countries as "socialist democracies" or "people's republics."
The typical Stalinist phraseology, vesting power in the working classes as
represented by their communist parties and emphasizing the working masses
struggle with "exploitation of man by man," has been replaced by references
to popular sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of the
countries. Virtually without exception, every new constitution and
constitutional draft contains the declaration that people are the source of
power, and that in its external aspect, the principle of sovereignty is
manifested by the exclusive competence of the state to control its own
territory. Besides all these references and the usual explanation of a unitary
or federal character of the state, both well-known to contemporary Western
constitutionalism, there are several terms or labels, commonly used for the
description of the post-communist countries, which warrant some atten-
31 Sokolewicz, Democracy, Rule of Law, and Constitutionality in Post-Communist Society
of Eastern Europe, DROrr POLONAIS CONTEMPORAIN (POLISH CONTEMPORARY LAW), (1990
n.2) at 5-6.
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335tion.
All new constitutions and constitutional drafts describe the state as
"democratic." The majority of them use this term in conjunction with the
description of the state as "a state of law" (in Poland and Romania), "a jural
state" (in Hungary), "a juridical state" (in Albania), "a state recognizing
supremacy of law" (in Azerbaijan), or "a law-based state" (in Belarus,
Bulgaria, Kirghizistan, Russia and Slovakia). All these deviations in
references to the well-known French concept of "6tat de droit" or the
German "Rechtsstaat" stem from translational subtleties rather than doctrinal
differences and with very few exceptions one can note a clear tendency of
the drafters to emphasize the importance of this idea and to provide quite
elaborate explanations of it.3"
Without searching for a more extensive definition of democracy, the
purposes of the constitutional descriptions of the state as "democratic" are
(1) to make the people as a whole a subject of the sovereignty, (2) to state
that the people manifest their will in a variety of ways and that the principle
of political pluralism is a fundamental element of a well-functioning
constitutional government, (3) to express that "the government of the people"
means the rule of the people's majority and the respect for the rights of
minorities and individuals, (4) to stress that the government "by the people"
means both the representative government and some elements of direct
democracy, and (5) to emphasize that the government "for the people" means
the idea of civic society, which subordinates the state to the societal
interests.337 It is worth noting that the forms of direct participation of the
335 The search for common structure of the new constitutions (see the previous subchapter)
has been restricted to the newly adopted constitutions and the drafts which provided relatively
elaborate concepts of the constitutional provisions. This subchapter and those that follow
search for general common features of the new East-European constitutionalism. For this
reason, the author used all new constitutional drafts available to him until January 1993. In
addition to the texts listed in note 326, other documents analyzed are: Draft of the
Constitution of Kazakhstan (dated June 2, 1992), the Constitution of Kirghizistan (of June 16,
1992 and August 1992), the Constitution of Azerbaijan (undated, submitted to CEELI
evaluation in July 1992), Draft Constitution of the Russian Republic (of March 30, 1992), the
Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (as amended by August 24, 1990), Draft Constitution
of Albania (of March 1991), and Draft Constitution of the Polish Senate (dated October
1991).
' There is no clear reference to the concept of state as "dtat de droit" in the Constitution
of Estonia or the Draft Constitution of Poland prepared by the Commission of the Senate.
311 See Sokolewicz, supra note 334, at 6 (referring to Abraham Lincoln's famous formula
of "government of the people, by the people, and for the people").
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people in power (through referenda or plebiscites) are clearly recognized as
important democratic instruments. There are references to these instruments
of direct democracy in all new constitutions and constitutional drafts and
some of these acts, the draft constitution of Belarus for instance, explain
these mechanisms in separate chapters. One of the drafts of Kirghizistan's
constitution goes even further, in that it envisages a model of plebiscitary
democracy in which the state is described as "a state of people's self-
government" and in which most of the important decisions, such as adoption
of the Constitution, creation of the Parliament, elections of the Senate and
the President, dissolution of the Parliament, and removal of the President, are
made by means of referendum.3 3'
The concept of the legal state, as provided for in the new constitutions,
also contains several essential elements.339 First, it assumes that the state
operates within the clear framework of hierarchically arranged legal acts with
the basic laws recognized as the apex of the legal system. To clarify the
scope of this framework some of the constitutional acts provide an elaborate
list of legal acts which fall within the meaning of the law.' One can
observe that almost all the new constitutional acts incorporate international
treaties into the scope of the law, some of them, such as Romania and
Hungary, on the basis of parity between domestic and international law, but
many of them (Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, and Russia) on the basis of
precedence taken by international treaties over municipal laws. 4
Second, the idea of the state of law means legality or submission of the
state to the law. It stems from the hierarchical character of state organs and
3M KIRGHIZISTAN CONST. (1992 Koichuyev Draft).
339 Several scholars have studied in detail the concept of '6tat de droit' in East-Central
European doctrine. See Kazimierz Dzialocha, Panstwo Prawne w Warunkach Zmian
Zasadniczych Systemu Prawa R.P. [State of Law in the Light of Fundamental Changes of the
System of Law of the Republic of Poland], I PANSTWO I PRAWO, (STATE AND LAW), at 13-27
(1992); Janina Zakrzewska, Konstytucyjna Zasada Panstwa Prawnego w Praktyce Trybunalu
Konstytucyjnego [Constitutional Principle of Legal State in the Practice of the Constitutional
Tribunal], 7 PANSTWO I PRAWO, (STATE AND LAW) 3-14 (1992); Janina Zakrzewska,
Trybunal Konstytucyjny-Konstytucja-Panstwo Prawa, [The Constitutional Tribunal-the
Constitution-the State of Law], 1 PANSTWO i PRAWo (STATE AND LAW) 3-12 (1992);
Wojciech Sokolewicz, Konstytucjonalizm Europejski i Przyszla Polska Konstytucja, [European
Constitutionalism and a Future Polish Constitution], 8 PANsTWo i PRAwO, [STATE AND LAW]
3-17 (1992).
340 ROM. CoNsT. tit. III, ch. 1, § 3, art. 72; POL. CONST. art. 6 (Seym Draft).
341 See ROM. CONST. tit. I, art. 11; HUNG. CoNsT. ch. I, § 7(1); Russ. FED. CoNsT. art.
3, § 4 (Draft); POL. CONST. art. 7, § 2 (Seym Draft); SLOV. CONST. art. 9.
[Vol. 23:155
CONSTITUTION MAKING
the principle that every governmental organ acts within the basis of law.
The difference between the state and the citizens is that the state and its
organs may only do things that are allowed by law, while the citizens may
do everything that is not forbidden by law. 4 2
Third, the state of law provides for constitutional guarantees of the
observance of the law. The most important of them is the concept of limited
government as embodied by the ideas of the division of powers and checks
and balances. The constitutional state of law also provides an extended
protection for human rights in the form of judicial review of the legality of
administrative actions and of the constitutionality of statutes, international
agreements, and executive orders. Almost without exception these principles
can be found in all the new constitutional drafts.4
3
As far as the economic and social policy is concerned, most of the
constitutional acts present the new democracies as "market oriented" with the
market system described as a "social one." "Social" means a widespread
support for a still large role played by the state in the relatively egalitarian
distribution of wealth. The constitutions of Bulgaria and Romania and the
draft constitutions of the Russian Federation, Belarus, and Ukraine clearly
use the term "a social state"; the draft constitutions of Poland and Alba-
nia3" refer to a state of "social justice," the constitution of Slovakia
describes the Slovakian state as "socially just" and the constitution of
Hungary speaks about "social market economy."
The attitude toward market mechanisms is more diversified. Only a few
countries, such as Hungary, Russia, Romania, and Slovakia, call themselves
342 See Sokolewicz, supra note 334, at 8. An exception to the rule of a clear determina-
tion of the state's functions is the provision of the Draft Constitution of the Republic of
Azerbaijan which reads, "The authorities of the President, unlike the authorities of Parliament,
need not to be exhaustively defined. The authorities of the President are determined by the
formula: 'Questions that are not the subject of legislation are addressed through executive
(administrative) procedures.' "
1 All of the new constitutions provide for one of the forms of judicial review. Most of
them clearly address the principle of the division of powers. The Constitutions of Hungary
and Slovakia and the Draft Constitution of Albania provide no clear reference to this
principle. Similarly, the Seym's Draft of the Constitution of Poland does not clearly
recognize the significance of the division of powers. The reference to this principle can be
found, however, in the Draft Constitution of Poland, prepared by the Senate's Commission.
3" POL. CONST. art. 1 (Seym Draft) ("Polish Republic is a democratic, state of law,
following the principles of social justice.") This description of the state as a "social one" is
missing in the Polish Senate's draft.
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clearly "market econom[ies]."' 5 Most of the new democracies declare
more cautiously that they are "market-oriented" in their common intention
to support economic pluralism, meaning "diversified forms of property," to
guarantee the freedom of entrepreneurship, fair competition, and to carry on
an antitrust policy. 6  Some other new democracies either try to avoid
clear constitutional declarations of their economic policy or, in fact, they lean
toward a policy of central planning, limit the scope of activity of a private
enterprise, and restrict the private ownership of land and mineral resourc-
es. ' With all these variations one can capsulize the common tendency to
describe a new East-Central European state as a democratic, social, law-
based republic, recognizing basic rules of the market as natural economic
environment.
C. Distribution of Powers
1. The Origins of the Theory of Division of Power
In The Federalist No. 9 Hamilton wrote:
The regular distribution of power into distinct departments;
the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the
institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices
during good behavior; the representation of the people in the
legislature by deputies of their own election: these are
wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal
35 See HUNG. CONST. ch. I, §9. Russ. FED. CONST. art. 9, § 1 (Draft) (referring to "the
social market economy"). ROM. CONST. tit. IV, art. 134 (stating "the economy of Romania
is a market economy"). SLOV. CONST. art. 59 (calling the state "a socially and ecologically
oriented market economy"). Art. 59.
346 KAZAKHSTAN CONST. art. 45 (1992 Draft); UKRAINE CONST. art. 6 (1992 Draft);
AZERBAIJAN CONST. §IV (1992 Draft).
37 ALB. CONST. arts. 19, 20 (1991 Draft) ("the State attends to planning the entire
economic and social activity and to harmonizing national and local interests, with a view to
meeting the material and cultural needs of the society and strengthening the independence and
defense of the country. The state exercises control over internal and foreign trade").
ESTONIA CONST. art. 32 ("the law may establish, in the public interest, categories of property
in Estonia which are reserved for ownership by Estonian citizens, certain categories of legal
entities, local government or the Estonian state"). KAZAKHSTAN CONST. art. 47 (1992 Draft)
("the land, its depths, waters, vegetable and animal worlds, and other natural resources are
within the exclusive ownership of the Republic of Kazakhstan").
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progress towards perfection in modern times. They are
means, and powerful means, by which the excellencies of
republican government may be retained and its imperfections
lessened or avoided.'
In fact, the ideas that the checks and balances of government are essential
to free institutions and that the power must be divided among several
governmental branches to avoid an arbitrary government were not new. The
advantages of the separation of powers were recognized by Aristotle and
elaborated by Polubius in his examination of the well-balanced Roman
system of power. John Locke listed three powers in the British Common-
wealth: legislative, executive, and federative. Locke, however, suggested
that supreme power lay in the legislature and did not recognize the judiciary
as a separate power. The judiciary was enumerated among "powers" by
Montesquieu, "the oracle . . . always consulted and cited on this sub-
ject."'  But Montesquieu, as Mauro Cappelletti convincingly argued,
despite listing the judiciary among "powers," believed that in fact it is no
"power" at all. He wrote that "of the three powers of which we have
spoken, the judicial is, in sense, null."3"
In fact, the American Constitution adopted a Lockean or Montesquieuian
model of government only to some extent and in various countries the idea
of distribution of powers was applied differently. It was obvious, for
example, that despite Montesquieu's references to the English system, the
powers in the English model were neither equal nor well separated. In
Montesquieu's France, the separation of powers was to impose efficient
restraints on the executive power and protect citizens against the absolutism
of monarchs. Separation of powers in America was conceived as a guaranty
of liberty, but it also was intended to protect the system established by the
Constitution against the domination of any single power. As Cappelletti
states,
The Federalist No. 9, at 72-73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
[hereinafter Hamilton].
39 The Federalist No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
'50 Cappelletti, Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and Legitimacy of Constitution-
al Justice, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 11, 12-14 (1985) [hereinafter Cappelletti]. See also
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 160 (Cambridge U. Press 1989).
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To be sure, the strict separation, "French style," of the
governmental powers, whether or not actually "Montes-
quieuian" in inspiration, was miles away from the kind of
separation of powers which almost contemporaneously was
adopted by the American Constitution. Separation of
powers in America is better described as "checks and
balances." ''
Differing needs dictate that in different systems the principle of division
of powers means different things. The common idea that the powers of the
government should be limited and its functions diffused is also currently
implemented in several basically different ways.
In the so-called French model, the principle of division of powers is
associated to a large degree with the idea of separation of powers in the
sense of actual separation of organs and their functions. Arthur Taylor von
Mehren and James Russell Gordley wrote,
The leaders of the French Revolution saw the principle (of
separation of powers) in more abstract and conceptual terms.
They began with the concept of sovereignty, portions of
which were delegated by the nation to each "power." For
the "concrete idea of function," there was thus substituted
the "abstract idea of power of a special nature that an
authority required in order to accomplish its task. Instead of
seeing the separation of powers as a political technique, the
men of the Revolution announced a dogma of political
theory." The principle of separation thus came to be viewed
in rigid and abstract terms. Each power was entirely
independent of the others; collaboration between powers was
forbidden, and theoretically, unnecessary because each had
been delegated the fragment of the national sovereignty
necessary to discharge its functions.3"2
With time traditional French mistrust of the judiciary abated, and the French
3s Cappelletti, supra note 350, at 14.
3s2 ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & JAMES T. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 217, n.3
(1977).
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permitted delegation of some functions from the legislative power to the
executive. The functional separation became less clear-cut, but still the
French system remained a symbol of a rigid concept of distribution of
powers.
The system of checks and balances, traditionally associated with the
American model, puts emphasis on the equality of power and not on the
separation of power. The power is distributed into three organs. Each organ
is run by a different team of people, whose functions are to some extent
blended and often overlapping. The president can veto legislative acts, and
unless the veto is overridden by a two-thirds vote in both houses of
Congress, it kills a bill. The president's ability to influence legislation stems
from his responsibility to report on the state of the nation, and his right to
call Congress into special session and to adjourn the legislature if the two
houses cannot agree on a date.353 The Senate confirms and rejects presi-
dential nominees. The House controls the budget and sets procedures for the
administrative agencies, and the courts interpret legislation and the Constitu-
tion. As enumerated by one of the early statesmen of the country, John
Adams, the checks and balances are as follows:
First, the States are balanced against the general government.
Second, the House of Representatives is balanced against the
Senate, and the Senate against the House. Third, the
executive authority is in some degree balanced against the
legislature. Fourth, the judiciary is balanced against the
legislature, the executive and the State governments. Fifth,
the Senate is balanced against the president in all appoint-
ments to office, and in all treaties. Sixth, the people hold in
their own hands the balance against their own representa-
tives by periodical elections. Seventh, the legislatures of the
several States are balanced against the Senate by sexennial
elections. Eighth, the electors are balanced against the
people in the choice of President and Vice President. And
this, it is added, is a complication and refinement of balanc-
es which is an invention of our own, and peculiar to this
country. "
1,3 FRED R. HARRIS, AMERICA'S DEMOCRAcY 58-59 (1983).
3-4 THoMAs M. CooLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTMIMONAL LAW IN THE
UNrrED STATES OF AMERICA, 187 (4th ed. Little, Brown & Co. 1931) [hereinafter COOLEY].
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In most parliamentary democracies organs of power are not separated,
powers are not equal, and the functions are blended. The chief executive
officer is a member of the legislative body and is elected by the legislature
to run the executive branch. His cabinet members also sit in the legislature,
and they simultaneously carry on executive and legislative functions. In this
system, the division of powers basically means only that none of the powers
can accumulate all basic functions, that is, legislative, executive, and judicial,
and that the independence of the judiciary is constitutionally guaranteed.
Wade and Bradley wrote that "[i]n many continental (European) constitutions
separation of powers has meant an unhampered Executive; in England it
means little more than an independent Judiciary.""'
2. The Distribution of Power in the New Post-Socialist Constitutions
Socialist constitutionalism traditionally rejected the doctrine of division of
powers and claimed that the entire power was vested in the supreme
representative bodies, the people's legislatures. The socialist theorists
maintained that the power in their system was concentrated but that its
functions were allocated to different branches of the government. According
to Marx, the doctrine of separation of powers is ". . . in principle nothing
else than a profane industrial division of labor applied to state mechanism
for the purpose of rationalization and control. 35s
An observer of the development of constitutionalism in East-Central
Europe must admit that the reluctance to experiment with the idea of the
division of powers is still widespread in several former socialist countries.
There is no unambiguous reference to this idea in the Constitutions of
Hungary or Slovakia or in the Seym draft to the Constitution of Poland.5 7
The Constitution of Romania and the draft Constitution of Albania clearly
follow the old-fashioned Soviet model and refer to the parliament as "the
highest representative body of the Romanian people" or "supreme organ of
state power" and to the government only as an organ of state administration
which "ensures the implementation of the domestic and foreign policy." The
3 5 E.C.S. WADE & A.W. BRADLEY, CONSTnUrIONAL LAW 25 (1970).
' ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW 695 (F.J. Feldbrugge ed. 1985) (HJ. Uibopuu on the
separation of powers).
3s7 In contrast to the Seym Draft, the draft Constitution of the Polish Senate clearly states
that "the State's power is executed by the separated and balanced legislative, executive and
judicial organs." PoL. CONST. art. 4 (Senate Draft).
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court is not described as a "power" but is referred to as "judicial authority"
or an "organ of justice."3 '
The other countries of the former Soviet dominance which have already
advanced their constitutional reforms clearly invoke the principle of the
division of powers. The Constitution of Bulgaria, for example, does not
leave any doubts as to the drafters dedication to this most venerated idea of
Western constitutionalism; it declares that "[t]he power of the state is divided
between a legislative, an executive, and a judicial branch."
One can observe that in the group of states which have dropped the
traditional socialist idea of parliamentary superiority, the American model of
checks and balances enjoys popularity. The concept is followed quite
extensively in the constitutional drafts of most of the republics of the former
Soviet Union, such as Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Kirghizistan, and Azerbaijan.
Furthermore, these constitutional drafts frequently emphasize that balance
and equilibrium among the executive and legislative authorities are highly-
valued attributes of a good government.
With regard to the vertical distribution of powers between central and
local government, the socialist legacy is still perceptible. Each new "team"
in all socialist countries has repeated that the decentralization of decision-
making could trigger the recovery of the communist system, but each new
reform of the local government has been more illusory than real. On the one
hand, it was obvious that, given the lack of proper information at the top,
local managers were better equipped to deal with economic, social, and
political reality. On the other hand, short of returning to a system of market
stimulants, the system of central control could be replaced only by the
supervision of local workers' committees-a solution that could endanger
party dominance. Economic power, once shifted to the working class, would
lead to the growth of political power for the masses.
In contrast to all declarations about decentralization of power, the
traditional socialist system of so-called "dual subordination" of the local
public administration reserved full control over the decisionmaking process
to the central governmental bodies. The local representative organs (councils
or soviets) were subject to the control of higher representative bodies which
could abrogate their acts. They could be dissolved upon decision of the
Parliament. Similarly, the decisions of the local executive organs were
controlled by the higher executive agencies with the ministers at the top.
This system was left intact by the draft Constitution of Albania and has not
358 ROM. CONST. arts. 58, 80, 101, 123. ALB. CONST. arts. 67, 76, 84, 106 (1991 Draft).
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been subject to any profound reform in Romania, Bulgaria, or some former
Soviet republics such as Kirghizistan or Kazakhstan, where the chief local
administrative officers (prefects) are appointed by the government and are
the representatives of the central government."m
All other new democracies, such as Poland, Hungary, Russia, Lithuania,
Belarus, and Slovakia, show a tendency to give more self-government to
territorial administrative units. The local government is guaranteed some
budgetary independence and juridical personality, while the central
government reserves the right to oversee the legality of the local govern-
ment's actions. The inhabitants of the territorial units directly elect the
representative bodies which have municipal duties and functions of public
administration. In most cases, the local councils or soviets elect the local
executive officers, but in at least one state (Slovakia) the Constitution
provides that the inhabitants of the municipality directly elect the municipal
mayor? It can be expected that forthcoming constitutional acts will favor
a truly decentralized model of local administration and will shift some
portion of power, which until recently attentively guarded by the central
government, to the territorial units organized on the basis of wide autonomy.
D. Presidential v. Parliamentary System
1. Major Political Systems
It is often claimed that the evolution of the doctrine of the division of
powers and its application in the political practice of several countries
contributed to the emergence of the two major political systems of presiden-
tial and parliamentary government." l Although with time the dichotomy
359 ALB. CONST. ch. IV (1991 Draft); ROM. CoNsT. ch. V, § 1, art. 122. In Bulgaria "the
oblast governors" are appointed by the Council of Ministers. BULG. CONST. art. 143, § 1.
However, the mayors of the townships are "elected by the inhabitants or the township
councils." BULG. CONST. art. 139. In Kirghizistan "akims," chief officers of local state
administration "act as the direct representatives of the President of the Kirghiz Republic."
KIRGHiziSTAN CONST. art. 82 (1992 Draft); See also KAZAKHSTAN CONsT. art. 103 (1992
Draft).
360 SLOV. CONST. ch. VIII, arts 155-56 (CSFR's Proposed Draft), 1991 U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, NTIS, Central & Eastern European Legal Texts, Dec. 23, 1991.
3" Douglas V. Verney, Parliamentary vs. Presidential Systems: Analysis of Political
Systems, in CoMPARATIVE POLITICS: A READER 175, 176-178 (Eckstein and Apter eds.,
1963).
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of the political systems dissipated into a variety of mixed models, it is still
successfully used in comparative analysis.
Without examining in 'detail the actual variations of these two major
political systems, one may distinguish them by several fundamental
features.' The presidential system, usually associated with the American
political experience, is characterized by a concentrated model of the
executive. The president is sole executive and is elected directly by the
electorate as the head of state and the head of the government. The
legislative branch of government is separated from the executive and elected
independently by the people for a set term of office. The cabinet members
are appointed by the president and are subject to the confirmation of the
legislature but they do not sit in the legislative branches of the government.
They can be called upon by the legislature to account for their actions but
they cannot be simply voted down by the legislature's expression of lack of
confidence. On the other hand, the president may call a special session of
the legislative assembly or adjourn its meetings, but he cannot dissolve the
legislature and hold new elections.'
In contrast, a typical feature of the parliamentary model is a dual executive
system, with presidents or monarchs as heads of state playing roles of
"senior statesmen" or "supreme arbitrators" and the prime ministers
functioning as politically accountable chief executive officers. If the head
of state is a president, typically he is not elected directly by the people but
by parliaments or special electoral colleges. With the cooperation of the
parliament, the head of state appoints the head of government, who
successively appoints the ministry. 3' In the parliamentary system the two
branches of government, the legislative and the executive, are fused. The
ministers usually are members of the parliament and are politically
responsible to the legislature, which can vote the executive out of office
without any need for a national referendum. In some countries with the
parliamentary system, the head of state, in cooperation with the head of
government, has power to dissolve the legislature and to call for an election
before the end of the parliamentary term. Being the fusion of the executive
and the legislature, the parliament is a supreme power over its constituent
parts. Douglas V. Verney wrote that "[t]he notion of the supremacy of
36 See id. at 175-191 (listing of the basic features of the presidential and parliamentary
systems).
- Id., at 186-88; see also Harris, supra note 351 at 58.
3 Verney, supra note 359, at 178-79.
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Parliament as a whole over its parts is a distinctive characteristic of
parliamentary systems. This may seem to be a glimpse of the obvious to
those accustomed to parliamentary government, but it is in fact an important
principle, all too often forgotten, that neither of the constituent elements of
Parliament may completely dominate the other."'
Of the mixed models, the French presidential-parliamentary system seems
to attract significant attention of the drafters of the new constitutions.3
Although traditionally France leaned toward a parliamentary democracy, the
Constitution of the Fifth Republic incorporated into the French system a
number of features typical to a presidential model. The constitution retained
a dual executive, but the president is directly elected by the people; also, the
power of the executive has been strengthened and made less dependent on
the parliament. The president's appointment of the head of the government
does not require a formal confirmation by the parliament, although the
parliament may vote tie government out of office. Within some limits
imposed on the frequency of this action, the president may, in cooperation
with the prime minister and the presidents of the chambers of the parliament,
dissolve the legislature and call new elections. The president cannot veto the
acts of the parliament but he may ask for the reconsideration of bills which
he opposes. As the ministers cannot sit in the parliament, the lines of
division between the executive and the legislature are less blurred than in the
parliamentary system. On the other hand, some legislative functions may be
shifted to the executive which legislates in these areas by decrees.
2. Basic Features of the Presidential and Parliamentary Systems in the
Post-Socialist Constitutions
Analyzed against this background, the new constitutional acts break down
into several groups. In the constitutional systems of the East-Central
European countries, such as Albania, Bulgaria, the Republic of Czechs and
Slovaks, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania, a parliamentary model
of government still seems to be prevalent. The preamble of the Constitution
of Hungary clearly provides that the state is "a parliamentary democracy."
Similarly, the Constitution of Bulgaria states that "Bulgaria is a republic with
a parliamentary system of government."
365 Id. at 181.
-16 ALEx N. DRAHNICH & JORGEN RASMUSSEN, MAJOR EUROPEAN GovERNMENTs 274
(1982).
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The constitutional acts of the other East-Central European republics do not
make straightforward declarations regarding the political system, although the
major features typical of European parliamentarism may be found in most
of these acts. Still, one may note cautiously the tendency to increase the
prerogatives of the presidents in these countries. The constitutions of
Estonia, Hungary, and Slovakia and the draft Constitution of Albania provide
for election of the president by the parliament or electoral college,36'7
whereas the constitutional acts in Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Romania establish
a direct system of presidential elections. The attempt of the Hungarian
President to strengthen his position has already been commented upon in
previous chapters of this article. The Lithuanians, although still clearly
supporting the parliamentary form of government, vest executive power both
in the Government and the President. In several countries, such as Albania,
Estonia, Lithuania, and Romania, the President may refuse to sign bills and
may submit them for reconsideration to the Parliament.3 Following the
German and Italian practice, the Estonian Electoral Body is comprised of the
members of the Riigikogu and representatives of the local government, or
Volikogus.
The attempt of the Polish president to strengthen his prerogatives, slightly
mitigated by Poland's Small Constitution, already has been widely comment-
ed upon in this study. One also can note a clear tendency of some former
Soviet republics, namely Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and
Kirghizistan, to introduce into their constitutions some elements of the
American system of government. In all these states the attempts to establish
a framework for a presidential system met with strong criticism of the
parliamentary factions. These factions link the presidential system to the
traditions of socialist autocracy and portray it as a potential threat to the
process of democratic changes in this region. In all these republics the
attempts to repress the excessive powers of the executive resulted in the
production of alternative versions of constitutional drafts promoting the ideas
of parliamentary democracy. In short, although at this moment it is clear
that the role of presidents in the new democracies keeps growing, it is still
30 The President may be elected either by the parliament (Riigikogu) or by the "electoral
body." ESTONIA CONST. art. 79.
' The right of the president to dissolve the parliament is not clearly guaranteed in all the
new constitutions. It is provided for by the constitutions of Romania and Bulgaria, but is not
clearly vested in the president of the other new democracies discussed above. ROM CONST.
tit. Ill, ch. II, art. 89; BULG. CONST. art 99, § 5.
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too early to decide which of the two major systems of government will
finally prevail in the republics of the former socialist bloc.
E. Judicial Enforcement of the Constitutions
1. Origins and Major Models of Judicial Review
Most of the studies on the origin of judicial review indicate that this
institution surfaced in the United States in the beginning of the nineteenth
century and was incorporated into the constitutional practice by the courts,
which had already displayed significant judicial activism. This statement,
although correct in general, requires some supplementary explanation. The
idea that the courts have the right to review the constitutionality of laws,
which found its judicial pronunciation in the famous opinion of Chief Justice
John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, has, in fact, its antecedents in the
doctrine of natural law. This doctrine implied that the law has a hierarchical
structure and that the people have the right to disobey and nullify the lower
law if it does not correspond with the higher one.369 To transform,
however, this vague idea into the institution of judicial review several
conditions had to be met.
First, to avoid arbitrariness, the reviewing institution's powers of checking
the consistency of the hierarchic system of law had to be separated from the
powers to make law. The organ which was making law could not review the
correctness of the law. The fairness of the system required the adoption of
the concept of the division of powers.
Second, the reviewing institution needed a well-refined supreme law which
could serve as a precise background for the evaluation of inferior law. The
vague concept of natural law was poorly suited to play this role. The
supreme law could not be, as in the English system, a body of principles or
maxims drawn from legislation, judicial precedence, custom, conventional
rules or the opinions of writers of authority. To shield the judges against
any assumption of arbitrary power, the development of judicial review
required an authoritative document, a written constitution.
Third, as Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist, "no legislative acts,
contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm
that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his
369 See MAURO CAPPELLEr & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
CAsEs AND. MATERIAL 6-8 (1979).
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master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people
themselves." 370 Thus, the principle of the supremacy of the constitution
became a condition sine qua non of the development of judicial review.
Fourth, the constitution had to guarantee its own rigidity. The amendment
process had to be more difficult and formal than the regular legislative
process. The excessive flexibility of the supreme law, which could be
amended freely by the legislature, would make the judicial review useless or
ineffective.
Fifth, the establishment of the system of constitutional review implied the
existence of a judicial system in which the judges would be prepared to go
beyond concrete adversary litigations and exercise judgments affecting
general legal policy of the state.3 71
These conditions were met for the first time in the United States, and it
was quite natural that this country pioneered in subjecting its legislation to
judicial scrutiny. In accordance with American theory and practice all acts
of Congress, state constitutions and state legislative, governmental and
administrative acts, and international agreements are subject to judicial
review.
The American model is often described as a decentralized or diffused
system of concrete review. Such a system allows all courts the right to
review the constitutionality of the laws. Furthermore, it is recognized as
concrete or incidental because the constitutional issue can only arise as
incidental to another litigious issue.372 This model has been adopted by
some South American countries such as Argentina and Mexico, by former
British colonies such as Australia or India, by some Scandinavian states such
as Finland, Sweden, Norway, and also by Japan, Denmark, and Greece.
Nineteenth-century Europe was reluctant to experiment with judicial
review. The first attempts to incorporate this institution into constitutions
were initiated after World War I in Austria. The Austrian model, which was
introduced by the Austrian Constitution of 1920, is often described as a
centralized or concentrated and abstract model.373 In contrast to the
370 Hamilton, supra note 348, at 467.
"' It should be noted that Alan R. Brewer-Carias lists only three of the conditions
mentioned above, specifically conditions two, three and four. JUDICIAL REvIEW IN
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1.
372 Id. at 125-55; CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 46-52
(1971) [hereinafter JUDICIAL REvIEW].
373 JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1; JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note
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American model, the power of review in the concentrated system is vested
either in a supreme court of a country or in a special court. This review can
be initiated through an independent action raising an abstract issue of
constitutionality. Such a model was introduced into the practice of many
countries with civil law traditions. In Spain, the Tribunal of Constitutional
Guarantees was created under the Constitution of 193 1, and the Italian
Constitutional Court was established by the Constitution of 1948. Recently
some countries with legal systems which have emerged from common law
roots, such as New Guinea or Uganda, began to experiment with the
concentrated system of judicial review."
Besides these two well known models, a variety of other types of
constitutional review have political rather than judicial character. Political
control of the constitutionality of law may be "internal" if exercised by an
organ of the central legislative body. Such was the case of the Soviet Union,
where the right of review was exercised by the Presidium of Supreme Soviet.
Political control may be "external" as is the case in France, where the right
to review legislation is vested in a special quasi-judicial body, Conseil
Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council), composed of nine members
appointed for nine years by the President of the Republic, the President of
the Assembly, and the President of the Senate. Former Presidents of France
are made ex-officio members of the Council. The Constitutional Council
must review organic laws before their promulgation. In addition, the Council
reviews other laws if submitted before promulgation by the President of the
Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of one of the parliamentary
chambers or by any sixty members of the National Assembly or Senate.
Political control may be "mixed" if exercised by the special organs
composed of deputies and extra-parliamentary experts on constitutional law.
Cappelletti explained this model through the example of the Constitution of
Romanian People's Republic. He wrote:
The recent Romanian Constitution of 1965, although not
admitting to judicial control such as that adopted in 1963
Yugoslavia... had instituted within the Parliament itself a
Constitutional Committee, elected by Parliament. Up to
maximum of a third of the total number of its members, the
Committee may be composed of specialists who are not
374 JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1 at 225.
375Id. at 186.
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members of Parliament. The Committee under Article 53 of
the Constitution has the task of putting before the "Great
National Assembly" reports and opinions on the constitu-
tionality of the bills as indicated by the rules of Parliamenta-
ry procedure. 37
6
Judicial Review in the New East-Central European Constitutions: As
previously noted, the socialist doctrine traditionally did not recognize the
need for judicial review. In the early 1960s the attitude toward judicial
control began to change and, in 1963, Yugoslavia for the first time began
setting up constitutional courts. Poland had the tradition of administrative
adjudication, which dated back to the interwar period when the Polish
Constitution of 17 March 1921 announced the establishment of the Supreme
Administrative Tribunal and the local administrative courts.377 In 1986
Poland adopted the statute on the Constitutional Tribunal, establishing a
precedent which had been followed by virtually all new European democra-
cies until recently. Constitutional review became the greatest novelty of the
post-socialist world, and the selection of a model of judicial review which
would be applicable to the legal traditions of the post-socialist countries
became one of the most controversial issues in the constitutional debate
across East-Central Europe.
To the disappointment of many American constitutional experts, one may
observe that the American decentralized model did not significantly inspire
the constitutional drafters in the former socialist countries. Several factors
contributed to the general preference to adopt one of the well-tested
European models.
First, it must be emphasized again that the American decentralized model
is rooted in the concept of constitutional supremacy. The idea that the
constitution should be drafted not by regular legislative bodies but by special
conventions to whom the people delegated a constituent power is an idea that
originated in America. The American Constitution also introduced a
relatively rigid process of constitutional amendment. The rigid character of
the constitution combined with the principle of its supremacy implied the
right of the courts to disqualify any repugnant laws. The same conclusion
3176 JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 372, at 10.
'" See, Ret R. Ludwikowski, Judicial Review in the Socialist Legal System; Current
Developments, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 89-108 (1988) (analyzing the traditions of judicial
review in East Central Europe).
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cannot be drawn per se from the fundamentals of the systems which fail to
place the constitution above the parliament.
Second, the diffused system has grown out of the concept of constitutional
checks and balances. In this system it is natural that one power is balancing,
controlling, and supplementing the functions of the other, although none can
take over all of the powers of the other. The concept of a diffused system
of judicial review of the legislation corresponds well with this model. It
certainly does not fit the system which implies a strict separation of powers,
such as provided by the French model. Also, the countries which emphasize
the superiority of the legislative assemblies hardly can agree with the logic
of the system which provides for control of the "superior" power by the
"inferior" courts.
Third, the decentralized and concrete system vests in the regular courts
only the power to nullify the law "inter parties" and extends the validity of
the courts' decisions on other cases through the principle of "stare decisis."
As Mauro Cappelletti wrote,
Since the principle of stare decisis is foreign to civil law
judges, a system which allowed each judge to decide on the
constitutionality of statutes could result in a law being
disregarded as unconstitutional by some judges, while being
held constitutional and applied by others. Furthermore, the
same judicial organ, which had one day disregarded a given
law, might uphold it the next day, having changed its mind
about the law's constitutional legitimacy. Differences could
arise between judicial bodies of different type or degree, for
example between ordinary courts and administrative tribu-
nals, or between the younger, more radical judges of the
inferior courts and the older, more tradition conscious judges
of the higher courts. This is notoriously what happened in
Italy from 1948 to 1956 and what continues to happen on a
large scale in Japan. The extremely dangerous result could
be a serious conflict between the judicial organs and grave
uncertainty as to the law.3l
The American Supreme Court hears appeals from the most important
constitutional decisions and under the principle of stare decisis its rulings are
378 JUDIcIAL REvIEW, supra note 372, at 58.
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binding upon all other courts. To reach the same effect in the civil law
system, the Supreme Court or the highest court would have to be given the
right of ruling "erga onnes." The effect which is possible in the American
pyramidal structure of the court system might, however, be very difficult to
obtain in the system where the coexistence of several high courts for
different areas of law prevails.
Last, but not least, the diffused system requires judiciary qualifications
which most civil law judges usually lack. The system of legal education in
most of the civil law countries is offered at the undergraduate level and is
less oriented toward professional training than in the common law system.
Civil law "career judges" are well trained to follow the rules provided in the
codes and to analyze the logical consistence of the system. Prepared to
focus on the unchangeable core of the legal system rather than on its mutable
elements, the civil law lawyers are not prepared to offer the policy-minded
analysis required by a constitutional review process. Even if one were to
agree that the role of the common law judges as lawmakers has recently
been reduced, the degree of judicial activism, particularly in the United
States, nonetheless far exceeds the scope of the discretion traditionally
reserved for European judges.
One can observe, at this moment, that some countries which traditionally
fall within the sphere of the French legal influences, such as Romania or
Albania, might prefer a sort of political, rather than strictly judicial,-
review.' 79 The other East-Central European states and some of the former
Soviet republics seem to be attracted to the German model, which is viewed
as an example of a centralized "mixed" system, combining some elements,
of both concrete and abstract review.
The German Federal Constitutional Court has gained a reputation as one
of the most energetic constitutional courts in the world."s The scope of
the constitutional review of the German Court is impressive. The Court can
be reached through five major channels. First, it has the power of constitu-
tional review of the rights and duties of federal organs.38' Second, it has
a right of abstract review of the formal and material compatibility of federal
Both Albanian and Romanian constitutional acts follow several features of a French
constitutional model. See ROM. CONST. arts. 140-145; ALD. CONST. arts. 116-118 (1991
Draft).
30 WALTER F. MURPHY & JOSEPH TANNENHAUS, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
32 (1977).38
'GRUNDGESETZ [CoNSTmrUnoN][GG] art. 93 (F.R.G.).
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law or Land law (the law of the states which are federal components of
Germany) with the Basic Law and the compatibility of Land law with federal
law. The Court acts on the request of the federal government, a Land
government, or of one-third of the Bundestag members.3 2 Third, the
Court has right of concrete review. If any court considers unconstitutional
a law the validity of which is relevant to concrete adversary action, the
proceeding before that court should be stayed and a decision should be
obtained from the Federal Constitutional Court.383 Fourth, the Federal
Constitutional Court rules on the compatibility of political parties with
fundamental democratic principles recognized by the Basic Law. 3" Fifth,
the Court hears the constitutional complaints of individuals whose rights
have been violated by public authority.
3
It is widely believed that the "mixed" character of the German system and
relatively wide direct access to the Court granted to the individuals enhance
the democratic character of a traditional centralized model. While some
countries, Poland for example, still substantially curb the scope of judicial
review, other countries, such as Russia or Ukraine, extend the scope of
judicial review almost as willingly as the German Court.38
The major issues which still generate a lot of controversy are the right of
the constitutional courts to hear individual complaints and the right of the
parliament to overrule the constitutional courts' decisions. On the one hand,
easy access to the constitutional court is an important factor of public legal
and social education. On the other hand, vesting the right to petition the
392 id.
33 id. at art. 100 § 1.
34 Id. at arts. 21 and 18 (dealing with the Court's right to curb the rights of those
individuals whose behavior threatens the "free democratic basic order").
3" Id. at art. 93(4)(a).
I Poland adopted a centralized and a limited "mixed" system of judicial review. The
right to review the constitutionality of a law was vested in the Constitutional Tribunal only
and the right to file a petition was originally vested in the main organs and officials of the
state who could initiate review directly, submitting abstract questions without any pending
litigation. It resembled the classic Austrian abstract model. However, review by the Tribunal
could also be initiated by regular courts addressing inquiries in connection with judicial
proceedings. This resembled concrete review. Access to the court was still indirect because
the inquiry could be submitted by presidents of the supreme courts or central administrative
organs. The Tribunal could not invalidate sub-statutory acts, and its decisions concerning
statutory acts were subject to the Seym's (parliament) approval. The Seym could overrule
the Tribunal's decisions by a qualified two-thirds majority. For comments on the Russian and
Ukrainian models see chapters on the constitutional reform in those countries, supra.
260 [Vol. 23:155
CONSTITUTION MAKING
court in all individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated, would
either immensely increase the workload and burden the budget of the court
or force the court to be very selective.
In addition, the right of the court to invalidate the legal acts passed by the
legislative body is not compatible with the superior status of the legislature.
This status still is recognized by several East-Central European countries;
consequently, the right of the constitutional court to rule decisively on the
constitutionality of all the laws, including statutes, requires either the
elimination of the principle of legislative superiority or the elevation of the
court's status to a special constitutional organ. This status would elevate the
constitutional courts above all other judicial structures. At this moment one
may conclude only that the development of the East-Central European
system of the constitutional enforcement is in process and that the German
model of judicial review seems to attract a lot of attention. Still, the extent
to which the new democracies will duplicate this system is hardly predict-
able.
F. Flexibility of the New Constitutions
1. Rigid v. Flexible Constitutions
At the end of the nineteenth century the traditional distinction between
written and unwritten constitutions was subject to criticism. It has been
pointed out that both "written" and "unwritten" constitutions have their
written and unwritten parts. Single framework documents, called "written
constitutions," become operational through the body of implementing laws,
interpretations, decisions of courts, and constitutional practices. Countries
with "unwritten constitutions" also have some authoritative documents which
determine the form and functions of the government. In 1880, Thomas M.
Cooley wrote,
A constitution may be written or unwritten. If unwritten,
there may still be laws or authoritative documents which
declare some of its important principles; as we have seen
has been and is still the case in England. The weakness of
an unwritten constitution consists in this, that it is subject to
perpetual change at the will of the law-making power; and
there can be no security against such change except in the
conservatism of the law-making authority, and its political
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responsibility to the people, or, if no such responsibility
exists, then in the fear of resistance by force.387
In 1884 James Bryce proposed a new classification of constitutions as
"flexible" and "rigid." The former were to be "promulgated and repealed in
the same way as ordinary laws;" the latter were to "stand above the laws of
the country which they regulate."38 Constitutional writers quickly adopted
Bryce's classification of constitutions although his criteria for the distinction
between "flexible" and "rigid" constitutions have been widely challenged.
First of all, in Bryce's description both types of constitutions share some
common features, most notably the attribute of stability.3 9 Second, Bryce
had a distinctive tendency to mix up flexible and unwritten constitutions. He
admitted that almost all currently adopted constitutions are rigid. Kenneth
C. Wheare observed that "a system of classification which places almost all
the Constitutions of the world in one category of 'rigid' and leaves only one
or two in the other cannot take us very far. '3" Third, his observation that
a flexible type of the constitution was particularly appealing to an aristocracy
and was most suitable for a state interested in territorial expansion lacks
serious support.391
Several scholars proposed different criteria of distinction between flexible
and rigid constitutions. Kenneth Wheare, reinforcing some comments of
Bryce, suggested using the terms "rigid" and "flexible" "not according to
whether or not they require for their amendment a special procedure which
is not required for ordinary laws, but according to whether they are in
practice easily and often altered or not.' 3' Leslie Wolf-Phillips made
another attempt to refine the classification. 393 He claimed that "no consti-
tution will be completely 'written' or completely 'unwritten,' completely
'codified' or completely 'uncodified,' completely 'rigid' or completely
'flexible.' The aim will be to establish the degree of the classificatory
attribute." 394  This refinement seems to fit the purpose of this article.
Indeed, it makes it possible to distinguish the question asked by Wheare of
' COOLEY, supra note 354 at 21-22.
38 JAMES BRYCE, CoNsTTuTIoNs 8 (1884).
39 Id. at 21, 66.
m0 K.C. WHEARE, MODERN CoNsTnUoNS 16 (1966).
391 BRYCE, supra note 388, at 31-36, 43-46.
" WHEARE, supra note 390, at 17.
393 LEsLIE WOLF-PHnLIPS, CONSTTMONS OF MODERN STATES XII (1968).
3 id.
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whether it is actually hard to amend a constitution-a question of political
nature-from the question of whether the constitution, in the intention of the
drafters, was made easily amendable.395 At the recent stage of the consti-
tutional works in East-Central Europe, the question, whether the new
constitutions will be subject to frequent change, cannot be answered
satisfactorily. The special procedures or requirements for constitutional
amendment, however, lend themselves well to comparative analysis.
In fact, someone who would like to claim that the ease or frequency with
which a constitution is amended depends less on the legal provisions which
proscribe the method of change and more on a variety of actual political
circumstances which accompany the change, would find a perfect example
in socialist constitutions. These constitutions gained the reputation of
flexibility regardless of their relatively rigid provisions on constitutional
amendment and change. The Constitution of the Soviet Union and most of
the constitutions of the satellite people's republics required a two-thirds or
three-fifths majority of the parliament to amend.3 The fact is, however,
that they were amended at will, as the socialist representative bodies were
totally controlled by the national communist parties.
2. Amending the Post-Socialist Constitutions
The post-communist constitutional reform changed the situation radically.
The outside commentator could note that the political leadership of the new
republics experienced a sort of shock, in that the procedures for amending
the constitutions which had previously been without meaning suddenly began
to give the constitutional texts their intended rigidity. The requirements of
a qualified majority needed for constitutional revision brought the process of
constitutional reform in Hungary, Poland, and the Republic of Czechs and
Slovaks almost to a standstill. Given the fractionalization of the immature
electorate, unexperienced in coping with the mechanisms of political
pluralism, a similar result may occur in the other new democratic republics.
3 Greg Asciolla, Adopting and Amending Constitutions in Eastern Europe 12 (1992)
(unpublished paper prepared under the supervision of the author of this article). The author
would like to recognize the contribution of Mr. Asciolla to the research for this subchapter.
I Several countries' constitutions required a two-thirds. majority for constitutional
amendments. See ROM. CONST. art. 56, POL. CONST. art. 106, BULG. CONST. art. 143, HuNG.
CONST. art. 24, and U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 174. The Czechoslovakian Constitution required
a three-fifth majority. CzEcH. CONST. art. 41. The German Democratic Republic
Constitution required only a plurality vote. G.D.R. CONST. art. 106.
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So far, one may observe the general tendency to incorporate into the new
constitutions a solid portion of rigidity. Notwithstanding warnings that each
transitory period requires a certain degree of flexibility, the constitutional
drafters in virtually all new democracies seem to believe that their constitu-
tions will stand unchanged for relatively a long period of time. The
following examples of recently adopted constitutions clearly show that the
framers wanted the amending process to be difficult.
In Bulgaria, the right to initiate constitutional amendments may be asserted
by one-quarter of the national representatives and by the President. Any
motion to this effect must be considered by the National Assembly no earlier
than one month and no later than three months after it has been filed. The
National Assembly may pass a law on amending the Constitution by a
majority of three-quarters of the national representatives, after three rounds
of balloting on different days. 39 A new constitution may be adopted only
by a special constituent body, the Grand National Assembly, which consists
of two-thirds more representatives than the regular National Assembly.3"
In Romania, the revision of the Constitution can be initiated by the
President of Romania upon recommendation of the government, by at least
one-fourth of the deputies or senators, or by at least a half-million citizens.
Citizens who initiate the revision of the Constitution must come from at least
half the counties of the country and in each of these counties and in
Bucharest municipality, at least 20,000 signatures supporting this initiative
must be obtained. The draft of the revision must be approved by a two-
thirds majority of the members of each chamber. This revision is subject to
public approval by way of referendum. The provisions of the present
Constitution concerning the national, independent, unitary, and indivisible
character of the state, the republican form of government, territorial integrity,
the independence of the system of justice, political pluralism, and official
language cannot be the subject of revision.99
39' The following provision even further complicates the process. "If a motion is
approved by less than three-quarters but no less than two-thirds of the votes of the national
representatives, the motion is resubmitted for consideration after two months have elapsed,
but before the passage of five months. In any new debate, a motion may be approved if at
least two-thirds of the national representatives have voted for it." BULG. CoNST. art. 154, §2,
art. 155 §§1-2. One must observe that the process of amending is elaborate although the
difference between a two-thirds (or eight-twelfths) and a three-fourths (or nine-twelfths)
majority is not significant.
3" BuLG. CONST. art. 158.
"9 ROM. CONST. arts. 146-148.
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The Constitution of Estonia vests the right to initiate amendments in one-
fifth of the deputies of the parliament and in the President. The amendment
may be adopted by referendum called upon the decision of a three-fifths
majority of the parliament or by the vote of three-fifths of the parliament,
repeated in two successive sessions and after three readings whereby the
interval between the first and second reading is to be at least three months,
and the interval between the second and third readings is to be at least one
month.'
Without going into details of other constitutional drafts, the commentator
may observe that the wisdom of the amendment process requires that the
constitution should be amendable, otherwise a whole new document would
have to be adopted. The recent pluralization of the political spectrum in the
new East-Central European democracies, combined with the built-in rigidity
of the new constitutions, may freeze the natural process of constitutional
development and, despite the intentions of the drafters, may endanger rather
than strengthen the stability of the new constitutions.
CONCLUSION: ONE OR MANY MODELS?
For the constitutional lawyer the search for a constitutional model is,
perhaps, the most difficult element in a meaningful comparative analysis.
Modeling may mean searching for structural design which could serve as a
pattern for prospective constitution-making. The conviction that there are
some commonly recognized features of "a good constitution" may inspire the
task of projecting for a single constitutional paradigm, which could be
recommended to the drafters as a fashion archetype or prototype for all
constitutions.
Searching for a constitutional model may also mean something different,
namely a descriptive analysis of common characteristics which can actually
be found in several constitutions. It may mean the examination of the
common roots of some commonly used constitutional institutions and
rationales for their application. This task, although modest, was always more
appealing to this author. He was convinced that the drafters of the new
4 The Estonian Constitution also provides for an emergency proceeding for the amending
the Constitution. Specifically, "a proposal to consider a proposed amendment to the
Constitution as a matter of urgency shall be adopted by the Riigikogu (parliament) by a four-
fifths majority. In such a case the law to amend the Constitution shall be adopted by a two-
thirds majority of the complement of the Riigikogu." ESTONIA CONST. art. 166 (1992 Draft).
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constitutions need information about the progress of other constitutional
works more than they need lessons or examples for emulation and imitation.
Looking at the material collected in this study from this perspective, several
observations can be made.
With all similar circumstances in which the new constitutions are drafted,
one cannot expect the duplication of the Stalinist process of constitutional
"modeling." The prototype of a socialist constitution was framed in Moscow
and forced on the satellite Soviet countries. As far as the new, post-socialist
democracies are concerned, the drafters borrow one from another and
sometimes borrow more heavily than they ought to do, but they have the
freedom of choice limited only by the will of their people. Thus, one should
discuss the actual frequency with which several constitutional features are
repeatedly used rather than an actual common core of the new constitutions.
In order to describe a model or a special type of constitution, the
comparative expert has to find features which help to place several
constitutions into one category while leaving the others outside of this group.
The comparative analysis of the new constitutions hardly satisfies this
requirement. True, the new constitutions have similar structures and most
of them reveal some intention of the drafters to base the stability of the new
constitutional system on a significant degree of rigidity, but it was pointed
out that the new post-socialist constitutions share these features with other
recently adopted constitutions in other parts of the world.
The description of the state as "a democratic, law-based republic,
recognizing basic rules of the market" is typical for many Western constitu-
tions. The reference to the state as an instrument of "the social justice"
sounds like a relic of socialist philosophy. However, the special concern for
the principles of social justice is not unknown to Western constitutions. For
example, the Constitution of Ireland reflects traditional Catholic teaching
about property and social justice. Specifically, it states that the exercise of
the property rights "ought, in civil society, to be regulated by the principles
of social justice."' The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany
describes the state as "a democratic and social state" and recognizes the right
"to own and inherit property," provided that use of property "shall serve the
public wealth." The Constitution of Japan declares that "all people shall
have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultural
401 IR. CONST. art. 43, §2; see also MURPHY & TANNENHAUS, supra note 380.
4w F.R.G. CoNsT. arts. 14, 20.
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living."
The analysis of the new constitutions in the context of the political system
shows as many similarities as differences. On the one hand, the new
democracies share with Western countries a general tendency to limit the
power of the government and to distribute its prerogatives among several
governmental branches. On the other hand, some countries still prefer a
parliamentary system while the others experiment with one of the forms of
presidential or parliamentary-presidential systems. At this moment, there are
no clear indications that any one of these systems will prevail in the
countries of former Soviet dominance.
As far as a system of constitutional enforcement is concerned, one may
note a general tendency to absorb some mechanisms of judicial review, the
greatest novelty in this region. Still, with some preferences worthy of note,
there is no one single model which would attract the attention of the drafters
of the new constitutions.
To sum up, there is no single constitutional model which would be
surfacing in East-Central Europe. There are, however, similar problems
faced by the countries of this region and similar constitutional remedies
which might be tested for their solution. The similarities should be
identified by the constitutional commentators and brought to the attention of
the drafters. It seems, however, to be worthy of some emphasis that two
basically different skills are necessary to advance the process of constitution-
al drafting. Looking for advice and assistance, the East must distinguish
between two kinds of constitutional experts: horizontal and vertical
comparativists. The first specialize in comparisons of recently drafted
constitutional models and in the process of constitutional drafting, whereas
the second focus on historical studies of constitutional traditions and legacies.
Western constitutional experts may successfully fulfill the first role and
highlight the horizontal comparative dimension of the constitution-drafting
process. If, however, the West does not want to duplicate the dissatisfying
constitutional experiments of the third world countries, it should leave the
assessment of the adaptability of the analyzed models to the constitutional
experts from the new European democracies.
JAPAN CONST. ch. lI, art. 25.
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